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2 Pillar One: Improving Surveillance and Response
Pages 27-35

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From page 27...
... To heighten the likelihood of containing infectious diseases through effective surveillance and response, whether the diseases are common infections or newly emerging threats, a nation needs support from all levels of government and cooperation among health care and veterinary networks throughout the country (CDC, 1998a, 1998b)
From page 28...
... . These realities force health authorities to improve preventive measures to combat common infectious diseases, generally within the framework of national immunization strategies and policies (see Appendix I)
From page 29...
... Another area of concern to public health and agricultural officials is the integration of the systems for detecting food-borne diseases with food monitoring systems. A useful step suggested by a Western expert would be to use Salmonella 1See for example, Interactions Among Government Agencies, Institutions, and Specialized Bodies for Liquidation of the Consequences of Terrorist Acts Involving Pathogenic Biological Agents and Dangerous Chemical Substances, Methodological Recommendations, MP0100/3556-04-34, State Sanitary Epidemiological Standards of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 2005.
From page 30...
... SURVEILLANCE AND MONITORING SYSTEMS System of State Sanitary Epidemiological Surveillance Centers (SSESCs) A system for combating and controlling infectious human diseases, unique in both size and standardization of approach, has been functioning in Russia for many years.
From page 31...
... However, many SSESCs in the outlying areas of the country have had difficulty paying employees, let alone replacing outmoded analytical equipment and installing modern communications equipment. Although the health sector receives generally favorable consideration in the federal budget process in Russia, the competing internal demands for increased government resources are severe.
From page 32...
... A realistic approach to strengthening Russian capabilities for disease surveillance and response over the next ten years is to make incremental improvements throughout the SSESC system. To guide this effort, the committee recommends prompt establishment of two model SSESCs for surveillance, diagnosis, analysis, and communication of information concerning infectious disease episodes.
From page 33...
... However, this level of funding is very small in comparison with the funds required to upgrade the entire SSESC system of 2,300 facilities. As the Russian economy continues to improve, new funds for much wider improvements throughout the system will likely become available from the government budget.
From page 34...
... Even though the Russian anti-plague monitoring facilities have remained largely isolated from the international community, perhaps due to security sensitivities dating from the Soviet era, they continue to be an essential component of Russian efforts to prevent and control infectious diseases of local, national, and global interest. Their data banks and their strain collections are valuable resources and should be fully utilized in
From page 35...
... The next chapter addresses the role of research organizations which support surveillance and control activities described in this chapter. Together, these two chapters should provide useful guidance for further Russian efforts to improve the scientific base for combating infectious diseases.


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