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Appendix D
Pages 266-303

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From page 266...
... the U.S. national security export control regime, (2)
From page 267...
... proposal. GENERAL ISSUES The Need for Export Controls Almost no one with whom the European delegation met advocated the complete abolishment of export controls.
From page 268...
... controls on the reexport by any country of U.S.-origin items. Nearly all the Europeans with whom the delegation met thought their country was doing an adequate job of maintaining a domestic export control regime.
From page 269...
... However, they also believe other CoCom countries do not completely share their view and are allowing controlled technology to be reexported. DIFFERENTIATION The British stated that a core list should apply to all destinations, a view that is consistent with the British opposition to differentiation.: They acknowledged that the nations of Eastern Europe could still prove to be a vehicle for diversions of Western technology to the Soviet Union, but they countered that differentiation would only encourage the Soviets to increase their efforts to divert technology.
From page 270...
... on chemical weapons. The British vigorously watch trade in the precursor chemicals on the AG's control list and have added six more to that list; they have also established a warning list in an effort to work with the British business community.
From page 271...
... The government believes that after the penalty has been paid, there is no need for additional, long-term recriminations. The British stated that, after the 1992 European market integration, the government will still maintain some forth of national administration of export controls.
From page 272...
... Further, the group believes that it is important to bring chemical weapons, missile technology, and nuclear trade into a CoCom-like framework. Finally, in the group's view, the act of European integration should create a unified market that is bound around its external border by an export control regime that is a "ring of steel." The industrialists saw telecommunications as a very high priority for the economic development of Eastern Europe.
From page 273...
... The officials also noted that telecommunication equipment is essential to infrastructure development in Eastern Europe. In this regard, the French do understand the objections of the U.S.
From page 274...
... Indeed, the French government's inclusion of industry representatives in technical advisory meetings was designed to increase the transparency of the process. On the matter of alternative proliferation control regimes, the French government already maintains control lists for the export of munitions, nuclear items, and missile technology.
From page 275...
... They only converse with other members of the French delegation. Finally, the industrialists remarked that it has always appeared to them that the United States simply did not trust the French export control regime.
From page 276...
... In a sense, additional time would enable developing proliferation control regimes, primarily those concerned with chemical weapons and ballistic missile production, to develop and become codified. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development A brief session was held at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to discuss the activities of the recently established Center for Cooperation with Economies in Transition in Eastern Europe.
From page 277...
... · Indigenous production of technical goods within the former GDR under existing contracts would not be subject to export controls even if the item was on a control list.
From page 278...
... EUROPEAN COMMUNITY The FRG government believes that, in a post-1992 environment, the European Community will be reluctant to get involved in export control issues. This is primarily because the European Community has few resources of strategic value and little experience in the export control arena.
From page 279...
... INDUSTRY PARTICIPATION The FRG officials said that the government relied heavily on German industry when deciding on technical export control issues and in official delegations to CoCom, because it does not maintain the necessary expertise within its bureaucracy and intentionally excludes its Ministry of Defense from involvement in CoCom matters. In fact, the government is encouraging greater industry and trade association participation in the CoCom process.
From page 280...
... components in order to escape U.S. reexport controls (i.e., "de-Americanization")
From page 281...
... export controls, but it has not eliminated it. German firms also continue to be concerned about the impact of U.S.
From page 282...
... That is why streamlining the control lists is so important. The Belgians noted that the country has export controls of many types, which are carried out by Royal Decree and under the authority of the Export Act of 1964.
From page 283...
... Some industrial representatives do assist the Ministry of Economic Affairs, but only as technical advisors. The government believes that it is very difficult to justify imposing domestic Belgian export controls on third countries when it is obvious that many other members of CoCom do not.
From page 284...
... The 1992 market integration does not mean that all export controls will disappear, however. Rather, the emphasis will shift to creating strengthened external trade borders.
From page 285...
... proposals to CoCom, Swiss export control procedures, and chemical weapons and missile technology issues. The discussion with government officials was chaired by the Ministry of Economics and began with a discussion of the recent U.S.
From page 286...
... "Swiss blues" are copies of Swiss licenses, which are provided to other governments when an export involves the retransfer of goods or goods that contain non-Swiss components. tThe Asian delegation visited Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, the Republic of Korea, and Japan in February 1990.
From page 287...
... In a sense, Macao is an open and unregulated door into China. Export Control Issues The delegation was impressed by the sophisticated levels of technology embodied in goods and products that were available throughout Asia.
From page 288...
... the Japanese government had taken a series of concrete steps to upgrade Japan's export control efforts. Similarly, the delegation was impressed with the efforts in Hong Kong to execute a vigorous plan of export control.
From page 289...
... In 1989, North America was the leading importer, with a 42 percent share of Taiwan's exports; Western Europe followed at 38 percent and Asia, primarily lIong Kong and Singapore, at 15 percent. Because of the changes in Eastern Europe, Taiwan plans to increase its exports to those nations over the next five years.
From page 290...
... . All were part of a working group that is putting together Taiwan's export control regime.
From page 291...
... The Hong Kong system of export control is an extension of the British system. Although Hong Kong has no direct links to CoCom, it adheres to all CoCom rules.
From page 292...
... Many of the representatives stated that Hong Kong was not an export sieve for goods destined for China. In general, they praised the efforts of the Hong Kong Department of Trade to carry out British/CoCom export policies.
From page 293...
... MEETINGS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA Government Officials M~N~sTRY OF FoRE~GN AFFA~Rs At a meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) , officials confirmed Korea's willingness to adopt some form of bilateral export control relation with the United States.
From page 294...
... CUSTOMS SERVICE The delegation met with a senior South Korean customs official, who said that his department would enforce whatever regulations were agreed to with the United States. He indicated that the Customs Service was still learning about checking shipments and enforcing export controls, but that progress was being made.
From page 295...
... Korean Institute for International Economic Policy The delegation met with officials of the Korean Institute for International Economic Policy to discuss a broad range of economic issues, primarily the reporting of its results to the Korean government. The institute provided a review of a number of problems currently facing the Korean economy, including the following: · A U.S.
From page 296...
... The government has noted that these efforts have had the effect of lengthening the export licensing process for all Japanese firms. Government Officials MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY AS a result of the Toshiba-Kongsberg affair, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the lead agency in Japan's export control regime, increased its staff devoted to export controls from 43 to 106 people, and has become more attentive to end-user and end-use statements.
From page 297...
... The MOFA officials believe that it is critical to streamline the control lists as soon as possible, with respect to both their length and their complexity. The MOFA officials noted that the Japanese government holds interagency meetings on export control matters on a frequent, but irregular basis, and usually at the director or deputy director level.
From page 298...
... The center was not involved in the intensive CoCom list review for computers, telecommunications, and machine tools. The directors of export control affairs for three major Japanese companies attended the CISTEC meeting.
From page 299...
... foreign policy export controls on U.S.Canadian relations. · The Canadian government's administration of CoCom export controls.
From page 300...
... Canadian export controls are administered under the authority of the Export/Import Permits Act. This act prohibits unilateral controls and requires that the control list be linked to CoCom.
From page 301...
... They also believe that linking trade sanctions to compliance with export controls was counterproductive.
From page 302...
... In general, the group viewed export controls as a restriction on legitimate business, and they questioned whether export controls really address security concerns or are a mechanism for protecting markets. They believe that the primary determining factor in licensing a sale should be the end use, not the technical capabilities, of a product.
From page 303...
... export controls are more liberal than Canadian controls. They noted, however, that the United States has major problems in the areas of commodity jurisdiction and distinguishing between technical facts and policy factors.


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