Behavioral Science and the Secret Service Toward the Prevention of Assassination (1981) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
Summary of Workshop and Plenary Discussions
Summary of Workshop and Plenary Discussions
Pages 23-92
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From page 23... ...
24 Identifying Possible Sources of Danger to Protected Persons 37 Suggested Approaches to the Study of Assassination ... 44 Relationship between the Secret Service and the Mental Health Community 49 Management of Dangerous Subjects 59 Legal and Ethical Aspects of Investigative Activities and Interventions 68 Improving Agency Operations: Resource Allocation and Management Issues 71 Guidelines for Establishing a Research and Consultation Capacity in the Behavioral Sciences and Clinical Disciplines .
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From page 24... ...
ASSESSING POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR About 20 new cases per day are brought to the attention of the Intelligence Division. These cases are referred to Secret Service field offices throughout the country, where they are assigned to special agents for investigation.
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From page 25... ...
For subjects they consider dangerous, special agents must devise ways to keep track of their activities, manage their behavior, or otherwise reduce the risk they pose to protected persons.* The vast majority of all subjects investigated by special agents are judged not dangerous.
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From page 26... ...
Thus, any attempt to predict that a Secret Service subject is or is not likely to be dangerous to a protected person is apt to be useless unless a very limited time frame is considered. Second, when the behavior being predicted occurs infrequently -- or has a "low base rate" -- accurate prediction of who will and will not engage in it is even less likely.
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From page 27... ...
Additionally, a cadre of such experts could be on call to assist agents personally in deciding how to evaluate difficult cases. The Concept of Dangerousness While it may be necessary from an administrative standpoint to have special agents decide that a subject is dangerous or not dangerous, many conferees questioned the appropriateness and *
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From page 28... ...
Many conferees felt that if the concept of dangerousness is to be retained and used for decision-making about subjects, the Secret Service should explore and attempt to develop indicators that would permit subjects to be rated and compared with each other in terms of the relative risk they pose to protected persons and also in terms of their own level of dangerousness at different points in time. In the category of dangerous subjects, the Service should be more explicit about the level of concern it has about each subject in relation to all others and about each subject over time, and should develop behavioral indicators to measure these gradations in dangerousness.
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From page 29... ...
Secret Service concern with emotionally disturbed people who make threats against protected persons may to some extent reflect the widespread popular belief that the mentally ill are violence-prone. Because of their relative unfamiliarity with mental illness, Secret Service special agents may tend to view the behavior of the mentally ill as dangerous because it seems so unpredictable, while the behaviors of those without apparent mental disorder may seem more rational.
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From page 30... ...
Thus, clinicians preferred to view the task of assessment for dangerousness as an ongoing process and not distinct from the monitoring and management tasks to which special agents are also assigned. For the purpose of assessing subjects for dangerousness, conferees agreed that mental health professionals might usefully provide Secret Service agents with • greater understanding of the course and fluctuations of mental disorders and emotional disturbances over time, and the relationship between diagnostic categories and behavior • assistance in identifying subpopulations of the mentally ill who are or might be dangerous to others or themselves • guidance concerning the types of questions or items to include in interview protocols to assess risk • techniques for interviewing potentially dangerous persons*
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From page 31... ...
Assessment Procedures: Suggestions for Improvement On the basis of what they learned in pre-conference briefings and in plenary and workshop sessions, conferees made a number of suggestions for improving the information collected about subjects, the field procedures and instruments used, the written reports detailing the findings of subject investigations, and information storage and retrieval procedures. Information Collected Conferees questioned the relevance of some of the specific items of information the Secret Service presently collects.
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From page 32... ...
Because relatively little is presently known about the items of information that are truly related to dangerousness, conferees suggested that the Service anticipate that whatever items are included in the revised data collection list will have to be further refined over time, with those items empirically determined to be irrelevant eliminated and perhaps replaced by new ones. The goal should be to reduce the amount of data collected to only a few items, which are shown by experience and research to be highly predictive with respect to dangerousness to protected persons.
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From page 33... ...
, history of extremely bizarre behavior, claims of personal relationships with protected persons that are remote, lack of concern for self-preservation, concern on the part of significant others about the subject's behavior; fixed ideas, obsessions, or compulsions concerning one or more protected persons; extreme or seemingly irrational hostility toward protected persons; evidence of intense interest in a protected person as suggested by such things as the presence of their travel routes or itineraries in the subject's home; repeated or frequent threats to harm a protected person; episodic or binge drinking, history of alcoholic blackouts; involvement in fringe organizations with a history of violence; history of unemployment or employment difficulties; presence of situational stresses (such as recent losses or life changes) that might interact with underlying mental disorder; absence of social supports (family, friends)
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From page 34... ...
, but also can provide many clues to the motivations and dynamics of a subject's interest in protected persons. Most special agents assessing subjects for dangerousness find the personal interview to be the most helpful source of information for decision-making.
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From page 35... ...
Special agents are instructed to elicit information on the list of topics mentioned earlier, but there is no standard and prescribed format for conducting the interview or reporting the information from it in written form. Interviews are open-ended: all topics are covered, but the order in which questions are asked is not specified, nor must questions be worded in a particular way.
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From page 36... ...
Although information about a subject in narrative form may be useful for some purposes (such as for advance work when a protected person travels to a subject's area of residence) , narrative portions should be written in such a way that the information relevant to decision-making is readily apparent; alternatively or additionally, information should be extracted from the narrative material, coded, and stored in the computer for retrieval and analysis.
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From page 37... ...
• A decision support system would be a useful device to assist agents in making their dangerousness decisions. IDENTIFYING POSSIBLE SOURCES OF DANGER TO PROTECTED PERSONS One of the critical concerns of the Secret Service Intelligence Division is to learn whether it is currently identifying and monitoring those persons most likely to pose risk to the safety of those it protects.
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From page 38... ...
Upon investigation by Secret Service special agents, many announced threateners are found to have a history of mental or emotional disorders. Clinicians and other conferees pointed out, however, that while some mentally ill or emotionally disturbed persons may be violent under some circumstances, many will never be violent; and they cautioned that the Service's concern with disturbed persons may be unwarranted in many cases and deflect attention and resources from more viable sources of danger.
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From page 39... ...
Secret Service personnel are particularly concerned about subjects who evidence suicidal tendencies, especially when combined with extreme hostility with or without overt threats toward one or more protected persons. The Service monitors such subjects very closely, in the awareness that they are unlikely to be deterred by conventional sanctions.
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From page 40... ...
* And Secret Service representatives mentioned they thought the number of women making threats against protected persons was on the rise (though they had no precise figures available for conferees)
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* Problems in predicting whether and when an individual might engage in behavior harmful to a protected person, coupled with the many difficulties and dilemmas associated with monitoring and *
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From page 42... ...
Situations and Settings That Enhance Risk Several conferees suggested that the Secret Service analyze situations and settings in terms of the level of risk they may pose to protected leaders. Public appearances of protected persons in particular geographic areas may be inherently dangerous, and certain types of situations and settings may be relatively easy to penetrate or present unusual difficulties for Secret Service protective units.
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From page 43... ...
Walter Menninger, and in Saleem Shah's paper. Some conferees suggested that protected persons, particularly presidents, may contribute to attempts on their lives by deliberately exposing themselves to situations of high risk -- for instance mingling in crowds and "pressing the flesh." Hamburg commented that presidents, presidential candidates, and other elected leaders say they want to mix with ordinary citizens for two reasons: to demonstrate that they do and can interact meaningfully with the rankand-file and not just with elites; and to create opportunities for the public to explore their knowledge, views, and skills, and ultimately to test their qualifications to hold high office.
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From page 44... ...
Several conferees, and Secret Service representatives as well, however, thought it might be difficult to convince public leaders that they should refrain from the types of exposure they may feel are important. Robert Michels observed that "it is going to remain the Service's problem of maximizing the protection within the domain of freedom that we allocate our leaders." Nevertheless, Michels and several others shared the view that protected leaders might be induced to modify their behavior if "mandated" to do so by other authorities and if in so doing they did not give the appearance of personal cowardice.
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From page 45... ...
* This concern was prompted by a Secret Service case presentation involving a subject who had expressed animosity toward protected persons and subsequently killed a Secret Service agent.
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From page 46... ...
The following ideas for research were proposed, some of them as methods of expanding the number of cases available for study: Comparison of Dangerous and Never-Dangerous Cases On the assumption that the Secret Service itself is the best judge of the level of risk posed by subjects to persons it protects, several conferees suggested that a retrospective analysis and comparison of dangerous and never dangerous subjects in its files would probably be a good starting point for understanding the characteristics of potential assassins. Study of Behaviors Similar to Assassination Because assassination is so rare -- at least in the United States -- and the Secret Service caseload of subjects contains no one who has ever attempted it, several conferees suggested that the Service try to test the validity of its own decision-making with respect to dangerousness on a similar, or "proxy," behavior that occurs with some frequency among its caseload of subjects.
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From page 47... ...
Such a study could be begun by asking special agents to recall their "near misses.1 Detailed Study of Assassins Walter Menninger suggested that a detailed study of all assassins and attempted assassins of political leaders, whether living or dead, should be undertaken. Such a study should include descriptive and clinical data on the personalities and backgrounds *
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From page 48... ...
It might also be possible, as Wolfgang suggested, to examine the level and type of threat activity which preceded such attacks and compare those who have given prior notice with those who have not. Studies in Victim Provocation Sara Eddy suggested it might be useful to examine whether there is anything specific about political leaders themselves -- their personalities, political style, the nature of their public statements, and so forth -- which might elicit threats to their safety or assaults on their lives.
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From page 49... ...
The Service provides mental health services to the extent that it operates as a kind of emergency mental health facility for disturbed subjects whose behavior is bizarre or otherwise apparently dangerous to protected persons and for whom it is unable to obtain assistance from mental health personnel and institutions. In these instances, Secret Service special agents must often "babysit" such subjects, try to help them, and otherwise take responsibility for monitoring their whereabouts until outside assistance can be enlisted, if at all.
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From page 50... ...
Additionally, though hospital personnel are asked and expected by the Secret Service to alert the Service when one of its subjects is about to be discharged, special agents have found they cannot rely on them to do so. Obstacles to Professional Relationship Both Secret Service representatives and conferees -- particularly clinicians -- felt that at present there are several obstacles to the establishment of mutually beneficial relationships between the Secret Service and the mental health community.
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From page 51... ...
Secret Service representatives also mentioned difficulties they have encountered in obtaining information from hospital records about subjects who have threatened protected persons or otherwise behaved in ways considered dangerous to them. In their view, concern with the rights of patients -- and with civil liberties generally -- has increased in the past few years, making their ability to carry out their protective duties much more difficult.
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From page 52... ...
Likewise, mental health professionals cannot delegate medical decisions (for instance, determination as to whether a subject is committable to a hospital for observation) to Secret Service personnel.
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From page 53... ...
Such an approach would mean that the Secret Service would consult various different practitioners or institutions on a one-time or infrequent basis, but not repeatedly over long periods of time. Several other conferees, however, noting the less than optimal quality of some of the advice and consultation the Secret Service presently receives and the inadequacies in patient care provided to some of its subjects, thought it would be advantageous to the Service to know and develop continuing relationships with specific mental health practitioners and institutional providers in the geographic areas where the largest numbers of dangerous subjects are typically found.
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From page 54... ...
Constraints on Mental Health Provider Capacities Although the Service could undoubtedly benefit from the advice and assistance of mental health professionals and institutions in the area of assessing and managing dangerous subjects, clinicians cautioned Secret Service representatives not to overestimate the capacity of the mental health system to respond. They emphasized that mental health facilities are undergoing major changes in underlying philosophy, staffing patterns, and funding, especially with respect to the chronically mentally ill, who are being sent back into their communities in great numbers.
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From page 55... ...
Issues of Confidentiality and Privacy To what extent do and should psychiatrists and other mental health professionals report to the Secret Service threats against protected persons which they might hear from patients? This issue was provocatively raised in a commissioned paper by Robert Michels, included in this volume.*
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How much, if any, information about a psychiatric patient who is also a Secret Service subject should be shared between mental health professionals and Secret Service personnel, and who should do * Tarasoff v.
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From page 57... ...
That is, could and should a Secret Service psychiatric consultant render an opinion on a subject without having evaluated the subject? Issues of Professional Independence in Judgment The possibility that mental health professionals might be co-opted by Secret Service goals has already been mentioned as an issue some clinicians thought worthy of attention.
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From page 58... ...
Robert Michels made the following suggestions: (1) that a dialogue among mental health professionals concerning the legal and ethical dilemmas in the relationship between the Secret Service and the mental health community be initiated; (2)
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From page 59... ...
, or when a protected person visits the subject's area of residence. In order to insure the safety of those it protects, the Service tries to minimize the opportunities for dangerous subjects to come in contact with protected persons, and does so by monitoring their whereabouts and status very carefully or, if appropriate, by resorting to the mental health or criminal justice system to secure their confinement.
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From page 60... ...
4. Although the Secret Service seeks to control its subjects' violence potential toward protected persons, interventions need not have an adverse effect on subjects.
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From page 61... ...
One method might be appropriate when a protected person is scheduled to visit a subject's area of residence, while another would be more useful when the subject is separated from the protected person by considerable physical distance. Similarly, monitoring strategies with subjects already confined should probably be different from those used with subjects on the street.
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From page 62... ...
, and by Shervert Frazier in his presentation on interviewing techniques to be used for assessing potentially dangerous subjects. As previously mentioned, when a subject's threats or dangerous behaviors are viewed as manifestations of mental or emotional illness, Secret Service agents typically feel more comfortable if they can get the subject admitted to a hospital for observation and evaluation, and/or for treatment.
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From page 63... ...
Furthermore, overcrowding in mental hospitals, the trend toward deinstitutionalization of chronic mental patients, and liability issues often make admitting physicians reluctant to take on new potentially violent patients. In private hospitals, the subject's ability to pay the hospital charges or his access to third party reimbursement would also be a factor.
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From page 64... ...
Therapy could consist of rerouting or eliminating the subject's direction of interest toward protected persons, by means of such behavior modification techniques as stimulus narrowing, systematic desensitization, and instruction in the management of anger.*
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From page 65... ...
Such subjects are obviously more likely to present an imminent danger than equally hostile subjects who are confined to a mental or penal institution. Some conferees suggested that non-confined subjects, who typically constitute about half the caseload of dangerous subjects, might be monitored on a monthly rather than a three-month basis.
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From page 66... ...
8. Some conferees questioned the value of reinterviewing dangerous subjects at all, as part of the quarterly investigation process.
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From page 67... ...
Not every agent, she suggested, is ideally suited to work with every subject. Ethical Implications of Case Management Practices Conferees and Secret Service representatives alike expressed concerns about the ethical implications of current and proposed intervention strategies and management techniques for dangerous subjects.
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From page 68... ...
This constitutes a drain on resources of the Secret Service and is a problem not easily resolved, even if the Service utilizes mental health consultants. LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES AND INTERVENTIONS Conferees' observations and suggestions with respect to the legal and ethical aspects of Secret Service information gathering activities and interventions with potentially dangerous subjects are summarized below.*
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From page 69... ...
Virtually all its activities in assessing and managing behavior potentially dangerous to protected persons involve legal and ethical dilemmas, and run the risk of involving the Service in costly litigation. Conferees were sympathetic to these concerns and suggested some ways to begin clarifying and resolving them.
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From page 70... ...
For instance, there are subjects who have made no overt threats and who are not in violation of any law, but whom the Secret Service considers dangerous because of their high level of hostile interest in protected persons. As Loren Roth noted, such subjects *
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From page 71... ...
In view of the sensitivity of the legal and ethical dilemmas posed on a daily basis by many aspects of assessing and managing potentially dangerous subjects, several conferees recommended that the Secret Service seek clarification of several legal and ethical issues prior to adopting new policies or procedures. Included here would be confidentiality, privacy, free speech issues, and the myriad of federal and state laws and regulations concerning hospital commitment and other mental health issues.*
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From page 72... ...
The Secret Service does not have at its fingertips, and cannot now easily retrieve, for instance, fundamental descriptive data about all cases and about various categories of cases: their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, frequency of threat activity, mental status, and so forth. Neither does it have readily available information about average length of stay on quarterly investigation for dangerous subjects, reintroduction rates, frequency and intensity of monitoring, and other caseload characteristics.
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From page 73... ...
* The present management information system is used primarily to identify threateners and to locate subjects for advance work prior to the arrival of protected person to their areas of residence.
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From page 74... ...
As pointed out by Don Gottfredson, Saleem Shah, and others, unless the Intelligence Division builds some research capability into its operations, it will be unable to use its very considerable wealth of information on file and the experiences and expertise of its special agents, to learn what works and what doesn't work and to improve its own operations. It was the opinion of all present that now is the time for such reflection, analysis, and evaluation to begin.
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From page 75... ...
As Robert Michels noted, the best science in the shortrun will be done outside the Service by contract, but the greatest impact on Secret Service operations will come from the development of a staff research capability. Several conferees, most notably Alfred Blumstein, argued that the first step in building such a research capacity should be to establish a research advisory board, external to the Service, which would oversee its development.
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From page 76... ...
They noted that the Service would always value a working relationship with individual consultants of its own choosing. Most conferees thought the Service was in a good position to exercise its own judgment as to the usefulness of particular consultants.
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From page 77... ...
The accomplishment of these tasks should provide the Intelligence Division with a rudimentary capacity and data base of information for testing hypotheses and conducting studies it might wish to undertake in the future.
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From page 78... ...
, processed for computer use, and analyzed. Analysis of such descriptive data, for instance, might yield a better understanding of what factors -- at least in the minds of Secret Service special agents -- differentiate dangerous from never dangerous subjects, and assist the Service in evaluating the validity of agent decisions.
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From page 79... ...
See Assessing Potentially Dangerous Behavior, page 24.
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From page 80... ...
* See Assessing Potentially Dangerous Behavior, page 24, for a discussion of proposed instrument revisions.
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From page 81... ...
Every conceivable scenario by which a protected person could be assassinated would be run through the Secret Service defensive-protective system to determine whether any routes to assassination are potentially available. Simulating an assassination assumes a rational-actor model of behavior -- that a person will act rationally and logically to pursue his goal, however crazy or ill-advised that goal might seem.
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From page 82... ...
In response to questions from conferees, Secret Service representatives acknowledged that many special agents do not enjoy the interviewing and investigative work connected with assessing and managing potentially dangerous subjects. Some, for instance, find *
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From page 83... ...
, thus permitting several agents to be involved in different aspects of the same case. In keeping with the view that there may very well be a place for specialists in the field of assessing and managing potentially dangerous subjects, conferees felt that promotional opportunities and meaningful career ladders should be developed for recruits who demonstrate capability in these areas, noting that persons who are excellent candidates for such work might not survive the years of varied assignments required before an agent has the opportunity to select a few areas for concentration.
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From page 84... ...
Agent Selection: Desirable Incoming Qualifications and Skills Whatever their subsequent career patterns (generalist or specialist) , incoming special agents who at any time will be assessing or managing potentially dangerous subjects should possess some basic qualifications and skills at the time they join the Service.
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From page 85... ...
Conferees generally supported Kenneth Hammond's contention that potential recruits are unlikely to differ substantially in their decision-making and prediction capabilities, and thus should not be selected on grounds of apparent superiority in these areas. As far as other skills and abilitites relevant to assessing and managing potentially dangerous subjects are concerned, Robert Michels said that it is easier to select persons who already demonstrate capabilities in some of these areas than to train those without them -- especially such qualities as interpersonal sensitivity, empathy, and "psychological mindedness."*
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From page 86... ...
Many conferees considered the agents themselves to be the experts in judging dangerousness to protected persons, and thought they should not have their decisions unduly affected by the views of mental health professionals. Conferees substantially agreed that special agents who assess and manage potentially dangerous subjects need more extensive and detailed training in psychopathology and in the use of clinical management techniques and options.
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From page 87... ...
Developing Skills of Agents Role Play and Use of Videotape Recorders The Secret Service Office of Training uses role play and videotape recorders for initial and follow-up training of special agents assigned to assessing and managing potentially dangerous subjects. Conferees considered these to be valuable instructional aids for teaching and refining interviewing techniques and for developing agents' self-confidence in interview settings.
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From page 88... ...
violent and non-violent mentally ill • permit them to observe mental health professionals making "imminent dangerousness" decisions • enable them to watch clinicians interview mentally and emotionally disturbed patients and thereby sharpen their own intuitive and interviewing skills • increase their repertoire of responses to and judgments about mentally and emotionally disturbed subjects • expose them to a full range of clinical management techniques and increase their understanding of the circumstances appropriate to each • help them feel more at ease in dealing with mental health professionals and institutions • enable them to handle their own stress more effectively when dealing with disturbed subjects.* Simulations, Gaming, and Senario Construction Frank Ochberg and others suggeste'd simulation, gaming, and scenario construction as devices useful for teaching special agents how to recognize and deal with less familiar but apparently increasing possibilities of harm to protected persons, such as hostage taking extortion, and terrorism.
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From page 89... ...
Upon completion of this program, agents so trained would return to the Secret Service to instruct and supervise less experienced or beginning special agents in the mental health aspects of their preparation for assessing and managing potentially dangerous subjects. The principal advantage of such a program is that it would enable the Service to develop its own competency in the mental health field, which would lessen the need for Secret Service personnel to consult outsiders about subjects presenting mental and emotional problems.
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From page 90... ...
Untoward events, whether attempted or successful assassinations, killing or maiming of Secret Service agents, or close calls, should be reviewed with all special agents in an honest and non-defensive manner, so as to locate possible errors in judgment and inadequate protective measures. Such reviews constitute an important source of feedback on operations, as well as an appropriate mechanism by which government agencies and their employees assume responsibility for examining their own actions.
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From page 91... ...
The number of persons protected by the Secret Service on any given day averages around 25 to 30, but may be as high as 70. The Secret Service also relies on Section 3056 as its basic legal authority to collect and disseminate intelligence information in connection with its protective duties.
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