Meeting Critical Laboratory Needs for Animal Agriculture Examination of Three Options (2012) / Chapter Skim
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Given its importance, there is a need to protect it from threats of FADs and zoonotic diseases and from potential threats caused by new and emerging pathogens. The proposed NBAF has been envisioned as a nextgeneration laboratory that would have a central role in the national infrastructure needed to handle threats from FADs, zoonotic diseases, and emerging diseases.
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Numerous recent National Research Council studies have assessed disease threats to animal and public health, and the committee did not attempt an exhaustive reconsideration of the broad array of disease agents that can affect animal agriculture. The list of disease threats has not changed nor have the drivers of disease emergence in our global society that can give rise to novel agents or to disease outbreaks caused by agents that are exotic to the United States.
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The committee addressed its study task in the context of an ideal integrated system for addressing FAD and zoonotic disease threats to the United States and considered what the role of a national biocontainment laboratory would be within such a system. The ideal system would capture and integrate the substantial human and physical assets distributed throughout the nation to address the threat of FADs and zoonotic diseases.
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However, the primary responsibility of those laboratories is to address their own national government and domestic needs. Trained Workforce Integrated System for Disease Threats Diagnostic Laboratory Network FIGURE S-1 Components of an integrated national system for addressing foreign animal disease and zoonotic disease threats.
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Such a laboratory infrastructure would include the capacity to safely perform diagnostics, to conduct research on foot-andmouth disease, to conduct research on non-foot-and-mouth disease FADs and zoonotic diseases in BSL-3Ag facilities, to undertake special pathogen activities in BSL-4 and ABSL-4 facilities, to support teaching and training, and to enable vaccine or other product development. In the context of these critical core laboratory components, the committee examined the advantages and liabilities of the three proposed options in its statement of task: constructing NBAF as currently designed, scaling back the size and scope of the proposed NBAF, or maintaining the current PIADC and leveraging the US capability and capacity through international laboratories with ABSL-4 large-animal containment space.
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Option 2 highlights a change in the approach to animal diseases by drawing on scientific and research expertise available in other federal laboratories and outside government, providing intellectual benefits and possible cost savings through increased efficiencies by avoiding duplication, and fostering greater collaboration between researchers as part of an integrated US system for countering FAD and zoonotic disease threats. Finally, by relying on a network of partners, this option may provide increased flexibility to re-evaluate laboratory infrastructure needs periodically in light of new and emerging disease priorities and technologies.
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Because this option would not provide the United States with ABSL-4 large-animal capabilities, agreements with foreign partners for access to ABSL-4 large-animal space and funding to support these collaborations would be required. Although that could enhance international collaboration in research on FADs and zoonotic diseases, it could limit the availability of ABSL-4 capabilities in a time of critical need, depending on the priorities of the foreign countries, and would separate ABSL-4 large-animal facilities from other FAD research.
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That analysis extends beyond the scope of the current study. In exploring national capabilities, the committee found a substantial number of public and private biocontainment laboratories across the country; these are capabilities that did not exist nearly a decade ago when Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 was issued, nor did they exist when previous NRC reports on options for a national biocontainment laboratory were issued.
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The National Animal Health Laboratory Network is an excellent model of such a distributed laboratory network and would serve a critical role in a more comprehensive and integrated national strategy. Balanced Support for Infrastructure and Research and Development The committee concludes that it is critical for policy-makers and agency planners to recognize that an effective system for addressing FAD and zoonotic disease threats to the United States consists of more than facilities; it also requires robust research programs.
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The ideal system to counter threats from for eign animal diseases (FADs) and zoonotic diseases includes research, development, and training; a centralized core facility; a distributed network of national and interna tional partnerships; and disease surveillance, diagnostic, and response capabilities.
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. Conclusion 2: A partnership of a central national laboratory of reduced scope and size and a distributed laboratory network can effectively protect the United States from FADs and zoonotic diseases, potentially realize cost savings, reduce redundan cies while increasing efficiencies, and enhance the cohesiveness of a national system of biocontainment laboratories.
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RECOMMENDATION Regardless of the options considered for a central facility, the committee rec ommends that DHS and USDA develop and implement an integrated national strat egy that utilizes a distributed system for addressing FAD and zoonotic disease threats.
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