Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Assessment A Call for Change (2008) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix J: Reprinted Interim Report
Appendix J: Reprinted Interim Report
Pages 126-148
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Appendix J Reprinted Interim Report 126
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REPRINTED INTERIM REPORT 127 Interim Report on Methodological Improvements to the Department of Homeland Security's Biological Agent Risk Analysis Committee on Methodological Improvements to the Department of Homeland Security's Biological Agent Risk Analysis Board on Mathematical Sciences and Their Applications Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences
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This study was supported by Contract No. HSHQDC-06-C-00046 between the National Academy of Sciences and the Department of Homeland Security.
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Cicerone is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers.
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ANTHONY COX, JR., Cox Associates JOHN GANNON, BAE Systems ERIC HARVILL, Pennsylvania State University HOWARD KUNREUTHER, University of Pennsylvania STEPHEN MORSE, Columbia University MARGUERITE PAPPAIOANOU, University of Minnesota STEPHEN POLLOCK, University of Michigan NOZER SINGPURWALLA, George Washington University ALYSON WILSON, Los Alamos National Laboratory Staff SCOTT WEIDMAN, Director, Board on Mathematical Sciences and Their Applications NEAL GLASSMAN, Senior Staff Officer, Board on Mathematical Sciences and Their Applications KERRY BRENNER, Senior Staff Officer, Board on Life Sciences BARBARA WRIGHT, Administrative Assistant
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ROBINSON, University of Wisconsin-Madison GEORGE SUGIHARA, Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California at San Diego EDWARD J WEGMAN, George Mason University LAI-SANG YOUNG, New York University Staff SCOTT WEIDMAN, Director NEAL GLASSMAN, Senior Staff Officer BARBARA WRIGHT, Administrative Assistant For more information on BMSA, see its Web site at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/ bms/, write to BMSA, National Research Council, 500 Fifth Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20001, call (202)
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The committee also acknowledges the valuable contribution of the following individuals, who provided input at the meeting on which this interim report is based: James Petro, White House Homeland Security Council, Adam Rose, Pennsylvania State University, Detlof von Winterfeldt, University of Southern California, and Staff of the Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio.
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REPRINTED INTERIM REPORT 133 Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 134 METHODOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S BIOLOGICAL AGENT RISK ANALYSIS 137 Background, 137 The DHS Bioterrorism Risk Assessment, 139 Recommendations, 141 Summary, 146 References, 146 APPENDIX 147
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, and final, to recommend longer-term improvements. On August 28-29, 2006, the NRC Committee on Methodological Improvements to the Department of Homeland Security's Biological Agent Risk Analysis met with representa tives of DHS, its National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC)
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Recommendation 1: DHS should establish a clear statement of the long-term purposes of its bioterrorism risk analysis. A clear statement of the long-term purposes of the bioterrorism risk analysis is needed to enunciate how it can serve as a tool to inform risk assessment, risk perception, and especially risk-management decision making.
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The computational engine be ing developed by Battelle does not permit, let alone encourage, risk managers to explore "if resource allocation, then probable consequence" scenarios for evaluating alternative risk management strategies. DHS needs to determine how strategies involving specific investments of resources in protection and countermeasures translate to changes in risk and impact terrorist plans and actions. Moreover, the model should have an interface and visualization component that makes its results and limitations easier to understand and be used by decision makers.
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Second, the United States requires a periodic senior-level policy net assessment that evaluates progress in implementing this policy, identifies continuing gaps or vulnerabilities in our biodefense posture, and makes recommendations for re-balancing and refining investments among the pillars of our overall biodefense policy. The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, will be responsible for conducting these assessments. The first Department of Homeland Security bioterrorism risk assessment was completed on January 31, 2006, and the report documenting the analysis was published on October 1, 2006. This assessment and report implemented the requirement of the National Strategy for Homeland Security, issued in July 2002 by the Office of Homeland Security, and of HSPD10 for DHS to assess the biological weapons threat in coordination with other appro priate federal departments and agencies.
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These comments are intended to provide guidance to DHS for its work during FY2007. Specifically, the committee has been given the following charge for this interim report: • Assess the adequacy of the DHS's current methodology as a foundation for the desired risk analysis capabilities; • Identify any other risk analyses that rely on the major components of the existing methodology, probabilistic risk analysis and multi-attribute risk analysis, and which could guide DHS's future developments; • Assess the feasibility of incorporating models of second-order economic effects into the methodology during FY07; • Identify better methods, if any, for handling the high degrees of uncertainty associated with the risk analyses of biological agents; • Recommend near-term improvements to enhance the transparency of the method and its usefulness to decision makers; • Discuss how the methodology could be extended to risks associated with classes of agents, including enhanced or engineered agents that have yet to be developed; and • Discuss the feasibility of extending the methodology to also serve as a framework for risk analysis of chemical or radioactive threats.
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Risk perception can be influenced by personal knowledge, experience, and beliefs; it can be affected by changing perceptions of the threat, the vulnerabilities, and/or the consequences; it may be influenced by information about hazards, risk assessments, risk policies, and risk management decisions. • Risk communication -- the process used by risk analysts, decision makers, policy m akers, and intelligent adversaries to provide data, information, and knowledge to change the risk perceptions of individuals and organizations and enable them to as sess the risk differently than they otherwise might.
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. The model used for the DHS bioterrorism risk assessment is a computer-based tool used for assessing the relative risk of terrorist use of each of 28 specific pathogens, identified in other sources.
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In order to justify the current methodology as a foundation for future analyses, a clear statement of the long-term purposes of the bioterrorism risk analysis is needed to enunci ate how it will support risk assessment, risk perception, and especially risk management decision making. Criteria and measures should be specified for measuring how well these purposes are achieved.
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However, it seems logical that the DHS vision for risk analysis should be broad enough to include risks posed by other significant future biological threats. Traditional bioagents are "naturally occurring microorganisms or toxin products with the potential to be weaponized and disseminated to cause mass casualties." Testing the methodology by using existing biological agent threat lists, as has been done to date, is a prudent and logical way to start, given the very large number of pathogens that could possibly be used as weapons.
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Most of the event probabilities have been generated using expert opinion. DHS is keenly aware that this approach may be unreliable, and the committee is pleased that DHS intends to use CREATE's expertise to improve elicitation of the views of subject-matter experts.
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must also be included to avoid underestimating true financial consequences. If these indirect costs are large, it may be necessary to evaluate their impact, taking into account risk aversion and/or loss aversion.12 Evaluation of these costs will require that DHS more carefully consider its consequence measures and modeling, which should be augmented to include indirect economic effects.
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In evaluating alternative risk management strategies, DHS should take into account all significant benefits that result from any strategy, beyond just those benefits that directly impact the risks of bioterrorism attacks. For instance, investment in intelligence might in clude all homeland security risks, and the risk management trade-offs should be considered in that larger context.
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• DHS's current plans for the incorporation of second-order indirect economic effects into its methodology are appropriate, as long as the model's level of granularity is carefully considered. • High degrees of uncertainty can be addressed by the incorporation of red teaming, attack-preference models, attack-tree models, and game-theoretic analyses.
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Introductory Remarks Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Leadership 10:00 a.m. Biology Presentation Prof.
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Updates and Planned Changes DHS/NBACC, Battelle Staff for the 2008 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment 10:45 a.m Break Closed Session (committee members and NRC staff only)
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