Skip to main content

The Resilience of the Electric Power Delivery System in Response to Terrorism and Natural Disasters Summary of a Workshop (2013) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:

2 Grid Infrastructure
Pages 4-9

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 4...
... Such careful balance naturally introduces four vulnerabilities: • Large, centralized power generation sources are often highlighted as potential targets for terrorists since the loss of a large generator would reduce electrical capacity by hundreds of gigawatts. However, as Dr.
Read the entire page →
From page 5...
... Bienstock hopes to develop real-time control algorithms that can analyze a cascading blackout and, while perhaps not mitigating it fully, at least identify the measures to make it less disruptive. Using publicly available data for the Eastern Interconnect, he was able to show how one such control algorithm, in conjunction with fast-acting controls, could rapidly stabilize the blackout, reducing the number of line outages from almost 6,000 to just 11 for a particular initial outage.
Read the entire page →
From page 6...
... Kassakian both noted that an EMP weapon, which could be as small as a briefcase, could be used to attack the control systems of the grid at the same time as an attack on the physical infrastructure, thus significantly compounding the effect of the physical attack by disabling some of the inherent balancing mechanisms in the grid. A cyberattack combined with a physical attack on the infrastructure may have a similarly crippling effect, as is discussed in Chapter 3.
Read the entire page →
From page 7...
... While the components of a substation are relatively easily replaced, the difficulty of and lead time necessary for replacing a transformer is a hindrance that can slow down the mitigation response. Anjan Bose, Washington State University, currently on leave and serving on the Department of Energy's Grid Tech Team, did mention that the recent rebirth of transformer manufacturing in the United States, as described by Mr.
Read the entire page →
From page 8...
... While the transport of the transformer requires state permitting in advance, the convoy design enables rapid installation by transferring its oil, cooling equipment, and other ancillary equipment (control cabinets, bushings, etc.) along with the transformer.
Read the entire page →
From page 9...
... Bienstock, who illustrated the effectiveness of real-time control algorithms in the case of multiple line failures. In his example, such algorithms limited the cascading losses to 11 outaged lines and 25.5 percent yield as compared to the case without such controls (39.3 percent lost yield and 5,959 outaged lines)
Read the entire page →

Key Terms

  • physical attack
  • physical infrastructure
  • transformer program
  • hurricane sandy
  • recx recovery

  • bulk power
  • easily replaced
  • sarah mahmood
  • transmission lines
  • terrorist attacks

  • security measures
  • whitley noted
  • switching station
  • granger morgan
  • lead time

  • natural disasters
  • transformer manufacturing
  • power grid
  • physical attacks
  • spare recovery

  • transformer requires
  • physical hardening
  • recx transformer
  • mitigation response
  • trade center

  • kassakian highlighted
  • electrical capacity
  • impact interchangeability
  • moving forward
  • additional complications


    • This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
    More information on Chapter Skim is available.