Budgeting for Immigration Enforcement A Path to Better Performance (2011) / Chapter Skim
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6 Budgeting Challenges
6 Budgeting Challenges
Pages 95-116
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From page 95... ...
And, it may be possible to inform budget choices with better information and analysis of the possible effects of alternative resource uses, so analysts can help policy makers better apply resources to meet the policy goals of immigration enforcement and not merely meet current program needs. We begin this chapter by recognizing the generic challenges that face analysts and policy makers for any complex, dynamic administrative system.
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From page 96... ...
Marshals Service with a flat budget unless and until new information justifies an increase or decrease." For policy and program areas in which the processes underlying budget demands are understandable and relatively stable, incremental methods often suffice to produce reasonably accurate estimates of future resource requirements. For many annually appropriated programs, this approach works quite well.
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From page 97... ...
So what method of estimation should DOJ use to develop initial estimates of resource needs for the immigration enforcement budget? A primary driver of service demand for DOJ immigration enforcement is the number of people apprehended as unauthorized immigrants each year.
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From page 98... ...
. Figure 6-1 2,000,000 R02080 1,800,000 vector editable 1,600,000 1,400,000 1,200,000 Number 1,000,000 800,000 600,000 400,000 200,000 0 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Year Deportable aliens located Federal prison population FIGURE 6-2 Comparison of federal prison population and deportable aliens located, 1962-2010.
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From page 99... ...
the nonlinear nature of relationships within the administrative system responsible for executing immigration enforcement policy; 2 Apprehended unauthorized immigrants can be seen as "customers" generating demand on DOJ's parts of the enforcement system. Service quality (however defined)
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From page 100... ...
A fundamental observation of the study of such queuing is that sys 4 In technical terms, DOJ's processing of immigration cases is a queuing problem, that is, a problem in which a group of "customers" wait in line to obtain a service, a service provider makes decisions about how it will allocate resources to various "servers," and the customers' wait time depends on those decisions. Unauthorized immigrants and their associated cases are "customers"; DOJ is the service provider; DOJ assets (e.g., U.S.
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From page 101... ...
First, the increased ille gal flows into Arizona reflected a behavioral response by immigrants, as migration flows shifted to Arizona in the wake of new enforcement resources put in place in Texas and California beginning in the 1990s. Second, within the Tucson sector, the rising number of unauthorized immi grants facing formal removal and criminal charges produced nonlinear spillovers at various nodes in the DOJ enforcement process, most notably at choke points in holding cells, court rooms, and transportation capacity.
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From page 102... ...
102 BUDGETING FOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT BOX 6-1 An Illustration of Queuing Effects If the waiting time per customer were linear in utilization, forecasting would be fairly easy. For example, if demand (the number of unauthorized immigrants fed into the DOJ system by DHS)
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From page 103... ...
adaptations by service providers, such as prosecutors or immi gration judges, who change the amount of time and resources invested in each "customer" by developing more efficient mecha nisms to place immigrants in formal removal and subject them to criminal charges; and 2. adaptation by potential unauthorized immigrants, who respond to new enforcement procedures by adjusting, for example, their efforts to enter and evade apprehension, which mean that resource demands for a given level of illegal immigration change over time, and they are a barrier to statistical estimation or modeling based on past behavior and therefore to prediction for budgeting.
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From page 104... ...
. Components of DOJ that process unauthorized immigrants have been extraordinarily adaptive in this regard.
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From page 105... ...
But, as noted in Chapter 3, the evidence on deterrence suggests there has been only a small effect of tougher enforcement on the volume of unauthorized immigration .8 Moreover, the recent volume of unauthorized immigration has been large enough that even with a sharp drop in flow and a related drop in apprehensions, the potential decline in DOJ enforcement services demand has been more than offset by the increasing proportion of people appre 7 For brief descriptions of the joint automated booking system and law enforcement sharing program that contribute to greater productivity for the immigration enforcement function as well as other law enforcement functions of DOJ, see U.S. Department of Justice (2011b)
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From page 106... ...
Thus, the demand for DOJ services is a complicated result of adaptation not only by potential unauthorized immigrants, but also by DHS and DOJ decision makers and administrators, including policies that involve increased "consequences" for violation of immigration laws. Apart from any deterrent effect, adaptive behavior by unauthorized immigrants could affect the amount and distribution of DOJ's workload costs in several ways, including a "caging effect," a "balloon effect," and reactive changes in the mix of immigrants.
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From page 107... ...
.9 Regardless of the overall effect on resource requirements, needs may change dramatically in short periods in one or many geographic locations. Reactive Changes in the Mix of Unauthorized Immigrants.
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From page 108... ...
In particular, while DOJ enforcement practices and resource demands are set by federal court districts, DHS practices and spending decisions are made by Border Patrol sectors and ICE field offices, and local law enforcement agencies operate at city, county, and state levels. These various jurisdictional boundaries do not either coincide or nest within each other: for example, there are federal court districts that span multiple field offices' jurisdictions and vice versa.
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From page 109... ...
In addition to these completely exogenous impacts on the immigration system, demand for enforcement resources also reflects policy changes at the federal, state, and local levels that occur outside of DOJ. Major, or even moderate, shifts in policy -- such as increased apprehen sions of visa overstayers or systematic changes in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion -- can have striking implications for resource needs throughout the immigration enforcement system.
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From page 110... ...
Abrupt shifts, uncoordinated actions, and different entities working at cross purposes are very common in this policy area, as in many others. Budget analysts and planners would need to anticipate the effects of a policy shift not only for DOJ's activities, but also for those of DHS and even state and local governments to the extent that the latter would affect DOJ's resource requirements.
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From page 111... ...
From DOJ's administrative and operating perspective, "external" factors also include the policies and behavior of the enforce ment components overseen by DHS. Information about planned changes in DHS's policies and practices is often unavailable when DOJ is developing budget estimates, as noted above, and when the Office of Manage ment and Budget and then Congress are reviewing those estimates.
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From page 112... ...
In addition, one of the high-priority goals set in 2010 by the Obama Administration for DOJ was to increase immigration judges by 19 percent by the end of fiscal 2011 so that as DHS criminal alien enforcement activity increased, not less than 85 percent of the immigration court detained cases would be completed within 60 days. Without meaningful measures of performance relative to the policy objectives of immigration enforcement -- such as measures of success in reducing successful illegal entry, or length of stay, or prompt and fair adjudication of status -- it is not possible to relate specific activities or resource uses to such enforcement outcomes.
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From page 113... ...
First, the case histories would have to be completed so that all critical events in administrative databases, and their dates, are included: this task will require combining the new case histories data maintained by DHS with matched administrative records for the same cases in DOJ. Second, personal histories -- including basic demographic characteristics and other background information (such as previously recorded apprehensions and encounters with federal immigration officials or other law enforcement and criminal backgrounds)
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From page 114... ...
One task is to estimate future resource requirements to carry out established programs and activities. A second task is to identify and assess alternative ways to use resources that may be more effective in achieving policy goals.
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From page 115... ...
The addition of information about performance and expanded use of case histories may increase the ability to conduct a "what if" analysis of how changes in resource uses may affect other system components and could contribute to changes in performance. This analysis could inform budget choices, improve decisions about where to use budgeted resources, and possibly improve performance.
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