Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk Assessment: State of the Practice (2013) / Chapter Skim
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31 The key risk assessment approaches discussed in Section 3 that involve concrete models or methodologies with suffi cient documentation or available information are further characterized in the matrices here. These matrices are designed to facilitate selection of a model for application to a hazmat transportation stakeholder's particular needs.
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32 Name -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- - Sponsor/Developer Mode Input(s) Output(s)
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33 Name -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- - Sponsor/Developer Mode Input(s) Output(s)
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34 Name -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- - Sponsor/Developer Mode Input(s) Output(s)
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35 Name -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- - Sponsor/Developer Mode Input(s) Output(s)
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36 Name -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- - Sponsor/Developer Mode Input(s) Output(s)
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37 Name -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- - Sponsor/Developer Mode Input(s) Output(s)
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38 Name -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- - Sponsor/Developer Mode Input(s) Output(s)
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39 Name -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- - Sponsor/Developer Mode Input(s) Output(s)
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40 Name -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- - Sponsor/Developer Mode Input(s) Output(s)
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41 Name -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- - Sponsor/Developer Mode Input(s) Output(s)
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42 which is widely available, and some of which is security-sensitive or restricted to industry use. Se cu rit y CCPS Guidelines: Security Risk Prioritization Process See also §3.3.1, 4.2.5 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - Center for Chemical Process Safety Highway Rail Marine Air Pipeline Chemical hazards, quantity transported per container, number of shipments, mode, interim storage, specific threat information, and the proximity to people, sensitive environmental areas, critical assets or infrastructure are all considered subjectively.
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43 CCPS Guidelines: Security Vulnerability Assessment Process See also §3.3.1, 4.2.6 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - Center for Chemical Process Safety Highway Rail Marine Air Pipeline Both internal and external threat information is combined with relative target attractiveness factors. Vulnerability is qualitatively assessed based on how well existing countermeasures can withstand or eliminate an attack.
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44 Name -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- - Sponsor/Developer Mode Input(s) Output(s)
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45 4.1.6 (Continued)
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46 Readiness and Resiliency Assessment System (RRAS) See also §3.4.1.3, 4.2.16 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - Oak Ridge National Laboratory Center for Transportation Analysis Highway Rail Marine Air Pipeline Input data is largely security sensitive and nondistributable.
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47 4.1.7 (Continued)
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48 Name -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- - Sponsor/Developer Mode Input(s) Output(s)
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49 4.1.8 Security Measure Identification, Prioritization, and Evaluation Name -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- - Sponsor/Developer Mode Input(s) Output(s)
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50 Name -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- - Sponsor/Developer Mode Input(s) Output(s)
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51 4.1.9 Security Risk Situational Awareness Name -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- - Sponsor/Developer Mode Input(s) Output(s)
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52 Name -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- - Sponsor/Developer Mode Input(s) Output(s)
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53 Sponsor/Dev. Users/Uses/Decisions Output(s)
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54 Strengths (including data) Weaknesses Availability Barriers/Desired Improvements The methodology makes strong use of a 1.5 ratio for decision making when comparing the risks of two alternatives.
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55 Strengths (including data) Weaknesses Availability Barriers/Desired Improvements Cost-effective approach for considering options that do not require more detailed assessment.
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56 Strengths (including data) Weaknesses Availability Barriers/Desired Improvements Risk indices provide single annual risk number.
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57 Component Key Sources of Data Assumptions, Limitations, Biases, and Availability Strengths (including data) Weaknesses Availability Barriers/Desired Improvements This is a very simple process that can be implemented with no additional data.
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58 4.2.5 (Continued)
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59 4.2.6 (Continued)
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60 4.2.8 Chemical Manufacturer Risk Assessment Framework See also: §3.3.4 Sponsor/Dev. Users/Uses/Decisions Output(s)
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61 4.2.9 Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment (CTRA) Process See also: §3.4.3.1 Sponsor/Dev.
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62 4.2.9 (Continued)
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63 4.2.10 (Continued)
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64 4.2.11 (Continued)
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65 4.2.12 (Continued)
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66 4.2.13 (Continued)
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67 4.2.14 (Continued)
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68 4.2.15 (Continued)
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69 4.2.17 Risk-Based Preventative Radiological/Nuclear Detection Resource Allocation (CREATE Model) See also: §3.4.1.3 4.2.16 Readiness and Resiliency Assessment System See also: §3.4.1.3 Sponsor/Dev.
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70 4.2.17 (Continued)
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71 4.2.18 (Continued)
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72 4.2.19 (Continued)
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73 4.2.20 (Continued)
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74 4.2.21 (Continued)
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75 4.2.22 (Continued)
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