Critical Technology Accessibility (2006) / Chapter Skim
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Critical Technology Accessibility
Critical Technology Accessibility
Pages 11-46
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establish the Committee on Defense Intelligence Agency Technology Forecasts and Reviews (the DIA Committee) to conduct meetings with the intelligence community in order to develop study topics relating to technology warning.
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proposed five study topics to the TWD, which chose one of them. The Committee for Critical Technology Accessibility was then organized to respond to the two questions posed in the statement of task (Box 1-1)
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. Box 1-2 Excerpt from Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress Examples include global commercial markets like information technology and integrated circuits where U.S.
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These global market changes impact decision making on the acquisition of technology. The rapid evolution of products such as cell phones, which have an expected life of 2 years, drives technology cycles with much shorter time frames than military products, which typically operate for a decade or more.
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Further, the use of products from the global marketplace, coupled with continuous technology refreshment to keep up with the state of the practice, will continuously reduce ownership cost while increasing reliability and mission performance, making them appealing to defense engineers. This situation prompted TWD to raise two sets of questions.
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· How could these risks be mitigated? The risks and impacts of foreign source denial3 are embedded in a larger supply management4 issue and are similar to the risks and impacts of other potential sources of supply disruption -- for example, plant destruction by fire or explosion, floods, strikes, or transportation failure.
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QUESTION A: WHAT IS THE RISK OF DENIAL OF CRITICAL PRODUCTS FROM FOREIGN SOURCES? Based on the information received and its own members' knowledge, the committee was unable to identify any product or technology currently being solely procured from a foreign supplier that could significantly disrupt U.S.
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While the committee does believe that a more detailed and structured approach to evaluating supply chain risk versus reward for all defense procurements is essential for assuring the nation's defense capabilities, it does not believe that detailed information about foreign-sourced components will, by itself, lead to better judgments. That is not to say that DoD's systems do not have foreign content.
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Over the last 60 years, the United States has created an industrial base for the domestic supply of every major strategic and critical military capability that requires specialized and expensive facilities. In particular, it has retained the industrial capabilities to produce nuclear weapons; missile defense systems; space systems and space control capabilities; armored vehicles; submarines and ships; air craft; aircraft stealth and counterstealth; and underwater detection, classification, and targeting as well as underwater stealth and counterstealth.
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Denial action by a foreign source may be a warning of further strategic intent and will stimulate action in the supply management domain. Further, commonality of systems with coalition partners provides worldwide depots for certain parts and components.
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INDUSTRIAL BASE BE MANAGED TO ASSURE ACCESS TO CRITICAL PRODUCTS AND TECHNOLOGIES? What about more strategic, long-term denial?
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. weapons; missile de fense systems; space sys tems and space control capabilities; armored vehicles; submarines and ships; aircraft; aircraft stealth and counterstealth; and underwater detection, classification, and targeting as well as underwater stealth and counterstealth.
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The committee notes that it is not just the components or functional products in these sectors that count. The United States is currently dependent on foreign sources for much of its machine tool needs, and semiconductor component manufacturers in this country are substantially dependent on some critical foreign-sourced tools for their domestic production.
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If necessary, DoD can, as it has in the past, invest in specialized capabilities that will assure its own missions and contribute to the nation's participation in the global commercial marketplace. DoD can also, as it has done before, take advantage of products of the commercial marketplace either as is or with modifications.
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While the committee believes that success will require the umbrella of an effective national security capability, it does not believe that the placement of defense expenditures will be a dominant economic factor. Instead, as in the past, we will be forced to deal with the trade-offs between performance, risk, cost, and schedule that accompany sourcing the materials for our security from a mix of global and captive domestic sources.
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Today we rely on systems integration as a mitigating factor in enabling the infusion of foreign technology. In the early days of the cold war our nation had a self-contained force and program management structure for major strategic and critical capabilities.The management construct for these systems provided for a very controlled process with adequate resources and authority to produce effective military systems.
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The rigid enforcement of military-specific instructional set architecture that demanded programming in noncommercial languages has migrated to the use of standard commercial languages, applications, and tools. The result has been an extraordinary reduction in time to design and cost, with attendant increases in availability as well as continuous technology refreshment by leveraging the commercial industrial base.
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. The Heritage Foundation report The Military Industrial Base in an Age of Globalization makes the point that "not participating in the global defense marketplace will increase, not decrease, risk to the U.S." (Spencer, 2005, p.
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soil, but whether these products are competitively available through the global marketplace. Systems integration, as performed by major defense industry prime contractors and by those responsible for integrating disparate systems into coherent forces in the field, is an essential national capability that must be sustained and enhanced through the global trade space (DSB, 1999)
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It was evident that the flat panel industry was leaving the United States and that DoD would be left with no alternative but to procure these items from foreign sources (NRC, 1995)
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In the committee's judgment, this is a useful example to consider as decision makers address their foreign content issues. Currently, DoD has an arrangement with IBM to provide applicationspecific integrated circuits from a trusted foundry (Carlson, 2005; DSB, 2005)
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Placing Trust in Foreign-Supplied Components, Software, and Services One of the underlying premises of the argument for having domestic suppliers for military systems is that domestic suppliers can be trusted more than foreign suppliers to supply reliable products. The committee does not believe that is a sound basis for assessing the trustworthiness of suppliers and their components.
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The committee also notes that software and service products are often plagued by flaws or poor performance, so design choices for critical functions must use redundancy or other techniques for protecting against flaws of either variety -- unintentional or intentional. These judgments are not peculiar to foreign sources.
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A decision maker must assess the likelihood of each type of supply disruption and the context of his whole management responsibility. The risks of foreign source denial are embedded in a larger supply management issue.
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Addressing Strategic and Critical Capabilities Strategic and Critical System Capabilities Requiring Specialized and Expensive Industrial Facilities Consistent with current policies and practices, the nation should retain the domestic industrial capacity to provide selected strategic and critical capabilities. Several industrial capabilities in the United States have been chosen for retention to assure access to their products.
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Many of the components are an integral part of the massive, globalized commercial marketplace in this area. Because the technology advances in this domain are driven predominantly by the commercial sector, the committee cannot envision achieving superior capabilities here without some use of commercial products from a globalized industrial sector.
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This industrial sector is overwhelmingly dominated by commercial markets, and defense purchases are so small as to be strategically insignificant in financial terms. The committee does not believe the commercial marketplace will permit China to gain a monopoly position in this sector, so the risk of component denial is not large.
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The President can decide to reduce dependence on oil from the Middle East, DoD can decide that the risk of depending on foreign sources for flat-panel displays is worth the price and performance, and the Air Force might determine that the risk of foreign dependence in the Joint Strike Fighter Program is worth the advantage of foreign participation, to list a few examples. The committee recognizes that there are risks at many levels of consequence in depending on foreign sources for components, supplies, and services.
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· The most authoritative judgments about the operational impact of vulnerabilities would come from the operational elements of the services, the defense agencies, and the combatant commands. The committee concludes that the right management approach is to depend on the data and judgment of DoD acquisition and logistics officials as the first point of assessment of risk versus reward.
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Foreign com management approach ponents are but one of is to depend on the the sources of assurance concern. It is the data and judgment of committee's judgment DoD acquisition and that obliging them to logistics officials as the provide a regular prod uct and supply chain as first point of assessment surance report that cov of risk versus reward.
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For this purpose, the committee believes the data and judgments developed by the process should be provided to a staff element at DoD for the analysis of aggregated trends and national-level implications. DIA TWD should be an integral part of this analytic process to enable the integration of information about supply chain vulnerabilities with intelligence about foreign sources or foreign intrusion into U.S.
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industrial base in these sectors. The committee believes that any systemic approach to determining the vulnerabilities and risks of foreign supply for DoD must involve the DoD organizations responsible for acquisition and logistics as well as DIA's responsibility for estimating the capabilities and intentions of foreign countries.
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A small staff element at the OSD level would be adequate and appropriate. DIA TWD should be an integral part of this analytic process to enable the integration of information about supply chain vulnerabilities with intelligence relating to foreign sources and foreign intrusion into U.S.
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industrial capabilities identified earlier justify the investment of large DIA TWD resources to monitor for and analyze major changes in global capabilities. These capabilities include network creation and management and information management; the integration of IT components; and systems integration.
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Finally, the DIA TWD should focus its management resources on tracking global capabilities in nuclear weapons; missile defense systems; space systems and space control; submarine construction; aircraft stealth and counterstealth; underwater detection/classification/targeting and underwater stealth and counterstealth; and electronic intelligence acquisition and analysis. Recommendation 3.
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Unpublished Jacques S Gansler, "Critical Technology Accessibility," Presentation to the committee on January 10, 2006.
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