Countering Terrorism Biological Agents, Transportation Networks, and Energy Systems: Summary of a U.S.-Russian Workshop (2009) / Chapter Skim
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16 U.S.-Russian Collaboration in Combating Radiological Terrorism--John F. Ahearne
16 U.S.-Russian Collaboration in Combating Radiological Terrorism--John F. Ahearne
Pages 160-172
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From page 160... ...
National Academies will publish the report of the Committee on Opportunities for U.S.-Russian Collaboration in Combating Radiological Terrorism. 1 The following are key extracts from this report.
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From page 161... ...
The committee decided to concentrate its efforts on the radiological terrorism threat posed by inadequately protected IRSs in Russia and on feasible approaches to upgrading the security of IRSs in Russia. Based on site visits by committee members, consultations with dozens of Russian and U.S.
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From page 162... ...
Press reports of illicit trafficking in radioactive material, Web chat attributed to terrorist groups, and discovery of primitive drawings of dirty bombs in the possession of international terrorist groups have heightened the concern. In addition to misuse of radiological sources considered in this study, radiological terrorism could be carried out by sabotage of a nuclear facility, waste site, or transport container.
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From page 163... ...
Radioactive material dispersed by an RDD may cause serious radiation health effects for a limited number of exposed people and indeed may result in some deaths. But the gravest consequences of detonation of an RDD are more likely to be the spread of contamination requiring evacuation of large numbers of inhabitants of the affected area; short and long-term economic disruption that could extend well beyond the contaminated area by impacts on transportation, financial, and other sprawling infrastructure systems; incitement of psychological trauma among individuals and groups that are exposed to radiation or believe they have been exposed; and attendant social or political instability.
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From page 164... ...
A particularly troublesome aspect of the Soviet nuclear legacy is the large number of inadequately protected high-activity IRSs that have been used as radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) to supply small amounts of electrical power at remote sites, primarily in Russia, with a few also sent to outlying states.
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From page 165... ...
On the whole, in Russia many skilled and dedicated people with relevant expertise are working on improving legal and regulatory systems related to IRSs and implementing security programs at the facility level. However, while organizational responsibilities seem to be reasonably well defined, the committee believes that the information presented in this report, including reported efforts by Chechen insurgents to use IRSs for malevolent purposes, calls for greater efforts by the Russian authorities and international partners to upgrade security efforts for IRSs.
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From page 166... ...
If no clear and affordable disposition path is available, then some facilities may resort to other means to hide or just abandon sources because they cannot afford to secure them properly or ship them to a disposal facility. Rosatom has developed a comprehensive approach to providing emergency rescue and related services.
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From page 167... ...
While government services for evacuees are likely to be substantial in scope, as they have been with previous accidents and attacks, the quality and sustainability of such services may not be high. The committee noted one apprehension among some Russian colleagues regarding the effects of a radiological attack that is not voiced in the West, namely, the potential for political instability that an effective RDD event might cause as various elements of the population lose confidence in the government's ability to protect its citizens.
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From page 168... ...
Also, it is an important partner of DOE in recovering unwanted IRSs. The specific tasks assigned to Izotop under the cooperative U.S.-Russian program are as follows: • Discover unused, poorly maintained, or abandoned radiation devices and equipment containing IRSs • Inspect equipment and devices proposed for return and for recycling of IRSs that are not being used for their intended purposes or that have been abandoned • Locate, dismantle, consolidate, transport, and bury IRSs in secure repositories • Identify, plan, design, and carry out measures to modernize physical protection, control, and accounting of materials at selected sites where IRSs remain As of December 2005, the cooperative program had recovered 1,732 IRSs with total activity of about 200,000 curies.
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From page 169... ...
Large numbers of inadequately protected IRSs are present in many countries, and particularly IRSs for which there is no longer a need. For these unwanted IRSs, financially affordable disposal pathways often do not exist.
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From page 170... ...
However, cooperation in this field should continue indefinitely as Russia and the United States continue to learn from each other. Although DOE's financial assistance should phase out in due time, DOE should not have an exit strategy for cooperation, because the threat of radiological terrorism will most likely persist for decades.
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From page 171... ...
It would probably be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded material for a period of a few minutes to an hour." These sources are typically used in practices such as radioisotope thermoelectric generators, irradiators, and radiation teletherapy. Category 2 sources, "if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled [them]
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From page 172... ...
, for some hours. It could possibly -- although it is unlikely -- be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks." These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high-activity sources (for example, level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges, and spinning pipe gauges)
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