Limiting the Magnitude of Future Climate Change (2010) / Chapter Skim
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7 Multilevel Response Strategies
7 Multilevel Response Strategies
Pages 193-214
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From page 193... ...
Chapter 4 discussed the role of international offsets in domestic climate change policy and how a domestic cap-and-trade system could be linked to international climate agreements. Chapter 6 discussed the ancillary benefits for international relations of effective climate change response measures.
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From page 194... ...
policies that could be directed toward low- and middle-income countries where emissions are rising most rapidly, and we illustrate the strategic and contingent nature of the policy problem with three scenarios for future action among these countries. Finally, we examine the roles of both competition and cooperation in encouraging international action to limit climate change.
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From page 195... ...
High-income countries have the capacity to take strong action to reduce GHG emissions, and they have growing incentives to do so as understanding of the potential damages from climate change grows. But such efforts will be insufficient to limit the extent of global climate change without effective action by the low- and middle-income countries with rapidly growing emissions -- countries that numerically dominate multilateral institutions including the United Nations (UN)
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From page 196... ...
Many international institutions and networks have some bearing on climate change, but none are comprehensive or authoritative. The complex range of existing global governance institutions reflects the large variety of interests, bureaucratic organizations, and capacities in and among states.
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From page 197... ...
Unlike a comprehensive carbon-pricing system, however, a complex of sectoral agreements would not equalize the mar ginal costs of emissions control within a jurisdiction. Sectoral agreements should therefore be seen as a potentially useful interim supplementary practice to limit emissions, rather than as a viable long-term substitute for agreements based on economy-wide caps.
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From page 198... ...
Binding global GHG emissions limits cannot be imposed by high-income countries. In the near term, some combination of incomplete international agreements and more specific limited-membership or bilateral agreements is likely.
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From page 199... ...
Distinctive Perspectives of Low- and Middle-Income Countries As discussed earlier, a significant fraction of the emissions reductions required to stabilize global atmospheric GHG concentrations must take place in low- and middleincome countries whose emissions are rapidly increasing.
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It is likely that most low- and middle-income countries will seek to keep this concept as the defin ing principle of a global climate strategy. • From the perspective of the low- and middle-income countries, the United States and other high-income countries will be credible in their demands for action only if they take effective action to limit their own GHG emissions, and if they use international institutions for addressing the problem rather than relying solely on bilateral negotiations or ad hoc groupings.
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From page 201... ...
One could argue that independent action would be beneficial for low- and middleincome countries. For instance, it is noted in Chapter 6 that measures to limit climate change can have substantial agricultural and health co-benefits for these countries.
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From page 202... ...
(Note that the potential pitfalls of international offsets are discussed in earlier chapters.) Any major financial transfers to low- and middle-income countries would surely have to be tied to technology transfer and other specific measures that help assure the public that their funding is actually contributing to genuine, additional emissions reductions.
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From page 203... ...
This sort of global regime would be very unsatisfactory in terms of emissions limitation worldwide, and it would raise serious issues of competitiveness insofar as producers in low-income countries were exempted from the costs of emissions control measures. (Similar issues would arise in scenario 2 as a result of financial transfers that relieved producers in low-income countries of the full costs of emissions reductions.)
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From page 204... ...
The implication is that BTAs could be a valuable part of a climate change policy portfolio, but only if they are firmly established within the WTO-centered international trade regime. Establishing nondiscriminatory BTAs could help to reassure domestic producers about competitiveness, prevent emissions leakage, and at the same time encourage more vigorous action by other countries.
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From page 205... ...
Continuing attempts to negotiate a comprehensive climate agreement under the UN Climate Change Convention are essential to establish good faith and to maximize the legitimacy of policy. At the same time, intensive negotiations must continue with the European Union, Japan, and other Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, and with low- and middle-income countries that are major emitters of, or sinks for, GHGs (especially China, India, Brazil, and the former Soviet Union countries)
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From page 206... ...
Several states have adopted performance emissions standards for large GHG emitters. The scope and magnitude of these state programs is potentially enormous, although significant questions remain about whether many of the state programs are more aspirational than real.
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Limiting magnitude.eps FIGURE 7.2 Cities participating in the U.S. Mayor's Climate Protection Agreement (http://www.usmayors.
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From page 208... ...
Minimum national standards may be particularly appropriate for policies traditionally within the purview of states and localities that promise large, cost-effective emissions reductions -- such as building efficiency standards. In considering the appropriate roles that states and localities should play in climate policy, it is also important to consider the way in which various judicial doctrines can preempt state and local action, even where Congress has not passed legislation expressly intended to preempt.
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From page 209... ...
, then a more stringent state program could compensate through additional emissions reductions within the state. With a federal cap in place, however, more stringent state caps may not actually produce any net decrease in U.S.
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From page 210... ...
If state programs coexist with a federal program, they risk making emissions reductions more expensive and increasing compliance costs for companies operating in multiple states. An additional consideration is how to avoid punishing states that have taken early action to reduce GHG emissions.
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From page 211... ...
For 40 years, the state has played a pioneering role in mobile source regulation, including adopting the GHG emissions standards that form the basis of the Obama Administration's establishment of a national Corporate Average Fuel Economy standard. The history of the exercise of California's authority has generally followed a consistent pattern: California first adopts mobile source standards that are more stringent than federal standards, and then, if the standards are successful, the federal government follows suit.
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From page 212... ...
This is a commonplace approach in federal environmental statutes, including the CAA and the Clean Water Act. If Congress does enact minimal national building codes, however, it should ensure that states and/or localities responsible for implementing standards have sufficient
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From page 213... ...
efforts to reduce GHG emissions, the many ways in which states and localities will be needed for implementing new federal initiatives, and the value of learning from policy experimentation at subnational levels, Congress should carefully balance federal and state/local authority and promote regulatory flexibility across jurisdictional boundaries, with consideration of factors such as the following: • The need to avoid preempting state/local authority to regulate GHG emissions more stringently than federal law ("ceiling preemption") without a strong policy justification; • The need for any new GHG emissions-reduction policies to clearly indicate whether a state retains regulatory authority (given various judicial doctrines that can preempt state and local action even without express preemption language from Congress)
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