Russian Views on Countering Terrorism During Eight Years of Dialogue Extracts from Proceedings of Four U.S.-Russian Workshops (2009) / Chapter Skim
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Lessons Learned from the Nord-Ost Terrorist Attack in Moscow from the Standpoint of Russian Security and Law Enforcement Agencies--Yevgeny A. Kolesnikov
Lessons Learned from the Nord-Ost Terrorist Attack in Moscow from the Standpoint of Russian Security and Law Enforcement Agencies--Yevgeny A. Kolesnikov
Pages 93-102
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From page 93... ...
There were more than 900 people in the building, including theater personnel.1 This act may be placed in the same category as crimes committed by members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other international terrorist organizations in the United States, Indonesia, and various countries of the Middle East. There is no doubt that this act represents the latest manifestation of international terrorism in its most extreme form and should be viewed as a blow against the entire international security system, affecting the interests of all civilized states.
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From page 94... ...
Law enforcement units, special operational response detachments, personnel from the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and emergency medical and fire brigades were deployed in the area of the tragedy. The area was surrounded by police forces and MVD troops.
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From page 95... ...
Furthermore, to ensure their control over the situation in the concert hall, the terrorists used well-known psychological tactics by which some hostages characteristically begin to experience feelings of gratitude towards their captors under periods of stress despite the harsh treatment they are receiving. Thus, the hostages were for a long time deprived of food, water, and the ability to move
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From page 96... ...
The bandits had established observation posts and fire points in technical and maintenance areas on the second and third floors, making it impossible for tactical groups to make a covert entry into the Cultural Center building. In the opinion of explosives specialists, the simultaneous detonation of the explosive devices would have led to the complete destruction of the building and the certain deaths of all the hostages and tactical team members (more than 1,000 people)
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From page 97... ...
With regard to these victims, the loss of whom was unfortunately impossible to avoid, the main factors that increased the likelihood of their deaths were as predicted by health care specialists, namely stress, hypodynamia, hunger, dehydration, and the consequent exacerbation of preexisting illnesses, which are absolutely to be expected in people in a weakened state.5 During the operation, many automatic weapons, ammunition, and 76.6 kg of explosives were discovered and taken from the terrorists, including 17 automatic rifles, 20 handguns, 25 homemade explosive devices, so-called suicide belts, 2 homemade bombs in the form of metallic tanks filled with OF-540 artillery
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From page 98... ...
All of this evidence illustrates once again that the action was planned in advance and was supported in circles opposed to Russian government policy in the North Caucasus. By means of coordinated investigations and operational efforts, the Moscow city prosecutor's office, the FSB, the Main Administration for Combating Organized Crime of the MVD Criminal Militia Service, and the Moscow Main Administration for Internal Affairs have done a great deal of work to clarify the circumstances of the hostage taking, determine who actually participated in the terrorist act, uncover the connections between the terrorists and their accomplices, and obtain information about terrorist acts that might be in preparation.
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From page 99... ...
Among the materials gathered for the criminal case are a video cassette of an interview given by Maskhadov on October 18, 2002 (five days before the events) , in which he threatens to carry out terrorist acts, and a video of an August 2002 meeting of Maskhadov, Shamil Basaev, Movsar Baraev, and Abu Omar, the Arab mercenary and spiritual mentor of the fighters, at a conference of bandit group leaders in the Chechen Republic, where Baraev received his final orders and blessing to carry out the planned act.
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From page 100... ...
Russia is ready to do everything in its power to promote measures to disseminate the experience it has gained in conducting such special hostage rescue operations, to exchange information on the weapons and equipment used, and to organize joint training exercises for both command and special operations units.
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From page 101... ...
Olga Nikolaevna Romanova, born 1976, salesperson at the L'Etoile store in Moscow; (2) Konstantin Ivanovich Vasiliev, born 1967, chief specialist in the personnel department of the Main Administration for Military Court Operations of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation; (3)
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