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2 Consideration of Site-Specific Risk and Mitigation Factors
Pages 19-26

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From page 19...
... • "To assist in the development of the operational protocols needed to safely and securely operate the facility. • "To include an integrated set of analyses using plume modeling and epidemiological impact modeling." The NRC report Review of the Department of Homeland Security's Approach to Risk Analysis recently evaluated the quality of the current DHS approach to estimating risk and applying those estimates in its many management, planning, and resource-allocation activities (NRC, 2010a)
From page 20...
... The Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) is on an uninhabited island, whereas the NBAF will be in a suburban-rural area that has a large human 1 Credibility could also be jeopardized in the event of escape of a zoonotic pathogen if the infected workers lacked access to top-quality infectious disease expertise and facilities.
From page 21...
... Figure 2-1 shows the proximity of the planned facility to the local population at KSU. The large population that gathers for football games and other events is potentially susceptible to infections with a zoonotic agent; additionally, the presence of large numbers of vehicles during public events increases the odds that some will transport a released pathogen outside of the area, increasing the potential for spread and complicating mitigation.
From page 22...
... It is expected that the NBAF will continue the PIADC responsibility of providing foreign animal disease training to qualify veterinarians as foreign animal disease diagnosticians. The NBAF will also provide opportunities for training KSU graduate students and postdoctoral research associates.
From page 23...
... MRHC does not have the appropriate level of clinical isolation facilities, diagnostic laboratory capability, or world-class infectious disease clinicians experienced in diagnosing and treating for exposure to BSL-4 pathogens. It does not meet the standards of performance found at BSL-4 research facilities at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, USAMRIID, and the University of Texas Medical Branch (see NRC, 2010b for similar issues regarding laboratoryacquired infections in USAMRIID and the community's impact in developing response measures)
From page 24...
... Passive surveillance is based on a traditional system in which practicing veterinarians report suspected "vesicular diseases", and this would not be applicable to the zoonotic pathogens that would be in the NBAF. To fulfill the SSRA's recommendation of enhancing local diagnostic capability to support regional surveillance and traceback capability, it will be essential to provide funding and validated tests to enable the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN)
From page 25...
... Tornado Climatology. In: National Climatic Data Center Technical Report 99-02, NCDC/NOAA: Asheville, NC.


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