Evaluation of a Site-Specific Risk Assessment for the Department of Homeland Security's Planned National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas (2010) / Chapter Skim
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Pages 57-68
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From page 57... ...
, and has addressed mitigation strategies for each. DHS has also appropriately responded to the Government Accountability Office's (GAO's)
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The SSRA did not account for the cumulative risk of a release and infection that could spread across the expected life span of the NBAF. The need to include lifetime risk estimates is consistent with the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9)
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Finding 2: The SSRA overlooks some critical issues, both site-specific and non-site-specific, that could significantly elevate the risk of accidental release and spread of pathogens. Site-Specific Although the SSRA accounted for the role of sales barns in increasing risk due to Kansas's central location as a hub of the U.S.
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The committee could not determine whether the user judgments were reasonable or optimistic and therefore could not determine whether the models underestimate the risk of a high-speed wind event, such as a tornado, and its consequences. The use of a tornado hazard model would have eliminated the need for user judgment, and would more appropriately provide information about the design basis wind speed and building envelope design.
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From page 61... ...
As shown in the SSRA, the high level of animal movement and the presence of sales barns near Manhattan, Kansas, significantly increase the degree of FMD spread and its economic impact. Finding 5: Substantial gaps in knowledge make predicting the course of an FMD outbreak very difficult, which led to weaknesses in the SSRA.
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From page 62... ...
The epidemiological modeling assumptions that were used in the economic assessment, such as depopulation rates and outbreak duration, were overoptimistic in their estimates. The committee questions the SSRA's assumption that its proposed mitigation strategy would contain the spread of FMD by culling 120-720 herds per day (page 230 of the SSRA)
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The mitigation strategies that are provided do not realistically demonstrate current or foreseen capacity for how federal, state, and local authorities would effectively respond to and control a pathogen release. Human Health The committee is concerned about the lack of clinical isolation facilities and world-class infectious disease clinicians experienced in diagnosing and treating laboratory staff or communities exposed to BSL-4 pathogens in the Manhattan, Kansas area.
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It will be crucial for a world-class facility like the NBAF to provide response plans that include world-class infectious disease clinical facilities and physicians who can properly diagnose, contain, and treat infected individuals. Animal Health The SSRA acknowledges that the Manhattan, Kansas, region is a hub of animal movement for the entire United States and that infected animals would be expected to move across the country and cause pockets of infection at great distances from the initial source of infection.
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Finding 10: The committee agrees with the SSRA's conclusion that investment in biosafety and biosecurity engineering and the training of personnel and responders can reduce the risks, but is concerned about current design plans that potentially compromise safety measures. Given that the SSRA states that the cost of a release (such as a release of FMDv)
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The committee does not agree that the BSL-3 quantitative risk assessment adequately frames the risks associated with operating a BSL-4 large animal facility, because it is insufficient to use BSL-3 pathogens to predict risks associated with BSL-4 pathogens that are zoonotic and for which no treatment is available. Given that the qualitative risk assessment was inadequate and that the SSRA did not perform a quantitative risk assessment for BSL-4 agents, further evaluation of risks and mitigation strategies will need to be established for BSL-4 agents (for example, Nipah and Hendra viruses or other emerging BSL-4 zoonotic pathogens)
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Such interagency working relationships are often pragmatically difficult, but they are essential for minimizing risks and putting in place mitigation strategies that can minimize the effects of a release from the NBAF. CONCLUDING REMARKS The SSRA team should be applauded for its effort in conducting an extensive risk assessment in such a short period of time.
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2009. Sustaining Global Surveillance and Response to Emerging Zoonotic Diseases.
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