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2 Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Pages 31-52

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From page 31...
... The 2011 strategic plan contains vision and mission statements as well as six strategic goals, as described in Chapter 1. While there are clear linkages between current NASA programs and the goals, there is no explicit prioritization among the goals in the 2011 strategic plan.
From page 32...
... Since the end of the Apollo program in the early 1970s, the human spaceflight program has been much more capability driven than mission driven. For example, the Space Shuttle Program was capability driven, in that it was intended to provide a new capability (low-cost transportation to low Earth orbit [LEO]
From page 33...
... Key decadal survey priorities in astronomy and astrophysics, planetary science, and Earth science now will not be pursued for many years, or not at all. The carefully crafted strategic planning process, with its priority setting and consensus building, that has led in the past to the United States leading the world, with science missions such as the Curiosity rover on the surface of Mars and the Hubble Space Telescope, is now in jeopardy because it no longer may lead to a tangible program outcome.
From page 34...
... During the course of its deliberations, the committee did not hear a clear rationale for the overall decline in NASA aeronautics spending during the past 10-12 years. In some cases, it appears as if shortfalls in other NASA budgets, such as human spaceflight, resulted in reductions in the aeronautics budget to pay for them.
From page 35...
... Tighter budget constraints highlight fundamental choices within the program portfolio, particularly with regard to the relative emphasis and funding among the human exploration, space science, Earth science, aeronautics, and technology development programs. This points to the critical need for a strategic plan that has clear priorities and a transparent budget allocation process.
From page 36...
... competence in launch vehicle technologies. Currently, space operations and exploration programs that encompass the agency's human spaceflight activities constitute nearly half of the NASA budget, while Earth and space science constitutes 29 percent of the budget and aeronautics constitutes just 3 percent of the budget.
From page 37...
... This would require reducing or eliminating one or more of NASA's current portfolio elements (human exploration, Earth and space science, aeronautics, and space technology) in favor of the remaining elements.
From page 38...
... Option 1 might also diminish NASA personnel capabilities if changes in policies prompted large numbers of key personnel to retire or seek other employment. To be effective, Option 2 may require congressional authorization for NASA to make long-term financial commitments to a particular program to assure prospective partners that neither NASA nor Congress will unilaterally cancel a joint program.
From page 39...
... Recommendation: Following the establishment of a new consensus on the agency's future, NASA should establish a new strategic plan that provides a framework for decisions on how the agency will pursue its strategic goals and objectives, allows for flexible and realistic implementation, clearly establishes agency-wide priorities to guide the allocation of resources within the agency budget, and presents a comprehensive picture that integrates the various fields of aeronautics and space activities. Recommendation: NASA's new strategic plan, future budget proposals prepared by the administration, and future NASA authorization and appropriation acts passed by Congress should include actions that will eliminate the current mismatch between NASA's budget and its portfolio of programs, facilities, and staff, while establishing and maintaining a sustainable distribution of resources among human spaceflight, Earth and space science, and aeronautics, through some combination of the kinds of options identified above by the committee.
From page 40...
... In addition, the human spaceflight program provides a basis for advancing science (such as life and microgravity research conducted on the International Space Station) while achieving closer international relationships with program partners and thus contributing to broader foreign policy objectives.
From page 41...
... such as the Hubble Space Telescope, the James Webb Space Telescope, or the Curiosity rover, and by small Explorer, Discovery or New Frontiers style missions. (See Figure 2.4.)
From page 42...
... global leadership, particularly in Earth and space science and human spaceflight. The United States has consolidated its leadership in space since the early days of NASA through the era of the space shuttle, the Hubble Space Telescope, and the ISS.
From page 43...
... Projects such as Mars sample return, future missions to the outer planets and their moons, and the next generation of space telescopes will need to be executed by international consortia. But unless NASA can address cost overruns and the United States can address budget shortfalls, which have resulted in there being little funds to pursue the next generation of ambitious international space science missions, the success of the international approach to demonstrating U.S.
From page 44...
... This is inherently recognized through NASA's participation in the International Space Exploration Contact Group -- a non-binding process for dialog involving many of the world's space agencies on establishing future pathways for human exploration. However, a note of caution is still called for.
From page 45...
... Recommendation: The United States should explore opportunities to lead a more international approach to future large space efforts both in the human space program and in the science program. If extending human presence beyond LEO orbit remains part of NASA's strategic goals and objectives, the United States could take the lead in establishing a global vision for the future of human exploration, which would be a long-term international venture that builds on the success of the ISS partnership and includes all willing space powers.
From page 46...
... However, this also makes it more difficult for NASA to manage its centers 6 Ames Research Center, Dryden Flight Research Center, Glenn Research Center, Goddard Space Flight Center, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, Langley Research Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, Stennis Space Flight Center. In addition, during the visit to Glenn Research Center, members of the committee also visited the nearby Plum Brook Station, which has recently undertaken work for the European Space Agency and may soon be providing its facilities to other international and commercial partners on a reimbursable basis.
From page 47...
... The Cross Agency Support budget funds NASA operations, including the construction of facilities and infrastructure, to provide capabilities that cannot be tied directly to the needs of a particular program. Cross Agency Support also funds environmental compliance and restoration activities.
From page 48...
... For example, during a visit to the NASA Plum Brook facility, members of the committee heard about industrial and international use of the test facilities. During a visit to the Kennedy Space Center, members of the committee heard about efforts to attract industry to use buildings and equipment no longer required for the space shuttle program and government regulations that make it difficult for NASA to transfer excess facilities to other partners.
From page 49...
... Finding: NASA officials lack flexibility in how to manage the agency in terms of personnel and facilities, a contributing factor to the mismatch between budget and mission. Conclusion: The NASA field centers do not appear to be managed as an integrated resource to support the agency and its strategic goals and objectives.
From page 50...
... For example, the public supports the space program in general, but that support is thin when the billion-dollar cost of major NASA programs is revealed and/or when surveys ask the public to prioritize NASA activities with other government functions such as national defense, education, public health, and so on. Even during the Apollo era (see Figure 2.7)
From page 51...
... While human spaceflight has been the most visible of NASA's accomplishments over many decades, there is no consensus on the next destination for humans beyond LEO, and thus on the required technological developments for launch systems, spacecraft, and related technologies. Beyond human spaceflight and operations, robotic space exploration, Earth and space science, and aeronautics all contribute in important ways to the nation's science and technology advancement, but the available funding for support of all of these mission areas will likely be inadequate for the foreseeable future.
From page 52...
... 2004. A Journey to Inspire, Innovate, and Discover: Report of the President's Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.


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