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Appendix F: Combining Game Theory and Risk Analysis in Counterterrorism: A Smallpox Example
Pages 103-110

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From page 103...
... paper describes a procedure that uses risk analysis to gener- This paper considers both traditional game theory (miniate random payoff matrices for game theory solution, and max solution for a two-person zero-sum game in normal then pools the solutions from multiple realizations of the form) and also a minimum expected loss criterion appropripayoff matrix to estimate the probability that a given play is ate for extensive-form games with prior probabilities.
From page 104...
... government policy makers in the spring of 2002 (their initial plan was universal vaccination, TABLE 1  Attack-Defense Cost Matrix but ultimately they chose the third scenario with stockpiling, No Attack Single Attack Multiple Attack biosurveillance, and very limited vaccination of some first Stockpile Vaccine C11 C12 C13 responders)
From page 105...
... We have not conducted the in-depth elicitation from multiple C11 = ETdry + ETAvent + ETAcamb + VIG + PHIS, experts in each area that is needed for a fully rigorous risk where ETdry and ETAvent are the costs of efficacy and safety analysis; however, we have discussed the cost issues with testing for the Dryvax and Aventis vaccines, respectively; representatives from each area, and we believe that the esti ETAcamb is the cost of new vaccine production and testing mates in this section are sufficiently reasonable to illustrate, from Acambis; VIG is the cost of producing sufficient doses qualitatively, the case for combining statistical risk analysis of vaccinia immune globulin to treat adverse reactions and with game theory for threat management in the context of possible exposures; and PHIS is the cost of establishing terrorism. the public healthcare infrastructure needed to manage this Expert opinion was typically elicited in the following stockpiling effort.
From page 106...
... The cost for a single false alarm is modeled as a normal random variable with mean $500,000 and standard The statistical risk analysis used in Section 3, albeit deviation $100,000. crude, shows how expert judgment can generate the random payoff matrices.
From page 107...
... All rows 4.1  Minimax Criterion must sum to one. We performed the simulation experiment described above The minimum expected loss criterion multiplies the prob100 times and compared the four defense strategies in terms abilities in each row of Table 2 by the corresponding costs in of the minimax criterion.
From page 108...
... And third, it captures facets of the problem that are not amenable to either game theory or risk analysis on TABLE 4  Optimistic Probabilities of Attack Given their own, because classical risk analysis is not used in adDifferent Defenses versarial situations and because classical game theory does not use random costs. No Attack Single Attack Multiple Attack Stockpile Vaccine 0.98 0.01 0.01 Biosurveillance 0.99 0.005 0.005 NOTES: BACKGROUND ON SMALLPOX Key Personnel 0.99 0.005 0.005 Everyone 0.999 0.0005 0.0005 Although the probability that the smallpox virus (Variola major)
From page 109...
... . "Emergency response to Board of Health strain and fluid containing the vaccinia virus a smallpox attack: The case for mass vaccination," Proceedings of the was harvested by scraping (Rosenthal et al., 2001)
From page 110...
... . "The race to predict terror's costs," New York Times, rorism events," Emerging Infectious Diseases, 8, 753-760.


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