Responding to Capability Surprise A Strategy for U.S. Naval Forces (2013) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
1 Framing the Problem
1 Framing the Problem
Pages 15-31
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From page 15... ...
2009. Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise, Volume I: Main Report, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington, D.C., September, pp.
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Disruptive technology (including the disruptive application of existing technology) and tactical surprise involve short-timeline events or capabilities -- hours to months -- for which naval forces probably have not had sufficient time to develop countermeasures unless they were at least somewhat anticipated.
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RADM Brad Hicks, USN, Program Director, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, "Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense: Press Briefing, March 19, 2008," presented to the committee by RADM Joseph A Horn, Jr., USN, Program Executive, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, and Conrad J
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The committee selected them in part because each addresses an issue important to one of the three naval forces. Denial of space access is treated in a Navy context, social media manipulation is framed to apply in a Marine Corps environment, and domestic disaster relief is largely a Coast Guard mission.
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naval forces will be covered more extensively in an upcoming NSB study, commissioned by the CNO, and anticipated to begin in 2013.
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It decided to explore the three surprise scenarios and three of the programs, which it called "examplars,"10 to help illuminate the following: • Certain areas of potential surprise outside the mainstream acquisition programs that may impede anticipation and/or response; • Successful principles and infrastructures that might be integrated into existing naval organizational structures and processes to deal with broader capability surprises; • Structures and processes that could accommodate the three surprise scenarios that are currently unaddressed or underaddressed (space access, flash mob arranged for by social media, disaster response) ; 9 Lisa Anderson.
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program, whose responsiveness was exemplified by the shooting down of the wayward National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) satellite in Operation Burnt Frost.13 The principles and key ingredients used by each exemplar program to deal with potential capability surprise are similar: a stable program and infrastructure; a capability thread that includes research and technology development; modeling and simulation; expert staff; acquisition and industrial capability; testing infrastructure; and very visible senior leadership support and top cover.
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• Phase 1, Scanning and Awareness. Involves scanning the horizon for potential technologies, technical applications, and operational behaviors that could Functional Framework Identify potential Equip and train surprises Assess Develop, surprise test, field & rank in Communicate/ terms of Engage likelihood Stakeholders in & severity Enterprise-wide Process Resource and Develop candidate mitigation plan for concepts & strategies and mitigation select FIGURE 1-1 Six phases required for mitigating capability surprise.
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U.S. naval forces test operational capability, leveraging the U.S.
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Figure 1-2 indicates the relationship between the three activities and the six phases of the framework. options for COORDINATING SURPRISE MITIGATION The committee discussed in detail how to recommend leadership and associated activities that could enable our naval forces to implement the surprise mitigation framework.
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The committee was especially mindful that in the present environment of limited resources and the need to consider affordability, the setting up of a new office would be considered unrealistic. On the other hand, the committee was keenly aware that it would be ineffective to just declare the need for the framework to be addressed and to state that the naval culture should consider potential surprises.
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To extend the N9I office's mission to also address capability surprise mitigation seems synergistic, but it does introduce the need for additional staffing and coordination. Option 2: Incorporate into the Existing N2/N6I Office The N2/N6 information dominance role resonates with a number of potential surprises, including the scenarios (Appendix A)
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Option 4: Assign to the Office of Naval Research Since the Office of Naval Research (ONR) is recognized as key to organizing research horizon search and assessment activities, through leadership from ONRGlobal in collaboration with the Office of Naval Intelligence and others, and since ONR is expected to lead in the formation of critical technical experiments and prototyping, perhaps it could be assigned responsibility for coordinating surprise mitigation for naval forces.
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However, while the committee considers the OSD office to be a focus of collaboration across the Services, the office would not be expected to focus on predominately naval surprise issues. Furthermore, mitigation of surprises directed against our naval forces must be implemented by the naval organizations themselves, especially in the case of rapid fielding, acquisition system upgrades, and the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures.
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In summary, the committee considered the N9I office within OPNAV to be the most likely existing organization from which to coordinate surprise mitigation for naval forces in concert with joint forces and national assets. However, the committee considered that it would be presumptuous to recommend that office if the CNO determines, based on plans and considerations of which the committee is not aware, that another office is more appropriate.
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From page 30... ...
naval forces to engage in a broad spectrum of issues, from horizon scanning to red teaming to experimentation and rapid proto typing, to exercising, fielding, and training. While there are a few exemplar organizations in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard as well as the Department of Defense that effectively work on capability surprise, there is neither an overall framework for nor a clear delineation of U.S.
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naval forces are proactive in developing and anticipating surprise capabilities it is recom mended that representatives from Special Operations Command (SOCOM) be an integral part of this office.
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