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11 A Note on the Interfacial Vulnerabilities of Transportation Systems--George Bugliarello
Pages 95-103

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From page 95...
... For instance, there are today no agent-based models that incorporate realistically the human component of the system and can predict the emergency response of individuals. The components of a transportation system range from individuals in the system -- a biological component -- to its social components, such as its organization and practices, to its machines, that is, in the broadest sense, its engineered artifacts, as described in Table 11-1.
From page 96...
... Regional National Individual users International compacts Power and fuel supply Working animals Community Sensors, command-and-control devices Bio So Ma Modern Humans Evolution Bio So Ma FIGURE 11-1  The biosoma. Fig 11-1.eps ATTACKS AND VULNERABILITIES Attacks on transportation systems can occur from individuals acting independently, such as hackers or some suicide bombers, or can be organized by social entities, such as terrorist groups of various degrees of sophistication, for example, those responsible for the September 11, 2001, attack in New York City and the attacks on trains in Madrid, London, and Mumbai.
From page 97...
... An example involving the interfaces among all three biosoma components within the system is failures of the traffic light command-and-control system involving incident commanders, the organization that operates the traffic lights, and the traffic lights themselves. Critical and choke points of a transportation system, such as locks, canals, traffic light control centers, and other commandand-control centers, are particularly vulnerable to biosomic attacks that may involve individual sabotage, organized attacks, and the use of machines to destroy critical components of the system.
From page 98...
... The impacts on human resources may stem from the possible inability in an emergency for a transportation system to convey the first responders to their assigned locations, as well as to convey personnel necessary for the operation of business, industry, education, health care, and security systems. The impact on supplies occurs when the transportation system cannot deliver food, materials required by energy systems and industry, and other supplies needed by businesses and service systems.
From page 99...
... Transportation systems are particularly vulnerable at their people access points: at stations, such as ticket offices, waiting rooms, and platforms that often gather crowds; at bus and street car stops; at taxi stands; and at airports, where long lines typically precede the access to security. Identifying the vulnerabilities of the points of contact among the organizational components of the transportation system and its interfaces with other organizations and jurisdictions is particularly important.
From page 100...
... An examination of the critical issues in transportation in the United States identified by the Transportation Research Board of the National Academies -- several of them in the economic and financial domains -- would show that they require in most cases an interlaced biosomic approach, with its associated interfacial vulnerabilities (TRB, 2006)
From page 101...
... VULNERABILITY MAPS Idealized computerized maps of a system can be useful in describing in a synoptic way different interfacial vulnerabilities, both within the system and where it interfaces with other systems (such as access points -- stations and loading docks; supply points, where the system interfaces with the power and fuel supply systems; intermodal transfer points; maintenance and repair facilities) and where it interfaces with the environment surrounding the system (such as phone lines, viaducts, and so forth)
From page 102...
... 4. Research is needed to go beyond empirical approaches and to develop a new body of knowledge that would help identify the vulnerability of interfaces, assess the probability and potential consequences of events at interfaces, study potential cascade effects, and develop strategies and technologies to bypass compromised interfacial points.
From page 103...
... . ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This research is supported in part by Sloan Foundation Grant number 200210-12 to the Urban Security Initiative at Polytechnic University.


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