Terrorism and the Electric Power Delivery System (2012) / Chapter Skim
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4 Vulnerabilities of Systems for Sensing, Communication, and Control
4 Vulnerabilities of Systems for Sensing, Communication, and Control
Pages 38-47
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From page 38... ...
the perceived threats to utility control centers. The most Most early communication and control systems used in likely threats identified were bypassing controls, integrity the operation of the electric power system were carefully violations, and authorization violations, with 40 percent of isolated from the outside world, and were separate from other respondents rating the seriousness of each as either a 5 or a 4 systems such as corporate enterprise computing.
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From page 39... ...
faster sampling rates. FIGURE 4.1 Perceived threats to power system control centers as reported in a survey of electric utilities conducted by EPRI in 2000.
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From page 40... ...
Programmable logic controllers, operate protective at this level.relays, systems to control transformer tap settings and capacitor banks, automated metering systems, and distributed control systems as well as a variety of field devices all operate at this level. NOTE: Numbers refer to points of vulnerability discussed in the text.
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From page 41... ...
The data can then be automatically downloaded to a PC or other risk of a "Trojan horse" or other deleterious program being device and transmitted to a central collection point. With this intentionally embedded in the software of one or more of technology, real-time communication links exist outside the the control centers is real, and this can only be addressed by utility infrastructure.
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From page 42... ...
However, today such relays can no longer be reached efforts to improve the security of control systems within the from the outside on most major systems, and new mandatory private sector by working through (1) the Electricity Sector security regulations are rapidly resulting in corrective action Coordinating Council (coordinated by the North American Electric Reliability Council)
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As of Bed (NSTB) program highlights potential risks that can March 2006, the top vulnerabilities of control systems and apply to some electricity sector organizations, describes potential mitigation strategies were assessed to be:
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From page 44... ...
often need data network that must be protected from external connections. from neighboring control centers or from market This is true whether a private network or the Internet is used computers.
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. Excerpts regarding 3 of the 10 listed vulnerabilities are given below: · Inadequately secured wireless communication (including microwave technologies)
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From page 46... ...
2006. "The North American Power Delivery NERC (North American Electric Reliability Council)
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From page 47... ...
SAND2005 ated Mitigations -- 2006." North American Electric Reliability Council, 1002. Available at http://www.sandia.gov/scada/documents/ Control Systems Security Working Group, U.S.
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