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8 Organizational Interaction in Response and Recovery
Pages 122-156

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From page 122...
... The organizational interaction is particularly interesting in this event, given the multiple geographic locations of damage from the disaster, the multiple jurisdictional levels involved in disaster response and recovery activities, and the multiple perspectives required for timely and appropriate disaster assistance to the affected populations. Further, the complexity of organizational requirements in some aspects of the disaster operations process increased cumulatively over time, as problems not resolved early in the response phase generated more serious secondary and tertiary effects in the recovery and reconstruction phase.
From page 123...
... to provide a succinct, descriptive account of the major types of organizations involved in disaster response and recovery activities by geographic location, jurisdictional level, type of authority or funding source, and decision perspective; 2. to present a brief profile of the major organizational networks that evolved into a broadly defined disaster-management system in response to the multiple needs generated by the disaster, indicating the problem focus of the respective networks and the kinds of information needed to support timely, appropriate action; 3.
From page 124...
... Identification of the critical points for information search, information transfer, and organizational learning within and between organizations engaged in disaster response and recovery activities is essential to increasing efficiency and effectiveness in the disaster-management process.3 This set of assumptions guided the selection of issues for study as well as the organization and presentation of findings for this chapter. Other issues may be explored in disaster response and recovery operations, but fall outside the scope of this chapter.
From page 125...
... Geographic Location The earthquakes generated consequences of differing types and magnitudes in three geographic locations of Ecuador, as shown in Figure 8.1. Zone 1: Western Nap o Province The area of primary impact, which included the epicenter of the earthquake near Reventador Volcano, was located in western Napo Province.s In this zone, two major problems were generated by the earthquakes.
From page 126...
... . Zone 3: eastern Napo Province.
From page 127...
... reorientation and, if needed, resettlement of local residents, severely shaken emotionally and economically by the disaster and struggling to cope with questions regarding an uncertain future in a zone of high seismic risk. The size and scope of this second set of problems necessarily shifted organizational action to national and international levels of operations.
From page 128...
... Reconstruction needs, experienced first at the local level, escalated to national and international levels of organizational action as managers at successive levels sought economic and technical assistance for rebuilding their communities. Zone 3: Eastern Napo Province The third zone of impact from the disaster included the city of Lago Agrio and adjacent communities in eastern Napo Province.
From page 129...
... The fact that problems were reported in the coordination and delivery of disaster assistance is not surprising.20 Rather, the complexity of this situation merits particular attention in understanding the design and dynamics of interorganizational coordination in disaster management. Administrative Jurisdictions Jurisdictional involvement in disaster response and recovery activities in the three zones of the disaster reflected the interdependent characteristics of organizational response.
From page 130...
... Although a nation of high seismic risk, Ecuador's disaster management has been limited by the scarcity of resources available for equipment and preparedness training.24 The March 5, 1987, disaster, involving three geographic locations with differing requirements for assistance, placed greater demands upon the national Civil Defense organization than its capacity for delivery of services. Recognizing the magnitude of the disaster and its impact upon the nation, President Leon Febres Cordero Ribadeneira declared a national emergency in the provinces of Carchi, Imbabura, Napo, and Pastaza under the provisions of Article 101 of the Law of National Security.25 He also called a meeting of the ministers of Health, Finance, Public Works, Energy, Social Welfare, and Environment; the director general of the Ecuadorian State Petroleum Consortium (CEPE)
From page 131...
... In-country organizations joined in a national campaign to offer voluntary contributions to disaster assistance in a remarkable demonstration of solidarity with the disaster victims.32 Links to the international community provided resources that were not immediately available in Ecuador to initiate the design and implementation of disaster assistance activities. The International Red Cross, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, and other organizations were important sources of technical expertise, resources, and personnel in the labor-intensive tasks of community assistance to disaster victims.
From page 132...
... International organizations provided resources and skills that enabled local communities to rebuild homes and infrastructure, and the nation to reconstruct the oil pipeline and major transportation routes. The meshing of organizations, across jurisdictions and types of mission, contributed to a developing concept of an integrated disaster-management system.
From page 133...
... When provided with limited resources from the national Civil Defense organization, such as a machine for making cement blocks, and supplies from international charitable organizations, such as sacks of cement from the Norwegian Red Cross, residents of communities in the Andean highlands worked in mingas to produce concrete blocks for reconstructing houses for all families in the village.33 Scarcity of resources and urgency of needs compelled innovative means of organizing action in disaster-affected communities, where responsible managers integrated elements from separate domains to solve a shared problem. In summary, organizational action in disaster response and recovery activities was directed from the national level by an Emergency Committee established by the President of Ecuador.
From page 134...
... For residents living at marginal economic levels, the disaster threatened their basic existence and presented choices for either rebuilding in stronger ways or relocating in geologically more stable territory. ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS IN DISASTER RESPONSE AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS Reviewing the extent, form, and outcomes of organizational action in disaster response and recovery operations following the Ecuadorian earthquakes of March 5, 1987, a pattern emerges of interacting networks operating simultaneously in reference to particular problems.
From page 135...
... Although breakdowns occurred within categories of organizational operation, performance was reported to be significantly better within a given network than between networks.37 Through the national framework for disaster management established by President Febres Cordero to meet the needs generated by the March 5, 1987, earthquakes, the major ministries of the nation were involved in fashioning and implementing appropriate policies for response and recovery, as stated above. Eleven ministries and 10 national institutes or administrative units were included in this national Emergency Committee.
From page 136...
... . ~ —T I Chantable Social I _ ~ con -.~ At_ __ __ __ __ Zone 1: Western Napo Province Zone 2: Carchi, Imbabura, and Pichincha Provinces, Highlands Zone 3: Eastern Napo Provinces While all types of organizations played some role in each disaster zone, the dominant pattern of organizational interaction is indicated for the respective zones.
From page 137...
... This task, however, was made more difficult by the rudimentary state of public services within the communities and the lack of equipment, training, or experience with disaster management. In most communities, the local churches had established stronger relationships with the citizens than had the Civil Defense councils, which were relatively new and still in the process of development.
From page 138...
... ; U.S. Peace Corps volunteers; and other international organizations that contributed disaster assistance.40 Basic needs for the disaster victims in western Napo Province were overshadowed by the stunning blow to the national economy from the destruction of the Trans-Ecuadorian oil pipeline and the consequent lapse in oil exports.
From page 139...
... . In summary, three problems generated by the disaster in western Napo Province interacted with one another to produce an even more complex and difficult set of policy questions for organizations engaged in disaster response and recovery.
From page 140...
... The complexity of tasks in disaster response and recovery greatly increased the difficulties of designing coordinated organizational action. Disaster Operations Network 2: The Sierra Pichincha, Imbabura, and Carchi Provinces The major problem generated by the earthquakes in the Andean highlands of Pichincha, Imbabura, and Carchi provinces was the loss of housing, exacerbated by the prevalence of poverty.
From page 141...
... In Cayambe, for example, all housing construction and repair was committed for construction and financed by international or national sources by June 30, 1987.48 Disaster assistance from foreign governments was sent to the Ecuadorian government and transmitted to COEN, the National Center for Emergency Operations. The Civil Defense organization, working with COEN, was responsible for distribution of international assistance from foreign governments to needy communities in the disaster zones.
From page 142...
... Disaster Operations Network 3: Eastern Napo Province In eastern Napo Province, the major problems generated by the disaster were the interaction of isolation and unemployment resulting from the destruction of infrastructure—the highway and the oil and gas pipelines—and the pollution of the rivers, with its consequent impact upon health and agriculture. These problems were especially difficult because they deepened with time and were compounded by decisions made in reference to other aspects of disaster recovery and reconstruction.
From page 143...
... The primary link between the Indian and communal organizations of eastern Napo Province and the national and international sources of disaster assistance were religious and voluntary organizations. For example, Mision Carmelita, located outside Lago Agrio along the Coca River, took an active role in contacting the Indian communities along the rivers and in organizing the distribution of supplies and assistance to them.56 Catholic Relief
From page 144...
... A third network evolved to address the problem of isolation for eastern Napo Province between the Ecuadorian Army Corps of Engineers, the Ecuadorian Ministry of Public Works, the USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, and the U.S. Military Group in Ecuador, which included U.S.
From page 145...
... The project is interesting because it illustrates a critical dilemma regarding the role of information in building the basis of common understanding necessary for interorganizational coordination in the dynamic context of international disaster assistance. The controversy illustrated the dilemma of technical versus cultural exchange of information between the two governments regarding the construction of the road, and the ensuing constraints upon organizational interaction.
From page 146...
... Strengths and Needs for Further Development in the Larger Network of Disaster Response and Recovery Operations Strengths Many strengths emerged from the set of organizational interactions that characterized the disaster response and recovery operations following the March 5, 1987, earthquakes. Five practices, in particular, deserve mention, as they either confirm basic principles of disaster management or indicate innovative practices developed in this disaster:
From page 147...
... 3. The importance of prior networks of common goals, shared work experience, and professional association in facilitating the mobilization of resources and action across jurisdictional lines was vividly demonstrated by the ease with which communication traveled and action flowed within such networks as Catholic Relief Services, USAID/OFDA, Red Cross
From page 148...
... The strategy of having cash grants available to place an interdisciplinary team of experts immediately in the field worked very well for Catholic Relief Services. Prior experience in the country, prior experience in disaster, and pooled knowledge from multiple disciplinary perspectives resulted in a solid information base that enabled CRS/CATEC to design a field program of emergency assistance and rehabilitation that proved very effective in Napo Province.
From page 149...
... Representation of information in a common format and transmission of information to multiple participants in a timely manner also are critical functions in improving the communication and coordination processes central to effective performance in disaster management. Revised Concept of Disaster Assistance The allocation of assistance to victims of disaster is especially sensitive In communities with marginal economic standards.
From page 150...
... 3. Inquiry into the design and development of networks as appropriate organizational forms for the rapid mobilization, implementation, and evaluation of action in disaster management.
From page 151...
... A network of networks might organize this information in a model of disaster management which, in turn, could be incorporated into a computerized, interactive information system.
From page 152...
... Lower figures were also reported in the house-byhouse censuses conducted by the municipalities. In western Napo Province, the zone of primary impact from the disaster, the assessment team of CATEC/Catholic Relief Services also conducted a house-by-house census of need.
From page 153...
... Hoy. Also, professional interviews with local government officials in Baeza, Borja, and E1 Chaco, July 9, 1987, and with the Project Director, Proyecto Emergencia in Napo Province, Catholic Relief Services/CATEC in Quito, July 12, 1987.
From page 154...
... 37. Interviews with directors of local and provincial Civil Defense councils and directors of disaster-assistance projects, Quito, Olmedo, Cayambe, Baeza, Borja, and Lago Agrio, Ecuador, June 19-July 14, 1987.
From page 155...
... 54. Interview, Comandante de Battallon de Selva and Coordinator, Civil Defense Council, Canton of Lago Agrio, Lago Agrio, Ecuador, June 30, 1987.


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