Maritime Security Partnerships (2008) / Chapter Skim
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3 Information Sharing, a Key Enabler
3 Information Sharing, a Key Enabler
Pages 52-122
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From page 52... ...
Also of interest is information on various cargoes, crew, the supply chain, and even ownership and management affiliations, which helps to identify illegal, suspicious, or threatening activities. The Maritime Security Partnership Initiative The committee believes that the formation of partnerships to improve maritime security is characterized by a number of fundamental principles: • Maritime security around the globe will be advanced by strengthening existing partnerships and building new ones, with shared information the key enabler.
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From page 53... ...
Navy has coined the term "not classified," apparently to convey the notion of useful information sharing without the potential complexities of codified protection requirements. The term "unclassified," as used in this report, is viewed as encompassing "not classified" information.
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From page 54... ...
On May 29, 2007, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) issued the document Navy Maritime Domain Awareness Concept to guide Navy efforts to improve MDA-related capabilities and develop related Fleet Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
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From page 55... ...
commitment to implementing the maritime component of the global war on terror and addressing the associated homeland security and defense concerns. This focus notwithstanding, it is clear that the issues being addressed (e.g., barriers to information sharing)
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Operational Models As elaborated in the Chapter 2 review of existing and emerging international partnerships, "one size does not fit all" when it comes to information-sharing arrangements and the enabling technical mechanisms. Differences are traceable to a number of factors: • Different levels of trust, • The distinction between bilateral and multilateral arrangements, • A focus on coordinated action at the tactical level rather than on information sharing, and • Uneven levels of technological maturity and sophistication.
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From page 57... ...
as a foundation for effective partnerships. These enablers would support both information sharing to gain situation awareness and subsequent coordinated action.
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From page 58... ...
58 FIGURE 3.2 Singapore area maritime "picture." SOURCE: COL James Soon, Republic of Singapore Navy, Head, Defence Technology Office, Embassy of Singapore, "The 1,000 Ship Navy: A Perspective from Singapore," presentation to the committee, Washington, D.C., March 14, 2007. Figure 3-2, bitmapped, color, broadside R01141
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From page 59... ...
At the same time, this process would build trust and transparency with other nations, contributing substantially to global cooperation. The unifying concept behind maritime security partnerships is information sharing.
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NAIS U.S. Coast Guard Increment 1 (IOC)
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Coast Guard LRIT International IOC December 2008 Flag states, port Ship identification, Commercial COMSAT, Maritime states, coastal states position, date/time Internet Organization NOTE: CENTRIXS, Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System; CNIES, Cooperating Nations Information Exchange System; MSSIS, Maritime Safety and Security Information System; NAIS, Nationwide Automatic Identification System; RMAC JCTD, Regional Maritime Awareness Capability Joint Concept Technology Demonstration; CMA JCTD, Comprehensive Maritime Awareness Joint Concept Technology Demonstration; LRIT, Long-Range Identification and Tracking; DISA MNIS JPO, Defense Information Systems Agency Multinational Information Sharing Joint Program Office; COMPAC, Commander, Pacific; PACFLT, U.S. Pacific Fleet; USNORTHCOM, U.S.
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Although there are many individual CENTRIXS networks, they are now centrally supported and managed by the Joint Program Office's (JPO's) Multinational Information Sharing (MNIS)
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Cooperating Nations Information Exchange System The Cooperating Nations Information Exchange System (CNIES) is used by JIATF-S and 11 cooperating nations in South and Central America to suppress illicit maritime drug traffic.
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One problem is that many coastal state government facilities have little or no Internet connectivity. Further, only limited attention has been paid to date to the need to overlay AIS data with radar surveillance data, where available.
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From page 65... ...
is being developed by the USCG to enhance maritime safety, security, and mobility. NAIS will augment current capabilties to receive, distribute, and utilize AIS data.
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AIS coverage well beyond the available radar coverage is to be operationally useful, it will require the development and employment of sophisticated anomaly detection techniques, as described in a later section of this chapter. Regional Maritime Awareness Capability Joint Capability Technology Demonstration The Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC)
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From page 67... ...
. In addition, to cope with the large volume of maritime information to be made available under MDA intitiatives, the CMA JCTD is developing and integrating automatic tools to provide timely and accurate maritime situational awareness, to identify and prioritize relevant and actionable information, and to acquire, fuse, and manage disparate information. The CMA JCTD emphasizes the exchange of classified information, offering the requisite operational benefits but also introducing information protection requirements that are not fully compatible with a keep-it-simple, low-cost-of-entry approach to information sharing with nontraditional partners.
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From page 68... ...
Service COCOM Service COCOM Operational Decision Support Operational Decision Support HLS Commanders HLS Commanders MDA Tactical Data Tactical Data Policy MDA Policy Barriers MDA Tools •Collaborative Networks •Security •Multiple Levels of Security •Interoperability •Tailored Functions •Culture Coast Intelligence Coast Intelligence Agency Agency Guard Coalition Guard Coalition Analytic Data Partners Littoral Data Littoral Data Analytic Data Partners Local Data Local Data FIGURE 3.3 The CMA JCTD: Demonstrating improved information sharing and management. NOTE: HLS, homeland security.
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From page 69... ...
This information can readily be transmitted using current shipboard Global Maritime Distress and Safety System equipment at a cost of about 50 cents per transmission. Each ship will transmit its information to a data center specified by its flag state using services provided by communications service providers -- for example, the International Maritime Satellite and Applications Service Providers.
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International Routing Rules International LRIT Data Journal Exchange FIGURE 3.4 LRIT system. SOURCE: Chris Trelawny, Head, Maritime Security Section, International Maritime Organization, "IMO Perspective," presentation to the committee, Washington, D.C., February 7, 2007.
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From page 71... ...
Other Related Navy Maritime Domain Awareness Initiatives The systems described in Table 3.1 are good examples of existing technology and systems that are being leveraged to enable maritime information sharing. Beyond these systems and demonstration initiatives, the Navy -- specifically, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communication Networks (N6)
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From page 72... ...
• JWICS • Data not fully shared • AIS information • SIPR • IMO participation • Meteorological/ ROCs • CENTRIXS • AIS information hydrographic data Navy 1 • Collaborative tools • LRIT system • Non-DOD-led HQs • AIS information • Supply chain security • Stand-alone 3 • MOC/MHQ involvement • Law enforcement data • Low barriers to entry • Governance • Commercial proprietary • Open to all Navy 1 Navy 2 • Requires technical data • Market/commercial HQ relevance 2 standards/protocols • Governance • Investment strategy • Collaborative tools • No barriers to growth • Requires technological 1 standards/protocols Navy 2 • Investment strategy Some information NGO NGO exchange between NGO NGO MDA both COPs Free Market Security Trust FIGURE 3.5 MDA bins for data sharing. NOTE: JWICS, Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System; SIPR, Secure Internet Protocol Router; MOC/MHQ, Maritime Operations Center/Maritime Headquarters; ROC, Regional Operations Center.
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From page 73... ...
However, these architectures have features that violate the low-cost-of-entry and keep-itsimple principles when starting from scratch to build trust with nontraditional partners: • Risk and complexity associated with the sharing of classified information; • Reliance on government-developed software (versus COTS) , which may also add technology-sharing issues and demand more operator training for the partner's personnel; and • Reliance on U.S.-provided networking infrastructure, which may itself engender distrust.
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From page 74... ...
Figure 3.8 reflects the fact, noted by a Chilean Navy officer during discussions with the committee, that all nations have sensitive information content and sources and attendant information sensitivities that must be protected. Accordingly, the reality of information sharing involves some combination of human judgment and prearranged safeguarding technology to filter information in accordance with the range of potentially complex criteria indicated in the figure, including operational sensitivities, capability sensitivities, legal/statutory constraints, and policy/diplomatic constraints.
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• Small Portable Operations Kit – Iridium SATCOM radio – Sectera cryptographic device – Laptop computer – Designed for remote site or small ship FIGURE 3.6 Enabling hardware for the user terminal. SOURCE: Paul Dickson, CENTRIXS Operations/Plans, Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM)
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From page 76... ...
The last option, however, could insert commercial players too deeply into the maritime security operations of partner nations. IT Architectures for Information Sharing Based on the foregoing observations, the committee offers the following finding and Recommendation 7: Finding: Effective information-sharing architectures and systems are operating today at the classified and unclassified levels.
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FIGURE 3.8 An operational view of multilateral information sharing. 77 Figure 3-8, editable, b&w, broadside
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expertise, to provide responsive, dedicated technical support across the full range of interagency initiatives for the design, engineering, and fielding of information technology (IT) infrastructure that would enable information sharing for maritime security.
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in Recommendation 7 proposes a Navy effort to strengthen IT-enabling infrastructure architecting, engineering, and fielding in support of MSP initiatives. As was made clear at the beginning of the chapter, the committee believes that information sharing will generally be carried out among regional or subregional partners, although the global effect will be a collective one.
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P P P P S S S S Nation A Nation B Nation 1 Nation 2 Regional Information Sharing and Internet-based CENTRIXS-based Collaboration Commercial National Networks Infrastructure Infrastructure S S S S P P P P Nation D Nation C Nation 4 Nation 3 Internet-based "Backplane" Key for Potential Interoperable IP-based Filter Interregional P Private Info Internet Backplane S Shared Info Exchange FIGURE 3.9 Enabling maritime security partnerships: a conceptual architecture for information sharing. Figure 3-9, editable, b&w, broadside
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From page 81... ...
Building Mission Capability The discussions above recognize and applaud the ongoing initiatives and efforts to advance information sharing and coordinated action capabilities with and among nontraditional partners. Much of the Navy and COCOM-related material discussed above dealt with architecting and prototyping early instantiations of an enabling net-centric information infrastructure and implementing useful, basic AIS-oriented information sharing.
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, to human reporting (e.g., local law enforcement) ; • Analyze/fuse.
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SOURCE: Scott Cantfil, Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) liaison officer, "Interdiction Continuum," presentation to the committee, Washington, D.C., May 16, 2007.
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From page 84... ...
While the distinction between intelligence and surveillance sources is important, it is also important to recognize that the two mechanisms are frequently interdependent in the operational arena, such as when surveillance assets are required to detect and track a vessel that has been previously reported by intelligence to be of interest to maritime security officials. Intelligence The United States and other nations concerned with the many facets of maritime security, ranging from the efforts of the Proliferation Security Initiative
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From page 85... ...
The nature and quantity of these inputs tax the ability of the available response and interdiction forces to take advantage of all such tips. JIATF-S is unique in having established effective procedures for routinely and quickly converting classified intelligence and sensitive law enforcement information into a form that can be shared at an unclassified level under bilateral agreements with partner nations capable of taking responsive actions.
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From page 86... ...
Implications for Information Sharing As noted above, sources of intelligence on maritime traffic range from traditional highly classified national intelligence collection and reporting systems that were originally developed primarily to deal with military ships, through a rich set of law enforcement information, to the broad and increasingly important category "commercial and nontraditional." Information from all these sources, when fused with complementary data from a surveillance system's sensors, could, in principle, provide a comprehensive COP of all activity on the surface of the ocean, or at least of all activity in an area of interest. In addition to the various human and technical information collection practices of nations, many of which reside within the various national security and military organizations, the various law enforcement communities in most nations maintain databases on individuals and vehicles that fall into the general category "law-enforcement sensitive." These include watch lists of known or suspected terrorists and long-standing Interpol procedures for exchanging information on specific individuals who are formal subjects of arrest or detention warrants.
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From page 87... ...
Examples of nontraditional sources of maritime intelligence information that could contribute to information sharing among MSP include the following: • The Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) (operational, under IMO, Web-based)
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From page 88... ...
Such vessels are acknowledged to constitute a growing source of threats to maritime security from the smuggling of contraband and people, the poaching of resources, piracy, and even attacks from the sea. It is highly doubtful that even planned improvements in traditional intelligence and law enforcement collection and reporting capabilities will provide enough information about the existence and location of such threats to preclude their deployment.
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From page 89... ...
with large numbers of ship locations and, in some cases, identities. However, this may do little to enhance maritime security unless mechanisms exist for identifying specific ships as being "of interest" on the basis of supplemental intelligence information, as discussed above, or on the basis of anomalous behavior, as discussed below in the section "Analyze/Fuse." The fact that the effectiveness of existing, mostly passive, broad ocean surveillance systems is highly dependent on the "cooperative" radiation of ships indicates that complementary active systems -- primarily radar systems -- are thought to be needed if truly persistent surveillance of important broad ocean areas is to be established, as envisioned by the U.S.
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From page 90... ...
14 As suggested above, it appears to the committee that the Navy has taken an understandably cautious approach to expanding its maritime surveillance capabilities to meet the surveillance challenges of the National Strategy for Maritime Security. While caution is clearly called for before the Navy becomes committed to a major new acquisition program and its attendant future operating costs, the committee believes that there are several potentially less costly opportunities for improved ocean surveillance that warrant technical development and concept exploration.
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From page 91... ...
. Open ocean surveillance using commercial space-based imaging appears to have considerable potential.
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2006. "ASPRS Guide to Land Imaging Satellites," updated for the NOAA Commercial Remote Sensing Symposium, Washington, D.C., September 12-14.
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From page 93... ...
This suggests that a body of technical expertise is well established and available to the Navy and could be offered to other countries in support of the overall goal of improving the persistent ocean surface surveillance capability worldwide as a key to a successful MSP initiative. The Air Force OTH-backscatter radars (FPS-118)
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From page 94... ...
leader in ocean surface surveillance, Navy leadership of such an exploratory process would be essential. Potential for Improved Regional Maritime Surveillance Through Expanded Coastal Radar Surveillance Systems and AIS Receivers. The committee has been impressed with the efforts of the naval component commanders working under the regional COCOMs to encourage and assist other countries in improving their maritime surveillance capabilities.
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From page 95... ...
PACOM has been quite successful in encouraging cooperation in maritime surveillance and information sharing among the nations of Southeast Asia, particularly in the vicinity of the Strait of Malacca. Given these encouraging activities, it appears that a Navy-led initiative to expand such efforts worldwide and to include the cost of such technical assistance efforts in the Navy's baseline budgets, rather than relying on the ephemeral nature of most COCOM direct funding sources, could have a significant payoff.
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From page 96... ...
Of particular interest to the committee is the potential harnessing of the local radar and AIS displays available on all commercial ships that are already subject to IMO agreements. Given the tens of thousands of such ships that are usually at sea, this appears to constitute a significant source of surveillance information if it can be tapped at reasonable cost.
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From page 97... ...
. At current International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT-C)
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From page 98... ...
Navy is well positioned to expand its efforts in this field beyond the protection of fleet assets to include the broader information collection and sharing goals of the MSP initiative. Again, the promise of integrating such capabilities into a broader maritime surveillance regime appears to warrant further investigation.
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From page 99... ...
Navy is uniquely qualified to help expand international maritime surveillance in support of its and its partners' maritime security goals. In particular, as the nation's primary repository of expertise on broad ocean surveillance, the U.S.
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From page 100... ...
, and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition should direct the appropriate laboratories, system commands, and program executive offices to ensure that naval component commanders have the appropriate expertise and other assets to facilitate an outreach program to coastal states that would benefit from improved maritime surveillance capabilities. Analyze/Fuse Framing the Challenges Given the variety of current and potential surveillance data and intelligence information that can be exploited, it is important to recognize the functions that will need to be performed in the analysis and fusion of this multimodal data.
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From page 101... ...
However, overall data mining, analysis, and fusion technologies must advance in order to create rationalized alerts and actionable information that may then be shared with partner nations in sanitized form in accordance with bilateral agreements. As regional communities share information with the global community, the amount of multimodal data that will need to be mined, exploited, and shared in a timely manner in order to maintain maritime security will pose several technology challenges in each of the MDA analysis/fusion functional areas.
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From page 102... ...
Includes language Signal Exploitation translation services Info Exploitation FIGURE 3.17 A functional view of maritime domain information analysis/fusion. Figure 3-17, editable, b&w, broadside R01141
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From page 103... ...
maritime security community currently monitors dozens of high-interest vessels at any one time that could be affiliated with entities or individuals that could be involved in terrorism or other threatening or illicit activity. As noted in an earlier section, the identification of vessels of interest is substantially dependent on tips, often from law enforcement sources.
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From page 104... ...
The PANDA program is aimed at developing a normalcy database for a given ship's motion and using that normal behavior model to automatically identify anomalies or potential threats. Detection of potential threats based on analysis of vessel motion augmented with emission analysis is within the realm of possibility due to the increasing amount of information being collected by port authorities (by using human intelligence and law enforcement agencies)
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From page 105... ...
Similarly, efforts in both the law enforcement and intelligence communities involve linking vessel track data with the information on a ship's manifest to identify vessels of interest. To reduce the threat to maritime security, emphasis must be placed on analyzing and selectively sharing information on crew, cargo, supply chain, financials, ownership, and so on.
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From page 106... ...
Advancing the State of the Practice Today, the majority of maritime domain information is in stovepiped systems, and the focus is on tracking vessels of interest. While this manpower-intensive practice is useful in reducing the potential for harm by terrorists or criminals, more can be done through increased data collection, analysis, and fusion to further reduce this threat.
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From page 107... ...
In other words, we can advance the state of the practice by bringing all partner nations up to a base level of situation awareness through the dissemination of starter kits that include COTS or releasable GOTS fusion tools. These tools for merging AIS, imaging systems, and radar data would create an integrated and more reliable situational awareness capability for all MSP participants.
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From page 108... ...
SureTrak and other such technologies are already being considered as part of the Navy MDA activity. Commercial tools for data fusion and data mining might also be of interest and should be considered a component that requires the participation of humans.
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From page 109... ...
Much of the technology being developed to analyze and fuse data on maritime entities is in the early stage, in prototype form. However, as reflected in Navy efforts ongoing as of this writing, there are commercial off-the-shelf and potentially releasable government off-the-shelf analysis and fusion tools and software that offer early, useful capabilities for maritime security partnerships.
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should work on funding maritime domain awareness efforts in the mainstream of the Navy budget. Recommendation 10 expands Recommendation 7, which calls for the development of IT infrastructure starter kits to facilitate and accelerate operational information-sharing initiatives that include analysis/fusion tools.
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The TRIM tool used by JIATF-S for Spanish translation -- but supporting some 13 lan TABLE 3.2 Representative Tactical Action Agreements Tactical Action Tactical Action Agreement Ship boarding Standing authority or procedures for the USCG to stop, board, and search foreign vessels suspected of illicit traffic located seaward of the territorial sea of any nation. Ship riding Standing authority to embark law enforcement (LE)
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From page 112... ...
The issues involved in sharing such support with nontraditional partners relate to the availability of COTS or releasable GOTS products and tailoring them to the situation at hand. The provision of communications and collaboration tools and systems should be included within the broader "design template," "maritime security partnerships catalog," and "starter package" referred to in Recommendation 7.
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From page 113... ...
ties to its closest allies deal with the entire security spectrum and often involve the sharing of Secret information (e.g., CENTRIXS networks) , while its less mature partnership arrangement might involve sharing unclassified information, perhaps including sensitive law enforcement information, at the lower end of the spectrum.
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From page 114... ...
Given the range of security regimes driven by sharing at different levels of classification and/or sensitivity, it is important to identify a corresponding range of readily available building blocks for information protection. The architecture for information sharing between or among nontraditional partners will be implemented with COTS products integrated into an open architecture backbone context and protected by COTS security products.
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From page 115... ...
designations, including relevant law enforcement information standards. Finally, some unclassified information is not considered as national security information but yet may require protection under a particular partnership agreement.
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From page 116... ...
This issue can be addressed by U.S.-issued fly-away communication kits but would be a potential problem with partner-furnished equipment unless common standards for security products and their use are set. Unclassified information that provides information to low-end threats and assists them in avoiding detection may be broadcast.
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From page 117... ...
The committee did not, however, find any signs of an end-to-end information protection analysis, nor did it observe a NIST certificate for any information systems. Recommendation 7, which called for Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communication Networks (N6)
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From page 118... ...
Figure 3.19 illustrates a case in point: an analysis of surveillance coverage performance for different combinations of assets over a representative search box, noting the broader question of allocating assets among the more than 3,000 such search boxes that make up the JIATF-S area of interest. Even though such analytical challenges were not routinely discussed with presenters or during visits, they clearly exist wherever surveillance assets are being deployed and tactical actions are being taken and can be expected to persist as emerging partnerships mature.
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From page 119... ...
Examples include automated decision aids such as rudimentary anomaly detection. A Corollary Effort -- Strengthening the International Maritime Security Regime This report envisions the development of a two-pronged strategy for the building and strengthening of maritime partnerships -- working regional and subregional initiatives and, at the same time, longer-term steps to strengthen international maritime security.
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From page 120... ...
interagency maritime security partnerships initiative. This agent would provide systems engineering and operations analysis resources with technical support to International Maritime Organization initiatives.
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From page 121... ...
All of this, of course, implies investment. Just defining the options and assigning priorities is complicated by the fact that the MDA portfolio inherently cuts across multiple federal organizations and other systems (e.g., DOD, DHS, broader law enforcement, broader intelligence)
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From page 122... ...
rather than, for instance, on seriously investigating potential new or enhanced surveillance capabilities, as outlined in this chapter (new dots)
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