Effect of MUTCD on Tort Liability of Government Transportation Agencies (2014) / Chapter Skim
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Pages 18-28
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From page 18... ...
18 claims arose out of the plan or design for the construction or improvement of a state highway for which the State had immunity under the Idaho Tort Claims Act.181 The court stated, however, that "although immunity under I.C.
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19 claims act or similar legislation that applies to claims against the department.188 B Extent of the Waiver of Government Tort Immunity The liability of a public entity in tort varies from state to state depending on the extent to which the state legislature has waived immunity, as well as on the courts' interpretation of the applicable legislation.189 Numerous cases have involved the MUTCD and whether under the circumstances there was a waiver of governmental immunity.
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20 construction.204 Warning signs were posted, but the City had not installed a traffic signal.205 The City argued that it had sovereign immunity because the City was not required by law to install a traffic signal, and that any "failure to install a traffic signal was the result of discretionary action."206 The appellate court agreed that the City had sovereign immunity and affirmed the trial court's grant of a summary judgment in favor of the City.207 As held in another MUTCD case, "[w] hen the City first installs a traffic signal is no less discretionary than whether to install it." (Emphasis added.)
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21 Third, the departments argue that the MUTCD provisions at issue are not mandatory,218 that they are only guidance, not a standard.219 One department stated that the MUTCD is not a legal requirement to install any sign; that a diagram or picture in the Manual is not a requirement; and that the Manual does not obligate the department to create a traffic control plan or include more than one warning sign in a given area.220 In addition, transportation departments in some states are able to rely on statutory immunity for traffic control devices221 or the state's tort claims act's "immunities regarding discretion and signing."222 The Nebraska Department of Roads also mentioned its immunity for weather conditions.223 Fourth, insofar as basic principles of tort liability and MUTCD defenses are concerned, the departments defend on the basis that the plaintiff has failed to show that there was a duty to install or provide a traffic control device at the location of the accident, and, even if there were such a duty, the departments complied with their standard of care224 because their actions complied with225 or substantially conformed to the Manual.226 One department also noted that it may argue that the plaintiff wrongly interpreted the MUTCD or that the cited section of the MUTCD does not apply.227 Several departments noted that their defenses in MUTCD cases include the plaintiff's contributory negligence228 or comparative fault,229 "even if the department's conduct was ‘below [the] stan 218 Responses of Wisconsin DOT and Kansas DOT.
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22 Pennsylvania DOT stated in response to the survey that Pennsylvania "case law requires highways to be kept reasonably safe for [their] intended, foreseeable use."237 However, with respect to the MUTCD and a transportation department's duty to a motorist, as one court has held, "the MUTCD may be used as ‘a tool for assessing a breach of duty only after a legal duty has already been established.
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23 their departments have immunity if they fail to correct or give notice of a dangerous condition in connection with a highway or related facility involving a traffic control device.250 According to the Nevada DOT, [t] here exists Nevada case law holding that the State is immune from suit for negligence with respect to dangerous conditions of which it does not have notice.
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24 Nothing in this section exonerates a public entity or public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by such failure if a signal, sign, marking or device (other than one described in Section 830.4) was necessary to warn of a dangerous condition which endangered the safe movement of traffic and which would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care.
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25 Actual notice is not always required, as constructive notice may be sufficient.264 Under the Louisiana statute, constructive notice means "the existence of facts which infer actual knowledge."265 Because public entities are deemed to have knowledge of their own actions, it has been held that they do not have to have notice of their own faulty design, construction, maintenance, or repair of a highway.266 In a New York case, the court rejected NYSDOT's argument, which in the court's view suggested that the State could "create a dangerous condition but nevertheless avoid liability for injuries it caused because it was not fully aware of or did not appreciate the danger."267 In entering a judgment in favor of the claimants on the issue of liability, the court also held that compliance with the MUTCD does not eliminate the possibility of other negligence that was the proximate cause of the claimants' injuries.268 It is usually a question of fact whether a public entity had actual notice or whether the condition had existed for a sufficient amount of time that the public entity may be charged with notice.269 The period of required notice may be prescribed by statute. In New Hampshire, "there is limited liability[]
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26 control device at a particular location."278 In cases involving an alleged breach of the MUTCD, there must be evidence presented by one having engineering or other specialized knowledge. Such expertise is not within the common knowledge of jurors, as traffic engineers must comply with a Manual that "is several hundred pages long and [that]
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27 In Esterbrook the court held that the jury instructions were improper because "they implied that optional provisions in the traffic manuals were mandatory and that a violation of those provisions was negligence as a matter of law."294 In Hodges v. Attala County,295 a Mississippi court held that it was not negligence per se when the plaintiffs argued that the MUTCD "placed the responsibility for the placement and maintenance of traffic control devices with the governmental body."296 Moreover, "[e]
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From page 28... ...
28 of the transportation departments were not the proximate cause of an accident. In a New York case, the plaintiff's expert testified that the City should have painted the road in question as a four-lane rather than a two-lane road, so that the plaintiff would not have attempted to pass a tractor-trailer on the right side.308 In defending the claim the City submitted an affidavit of the City's traffic planner, who relied on the 1983 MUTCD.309 Although the court held that the City had "qualified immunity" for highway planning, the court also held that the City's action was not the proximate cause of the accident.310 Rather, the cause of the accident was the plaintiff's attempt to pass a tractor-trailer on the right as it was turning into a driveway.311 In an Ohio case, the Ohio Department of Public Safety's failure to replace a sign was not the proximate cause of an accident.312 Rather, the court held that the plaintiff's failure "to look ahead of her vehicle" and observe traffic conditions was the proximate cause.313 I
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