FORCEnet Implementation Strategy (2005) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
6 Science and Technology to Support the FORCEnet Information Infrastructure
6 Science and Technology to Support the FORCEnet Information Infrastructure
Pages 142-185
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 142... ...
The chart closes a loop to account for the NetworkCentric Operations Capability Vision, including evolving threats and new warfare challenges being affected by capability gaps and indicates that technology gap analysis can motivate science and technology programs that will lead to technology that can help close the gaps in operational capabilities. A path for spiral experimentation has also been added.
|
From page 143... ...
2003. FORCEnet Government Reference Architecture, Version 1.0, April.
|
From page 144... ...
; · Situational awareness and understanding; · Information assurance; · Modeling and simulation; · Dynamic composability and collaboration; · Support of disadvantaged user-personnel, platform, or sensor; and · Persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. 6.2 ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES AND FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES 6.2.1 Reliable Wideband Mobile Communications 6.2.1.1 Communications Overview In today's naval forces, communications with moving platforms and personnel are characterized by intermittent connectivity and low data rates.
|
From page 145... ...
network while nodes and users are moving is a significant technological challenge. 6.2.1.2 Communications Technology Challenges The following subsections discuss key communications technology challenges that must be addressed if FORCEnet is to achieve the vision of full network-centric operations.
|
From page 146... ...
146 of 4 6 HF list SPS -1B A TCOM EHF TCOM SA SPY SA UHF NOTE: Communications -9 SSR-1 1996. SPQ CCSS circa SESS cruiser, "Transformational Navy (N611)
|
From page 147... ...
The need for multiple agile beams indicates a phased array FIGURE 6.4 Concepts of operations overview for the Littoral Combat Ship and its distributed off-board systems. SOURCE: Navy Warfare Development Command.
|
From page 148... ...
The ability of moving personnel and platforms to continuously maintain the data rate and connectivity necessary for the achievement of their assigned missions is a significant technological challenge. The standard protocols used in the commercial Internet work well in the fixed infrastructure, but when the users and, in particular, the nodes and hosts are moving, special protocols are required.
|
From page 149... ...
has initiated a new program, Disruption-Tolerant Networking, to address this area. Overlaying the issues of routing protocols for mobile and disruptive networks is the issue of resistance to adversarial attack -- that is, information assurance specific to the network.
|
From page 150... ...
In particular, the current technology gaps include the following: · The capability in link and antenna technologies to provide increased data rates and beam agility; · Insufficient quality of service and network monitoring, control, and reconfiguration to provide the necessary availability and latency for priority traffic; · Necessary protocols in standard use to support the mobility, ability to overcome disruption, and information assurance robustness that will be needed in the future FORCEnet; · Reliable communications technologies to reach underwater vehicles at speed and depth; · Shared, robust, reliable, multibeam apertures, satellite relay alternatives to support communications on the move, and adaptive networks; · Reliable high-speed communications, including optical, in the marine layer; and · Improved antenna aperture technology for use by disadvantaged users: personnel, platforms, and sensors. Recommendation.
|
From page 151... ...
As implied, information management processes must be adjusted to satisfy specific mission drivers. A high-level summary of the contributing technologies follows: · Sensor management -- enterprise-mediated collection planning to maximize information value from observations of multiple areas and locations of interest by sensors most likely to satisfy mission needs, with appropriate mode, geometry, and timing; adjudication of competing demands for sensing coverage in support of all users in accord with command priorities.
|
From page 152... ...
6.2.2.2 Information Management Technology Challenges In network-centric operations, the information management process must work across all node components of the network in a fashion that is seamless and adaptive to command direction. This suggests that all nodes must make all their contributing elements of the information management process transparent to network command and control.
|
From page 153... ...
The contributing information management technologies identified above are available in varying degrees of maturity, but development is required to make those technologies suitable for network-centric purposes. Similarly, issues associated with defining and implementing information services are receiving scant attention.
|
From page 154... ...
Based upon the findings presented above and on the issues described in this section, the committee recommends the following: · Recommendation for ONR: Monitor technology availability and, as appropriate, invest to sustain investigations that: -- Develop technology for distributed real-time processing at heterogeneous fusion; -- Develop resource allocation driven by current operational situation understanding; and -- Identify and supplement information services that assure consistent information management processes across the network enterprise. 6.2.3 Situational Awareness and Understanding 6.2.3.1 Situational Awareness Overview Automated techniques for achieving situational and threat awareness (often referred to as Level 2 and Level 3 fusion, respectively)
|
From page 155... ...
6.2.3.3 Situational Awareness Science and Technology Perspectives Significant advances in S&T will be required to achieve aided, or automated, situational and threat awareness. The technologies deemed relevant are technologically immature, and the commercial resources that might be leveraged have embedded context that is inconsistent with military operations.
|
From page 156... ...
Based upon the findings presented above and on the issues described in this section, the committee recommends the following: · Recommendation for ONR: Monitor technology availability and, as appropriate, invest to sustain investigations that: -- Advance inferencing techniques necessary to relate objects and events to their environment and to units, activities, and behaviors, -- Develop a relational and control framework for managing a broad range of knowledge representations, hypotheses, assertions, and so on, -- Develop automated techniques for information capture, representation, authoring, and validation, and -- Integrate human and machine capabilities for hypothesis management -- balancing machine capability for handling numerical-scale problems with human ability for intuition. 6.2.4 Information Assurance 6.2.4.1 Information Assurance Overview Information is derived from integrating and interpreting data from multiple sources including sensors as well as software and human agents.
|
From page 157... ...
6.2.4.2 Information Assurance Challenges Communications/Network Core. While there are mathematical definitions for the long-term availability (i.e., the probability at any instant in time that the resource is usable)
|
From page 158... ...
Benchmarks should be developed to evaluate the security and trustworthiness of components and end-to-end systems composed from components. Monitoring techniques need to be developed to automatically detect intrusions and insider threats.
|
From page 159... ...
In particular, the current technology gaps include these: · Metrics, automated network analysis, and monitoring of network reliability and security that are capable of scaling to network-centric needs and to the demands of multilevel security and failure prediction; · Dynamic balancing of protection levels, including policy adaptation, with sharing needed to maintain mission effectiveness; · Trustworthiness of software systems and associated information in network-centric operations; and · The ability to conduct intrusion detection and identify insider threats. 7Current statistics are available at http://www.cert.org.
|
From page 160... ...
The subsections below discuss both, so as to not lose the flavor of the requests for help. With respect to network-centric warfare itself and, in particular, with reference to lessons learned from OIF, it was often mentioned to the committee that at times the Navy had no analysis capability for checking out networks and network-dependent systems before they became operational or for really checking out whether or not network-centric warfare was a real possibility with the available or future network communications infrastructure.
|
From page 161... ...
In particular, the current technology gaps include these: · Scaling of models and simulations to large numbers of sensors, platforms, and users; · Systems engineering, including means to check out large-scale networkcentric systems prior to deployment (i.e., the ability to model systems life-cycle design and testing and model validation) ; and · Robust "what if?
|
From page 162... ...
6.2.6 Dynamic Composability and Collaboration 6.2.6.1 Composability Overview Central to the vision of FORCEnet is the ability to "compose" system-like capabilities from components of the enterprise in order to achieve effective warfighting readiness in response to dynamically changing operational situations. The concept of FORCEnet composability is discussed at some length in the FORCEnet Government Reference Architecture (GRA)
|
From page 163... ...
For mission composability, it is assumed that the architectural framework, open standards, and protocols that accompany enterprise services (and potentially information services) will provide the characterization needed to enable composability.
|
From page 164... ...
6.2.6.3 Composability Science and Technology Perspectives Incorporating the notion expressed above, of campaign-level control, into these notions of mission composability will be a difficult challenge. Very little work has been done to address the complexity of managing mission composability in a way which assures that integrated, dynamic mission goals will achieve desired campaign outcomes.
|
From page 165... ...
. 6.2.7 Support of Disadvantaged User-Personnel, Platforms, and Sensors 6.2.7.1 Disadvantaged User Overview Dismounted troops or those in small vehicles must be provided network connectivity and situational awareness.
|
From page 166... ...
Based upon the findings presented above and on the issues described in this section, the committee recommends the following: · Recommendation for ONR, in coordination with DARPA and the Army: Sustain investigations that seek to provide: -- Minimum essential situational awareness for dismounted troops by means of technology that is least distracting for the users, and -- Lightweight, high-density power sources and improvements in power consumption in coordination with DARPA and the Army. 6.2.8 Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 6.2.8.1 Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Overview The concept of network-centric operations and its implications for composability require not just access to data from a range of national, theater, and tactical sensors but more complete integration of sensing components into the network framework.
|
From page 167... ...
This need to maximize and adjust the value of collected information to the enterprise carries the strong implication that for network-centric operations, the burden of assured sensor coverage -- for both offensive and defensive purposes-must shift from a narrowly focused, personnel-intensive, platform-centric perspective to a multimission, multifunction, automated network of sensors capable of providing adaptive coverage for all enterprise users. Whatever the combination of deployed sensors, the notion of pervasive and persistent ISR implies a network ability to monitor the state of sensing at any given time and to respond dynamically to changing needs in any region of the battlespace volume.
|
From page 168... ...
Automation will be essential in order to maintain efficient utilization of sensor assets by the enterprise and to enable coordinated (and often synchronized) use of sensors across the network to achieve desired operational effects.
|
From page 169... ...
Based upon the findings presented above and on the issues described in this section, the committee recommends the following: · Recommendation for ONR: Monitor technology availability and, as appropriate, invest to sustain investigations in: -- Networked sensor technology for wide-area alerting of asymmetric targets or activity, -- Automated sensor management for adjudicating sensing needs across mission goals and for sensing responsiveness to dynamic battlespace needs, and
|
From page 170... ...
Achieving the vision of networkcentricity will not be easy. 6.3 ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES RESULTING FROM THE GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID 6.3.1 FORCEnet Implications of the Global Information Grid The GIG initiative is addressing some major S&T issues that must be overcome to ensure its success.
|
From page 171... ...
modeling and experiments. Information Information services to Technically feasible -- requires Y management maintain information focus on information-centric content and quality.
|
From page 172... ...
Disadvantaged Automated situational Deployed situational awareness P user awareness and human with easy humanmachine machine interface are interface needs improvement. inadequate.
|
From page 173... ...
There are issues with low overhead information assurance for the disadvantaged user. Automated collaborative technologies and automated composability do not work well in an unreliable communications environment.
|
From page 174... ...
Specific plans include research to explore naval-unique concerns in communications, apertures, information management, and decision support (community-of-interest technologies) , and information assurance.
|
From page 175... ...
For FORCEnet, the organization of the program is expected to be consistent with the MCPs defined by the Naval Transformation Roadmap:9 Networks, ISR, and Common Operational and Tactical Picture (COTP) , plus essential supporting technology primarily in information assurance.
|
From page 176... ...
; -- Intelligent and adaptive sensor management; -- Automated situational and threat awareness; and -- User-tailorable information feeds and displays. · Crosscutting/Leveraging; -- Information assurance; -- Real-time, multicombatant command, engagement planning and con trol; and -- Real-time deconfliction of targeting information.
|
From page 177... ...
Mobile Dynamic Quality-of- End-to-end mobility using all network links for maximum Service Enabled Networks bandwidth efficiency, with expedited service for high priority traffic flows. Integrated and Autonomous Automated monitoring, configuring, and troubleshooting of Network Management networks without human action, and design and implementation of networks using models and simulations to predict performance prior to operations.
|
From page 178... ...
Information Assurance Secure Distributed Secure dissemination of information across multiple joint/ Collaboration coalition boundaries. Network Assessment, Protects naval IP networks from network attacks and Monitoring, and Protection provides for remote administration of networks in response to attacks.
|
From page 179... ...
The committee suggests that the Navy investigate relevant programs discussed by DARPA at the March 2004 DARPAtech Annual Meeting to determine their applicability to solving Navy FORCEnet capability gaps. Also, it is suggested that the Navy should coordinate with the National Coordination Office for Information Technology Research and Development and its recent publication, Grand Challenges: Science, Engineering, and Societal Advances Requiring Networking and Information Technology Research and Development.11 6.5 SUMMARY TECHNOLOGY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FORCENET INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE Section 6.2 in this chapter describes science and technology issues associated with achieving FORCEnet.
|
From page 180... ...
· There is a need to conduct all naval technology developments with consideration for the variable reliability of the naval communications environment in which those technologies will eventually have to perform. 6.5.1.2 Process Recommendations Based upon the findings presented above and on the issues described in this chapter, the committee recommends the following: · Recommendation for ONR: Develop a consistent FORCEnet technology roadmap and list of S&T shortfall assessments for guiding naval S&T investment strategy on the basis of a consistent set of FORCEnet capabilities that is recognized across the Navy.
|
From page 181... ...
However, the committee finds not only that current technology is inadequate to provide the needed robustness, but also that execution with existing technology may prevent the full realization of FORCEnet's potential. Network-centric warfare is appealing if the Navy can build and deploy a robust communications fabric and use it to link sensors, weapons, and decision making over great distances.
|
From page 182... ...
In addition to the critical needs for technology to assure robustness, there are needs for technologies that will permit the full benefits of FORCEnet to be realized. Many of them lie in the area of information management, described in detail in Section 6.2.
|
From page 183... ...
Working Working Not Required Efforts Comments Communications Technology Challenges (see Section 6.2.1.2) Links/antenna Partial Issue for ships and submarines QoS/monitor Partial Protocols/STD Partial Underwater Partial Speed and depth communications issues, optical communications Satellite relay alternative Optical communications, marine layer Apertures -- Partial disadvantaged users Information Management Technology Challenges (see Section 6.2.2.2)
|
From page 184... ...
Mission management Readiness monitor Manpower and training Collaboration Partial Automation in unreliable communications Disadvantaged-User Science and Technology Challenges (see Section 6.2.7.2) Humanmachine Partial interface Customized Partial information Aperture size/ Partial Small ships, weight underwater platforms Power sources Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Challenges (see Section 6.2.8.2)
|
From page 185... ...
· Recommendation for ONR: Invest, as resources permit, in technologies that would further enhance FORCEnet capabilities after due consideration of alternative sources of technology.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.