The 2nd International Forum on Biosecurity Summary of an International Meeting (2009) / Chapter Skim
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2 Plenary and Working Group Presentations and Discussions
2 Plenary and Working Group Presentations and Discussions
Pages 23-64
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in 2007. The talk highlighted the progress made by the international scientific community in considering dual use issues in the life sciences, the challenges that remained to be addressed, and some of the opportunities that might be presented by the current intersessional process of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)
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As an intergovernmental body, WHO has focused many of its efforts on assisting member countries by working to develop risk assessment methodologies and to produce a tool kit of resources with multiple risk management options. WHO has formed a scientific working group on life science research and global health security that recommended five areas for action: education and training, disease outbreak preparedness, risk assessment methodology development, stakeholder engagement, and capacity building. WHO held a regional workshop in Thailand in December 2007 that recommended further actions by both WHO and its member countries in many of these areas.
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The workshop will focus on the biosecurity implication of emerging technologies such as synthetic biology, and will explore ways to incorporate biosecurity practices into the internationally mobile scientific workforce. Plenary 2: Emerging Life Science and Technology: Challenges and Opportunities for Biosecurity The second plenary session of the Forum also looked to the future of the life sciences and addressed some selected highlights of recent scientific work.
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Improvements in rapid DNA synthesis and assembly and in the fidelity of synthesized and amplified DNA are both important developments for synthetic biology, allowing functional DNA products to be generated from databases or novel sequences. Techniques for generating mutations within DNA and for selecting mutations that lead to desirable phenotypes are also useful.
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Dr. Calvert stressed that both fields of systems and synthetic biology have become highly interdisciplinary and can draw on expertise outside of traditional life sciences departments.
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Plenary 3: Introduction of the Breakout Sessions After listening to the introductory panel survey several possible ways that the international community might think about life sciences and biosecurity issues, and also to the presentations highlighting scientific advances in emerging fields such as computational, systems and synthetic biology, the Forum participants considered the topics of the three working groups: (1) education and awareness, (2)
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Dr. Franz emphasized that the key challenge in considering standards and methods for research oversight is to protect scientific creativity and discovery, while simultaneously reducing the chances of the misuse of science to cause harm.
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Dr. Azzi also emphasized that it is important to present a clear case as to why the life sciences community is undertaking work on biosecurity issues.
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The CAS has established biosafety committees and training programs at each of its life science institutes, has actively participated in international biosecurity discussions through groups such as the IAP and the WHO, and through two workshops: the CAS-COMEST symposia on ethics in science in Beijing and Shanghai in 2005,10 and the upcoming international biosecurity workshop to be held in Beijing in late 2008.
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At the time of the presentation the group had conducted 26 seminars in life sciences departments in the United Kingdom and had conducted more than 70 seminars in the United States, South Africa, the Netherlands, Finland, Japan, Israel, India, Argentina, Uganda, Kenya, Ukraine, and Australia. The seminars developed by the group seek to bring biosecurity discussions directly to researchers and students, and are usually held as part of regular university departmental seminars.
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Finally, in countries with no current interest in biosecurity, education could serve as the means to raise the issue and begin the process of engagement. Plenary 5: The 2008 BWC Intersessional Meetings Ambassador Georgi Avramchev (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Macedonia to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Chair of the 2008 Meetings of the Biological Weapons Convention)
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The Ambassador focused many of his remarks on concrete ways the scientific community might effectively contribute to the work of the BWC. In particular, he suggested holding events, both within the scientific community and as side events at the BWC meetings in order to: discuss biosafety, biosecurity, oversight and outreach; continue to produce reports and documents on such issues, which also served as valuable resources for the BWC Implementation Support Unit to draw on in preparing the background papers for the meeting; placing biosecurity issues on the agendas of scientific organizations; contacting national ministries of foreign affairs about meeting preparations; and participating in other ways, such as by serving on a BWC discussion panel or presenting a poster.
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Katsuhisa Furukawa (Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society) began with an overview of Japan's experience, the "taboo" on biological weapons because of Japan's use of them in World War II, and the role of biological scientists in Aum Shinrikyo.
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He found that visits by experts and scholars, as well as general interaction with the international scientific community, were helpful in raising interest.
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The involvement of academics from outside the country made the topic more attractive for South Africa, although slow responses complicated logistical arrangements. She reported that the seminars had evoked a mixed response from institutions in terms of research oversight and policy responses to biosecurity issues.
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Lessons from Biological Weapons Programs for Education and Awareness Rais ing. Iris Hunger (University of Hamburg)
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Scientist-based approaches are most promising if aimed at identifying biological weapons programs ("whistle blowing") and slowing and stopping them.
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13 Website for "Raising Awareness: Multiple uses for chemicals and the chemical weapons convention (IUPAC Project 2005-029-1-050) " is available at: http://www.multiple.kcvs.ca/.
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Dr. Epstein commented that, next to nanotechnology, synthetic genomics may be the most assessed and analyzed field that does not yet exist.
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as providing essential principles that any code of conduct should include. The group, therefore, encouraged governments to support initiatives to implement the Statement through the development of new codes by national scientific bodies, such as academies and professional societies, or the modification of existing codes to include biosecurity issues.
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the history of biological warfare and biological weapons programs; (c) the dual use dilemma posed by life sciences research; (d)
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Finally, the group suggested that a task force be established under the auspices of the IAP Biosecurity Working Group to consider: • Where and how best to establish and operate a clearinghouse; • How to achieve the objectives for education, for awareness raising and for involving industry and the private sector; and • How to secure resources to fund the various initiatives. Highlights of the group discussions and suggestions were presented by Alastair Hay to the entire Forum in one of the final plenary sessions.
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CISSM also proposes oversight methods on the national and international level. National review bodies would oversee and approve research of moderate concern (e.g., work with specific listed agents, particularly activities that enhance virulence, transmissibility, or weaponization)
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David Friedman (Institute for National Security Studies, Tel-Aviv University and the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities) explained that Israel is in the top 10 countries in the life sciences and in the top three in some life science fields, and that Israeli scientists are very concerned about biosecurity issues.
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core theme.15 It includes education and awareness raising (biosecurity, dual use, biosafety) , dual use review, science in the event of an emergency, emerging infections, and global health and policy engagement.
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discussed research oversight from the perspective of a major biological science funding body. First he presented several reasons for the Wellcome Trust's attention to biosecurity.
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Working Group Discussions After the formal presentations, David Franz led the working group through a discussion of biosecurity definitions, elements of biological research oversight that were under way and that were proposed, the best principles for research oversight, international challenges to oversight, and possible next steps for the oversight of dual use research. The group discussed several research oversight methods that could be employed by interested groups.
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Results Principles for Research Oversight. After addressing existing mechanisms, the group discussed some broad principles important for research oversight.
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2. Capacity building: How can one ensure support for research, disease surveillance and public health and assistance to countries to implement dual use research oversight measures?
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. Research oversight would benefit from adapting existing review mechanisms such as institutional biosafety committees that handle research involving recombinant DNA.
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Summary of Working Group 3: Science Advising Chair: Angelo Azzi Rapporteur: Ralf Trapp Summary prepared by Katherine Bowman and Ralf Trapp Background Working group 3 focused its discussions on the role of the international community in providing scientific advice on issues related to biosecurity. To facilitate discussions among participants, several of the working group sessions incorporated brief presentations.
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WHO. Ottorino Cosivi had spoken during the first plenary session about the spectrum of risks posed to global health security in the 21st century and on efforts that WHO has made to support the elimination of chemical and biological weapons and to promote global health security. Although not making a second formal presentation to the working group, Dr.
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OPCW and IUPAC. Ralf Trapp discussed the structure of the OPCW, which administers the Chemical Weapons Convention, and how science advising works in this context. The OPCW includes a Scientific Advisory Board composed of experts from States Parties to the Convention, and this provides an integrated mechanism to feed scientific input directly into the Convention review conferences.
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He felt that it might be particularly valuable for the developed world to create educational and training materials that could be shared with the developing world to facilitate this process, and that the African science academies should assume more prominent roles in spearheading safety and security awareness and in advising their governments. Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW)
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Starting Points on the Role of Science Advising. The working group took as its common starting point that the scientific community should provide advice about how to deal with the benefits and potential risks of advances in biology, biotechnology, and the life sciences, including biosecurity matters.
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It was also understood that the concept of biosecurity is not limited to issues relating to biological weapons or bioterrorism, but must proceed from the recognition of the existing biological risks under given circumstances. It was felt that the argument for enhancing biosecurity needed to
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An opportunity exists to gain much-needed political support, if biosecurity can be integrated into the wider policies of developing countries toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals. In 2007, for example, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, France, Indonesia, Norway, Senegal, South Africa, and Thailand issued the Oslo Ministerial Declaration -- Global Health: A Pressing Foreign Policy Issue of Our Time, as part of their initiative on Global Health and Foreign Policy.25 The declaration recognized the importance of health issues in policy discussions and the interplay of health with other challenges; the theme on "Capacity for Global Health Security" included item 7.2, namely: "Recognize that the potential of biotechnologies to help developing countries achieve the Millennium Development Goals should not be eclipsed by otherwise legitimate security concerns: establish robust governance mechanisms to prevent misuse of the biological sciences, without hindering their positive contribution to development." The working group emphasized that advice on biosecurity needed to be multidisciplinary and multisectoral, and had to appreciate that bio security is a multistakeholder issue, and hence has to be inclusive.
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These include UNESCO, WHO, FAO, OIE, the International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups, the United Nations Environment Program, the BWC Implementation Support Unit, OECD, and others. International organizations, including specialized agencies, can play important roles with regard to involving the scientific community and in seeking their advice, and providing the governments of their member states with advice based on sound scientific principles and evidence.
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This is essential for consistent and relevant advice to policy makers, as well as for outreach and education directed at the scientific community and the public. The working group noted that international scientific consensus does not necessarily exist on the advantages and risks created by developments in the life sciences.
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During the discussions, it was noted that South Africa, for example, is already working to develop networks among groups such as university research directors, and has created the National Science and Technology Forum as a mechanism to bring together some of the relevant constituents. On the other hand, it must be understood that enhancing and enforcing regulatory frameworks, providing science advice, adopting ethical codes, and providing education and outreach can achieve only so much, and that these efforts cannot and should not be expected to completely deter or prevent acts of malevolence.
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Science unions should get involved as well, and can work through their national constituencies to promote biosecurity in the local/regional context and within a broader perspective on risk assessment, management, and communication regarding advances in the life sciences.
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