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Appendix B: U.S-Japan Technology Linkages in Airframes and Aircraft Systems
Pages 103-127

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From page 103...
... BOEING COMMERCIAL TRANSPORT ALLIANCES WITH JAPAN In the more than 20 years since the YS-11 program was canceled, Japanese activities in the airframe segment have been carried out mainly through alliances between the heavy industry manufacturers and Boeing. In the Boeing perspective, Japan is important as a market, collaborator, and potential competitor.
From page 104...
... Boeing calculates these figures based on cumulative and projected engine purchases, and uses information provided by suppliers on foreign content of subsystems. It is generally possible to project engine purchases because airlines need to make a significant investment to support the maintenance of a particular engine.
From page 105...
... The agreement was for a fixed-price purchase of the first 500 ship sets, which incorporated learning curve cost reductions over time. Boeing calculates Japanese work share as 15 percent of the airframe this does not include airframe systems and constitutes about 6 to 7 percent of the total value of the airplane.
From page 107...
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From page 108...
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From page 109...
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From page 110...
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From page 111...
... government approvals such as a Department of Commerce technical data export license were needed for this project. The Departments of Commerce and Defense tend to take a restrictive stance on certain technologies such as those related to composites, but sensitivity is generally limited to design knowhow rather than manufacturing processes.
From page 112...
... 777 Boeing, the three heavy industry companies, and the Japanese government worked out a "program partnership" for the 777 twinjet, which is due to enter airline service in 1995 and will seat 328 with a range of 5,000 miles in its initial version. The structure of the deal itself is very similar to the 767, although Boeing originally offered equity participation similar to that contemplated for the 7J7.
From page 113...
... For example, Japanese engineers had access to the load data for the wing center section because they designed and will manufacture the wing box, but data on the outboard section were not made available. The most significant increases to the Japanese work share are the 777's wing box and the pressure bulkhead, both of which were designed and built by the heavies.
From page 114...
... For example, after Boeing had determined how much work to give the heavies, the Japanese partners needed to reach agreement on dividing the work share. Apparently, this process was not completely straightforward.
From page 115...
... Japanese Advanced Manufacturing Capabilities During its study mission to Japan in June 1993, the committee had an opportunity to tour the manufacturing facilities of the Japanese heavies and several smaller aircraft suppliers. The committee was particularly impressed with the manufacturing capabilities of Japanese industry much of it devoted to participation in the 777 and other Boeing programs.
From page 116...
... The overall impression is that various fundamental technologies have been distributed among the major players in the Japanese industry. From manufacturing processes involving fuselage structural components, to more highly loaded structures such as wing sections, to lightweight composite structures, which include moderately stressed composite landing gear doors as well as more highly loaded carbon fiber wing structures, Japanese aircraft manufacturing capabilities are state of the art.
From page 117...
... The floor beams are carbon fiber composite structures, the first such application of composites in Boeing commercial aircraft. The first 777 was rolled out on April 9, 1994, with plans to commence flight tests in June 1994.
From page 118...
... The Boeing relationship has provided the Japanese heavies with a relatively low-cost, lowrisk means of entering the global airframe field. Participation in Boeing programs particularly the 777 has allowed the Japanese heavies to implement advanced manufacturing techniques in producing modern technology aircraft, but they have not obtained Boeing's most critical technologies.
From page 119...
... The Japanese heavies have failed twice in independent programs, and it is Boeing's policy not to participate in a program at less than 50 percent equity. Further, significant participation in McDonnell Douglas commercial programs might be more costly and risky than continuing with Boeing, and collaboration with Airbus is problematic because the heavies would presumably need to take work share away from the Airbus members themselves.
From page 120...
... As noted earlier, Japanese companies had assembled the North American F-86 in the l950s, and moved on to the licensed production of the more advanced Lockheed F-104 in the 1960s, and the McDonnell Douglas F-4 in the 1970s. In the mid-1970s, Japan began to consider options for replacing the older fighters in the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF)
From page 121...
... government export approval, Department of Defense (DOD) program officers and even McDonnell Douglas are not equipped to stay fully abreast of technology transfers at the subcontractor level.
From page 122...
... Technical assistance Factory training Tooling Production test equipment Mobile Gaining unit Knockdown assemblies Follow-on material F-4 Technologies Titanium machining Titanium forming Wire bundle manufacturing Stability augmentation alla flight control system integration F-15 Technologies Boron and graphite composite Titanium tubing Digital multiplex bus system integration Limited software development capability Fly-by-wire flight control integration NOTE: No design technology or design data has been transferred. SOURCE: McDonnell Douglas.
From page 123...
... The F-15 work was beneficial in enabling Japanese suppliers to invest in new equipment more rapidly, to malce incremental improvements in technology, and to cross-fertilize capabilities from military to commercial work and from aircraft manufacturing to other businesses. This process was aided by the close integration of Japan's military and civilian industrial bases in aircraft.' The disagreement among analysts centers on the ultimate significance of F-15 technology transfers for commercial aircraft competitiveness, as distinct from the benefits presented by the work itself.
From page 124...
... The IDA set specifications that could not be met by existing aircraft, and MHI completed preliminary designs for a domestic aircraft with an unrealistically low estimate of development costs.~4 During 1986, DOD became increasingly concerned with the specifications and low development cost estimates, and began a more aggressive push for the FS-X to be based on an existing U.S. design.
From page 125...
... development work share (excluding work on the engines) , but this posed problems for the Japanese because more than half of the development costs were slated to go toward domestically developed avionics.
From page 126...
... Although much of this technology is "old," analysts have pointed out that Japan has developed competitive Tithe four nonderived technologies are all in avionics: the phased array radar, the inertial reference system. the integrated electronic warfare system, and the mission computer.
From page 127...
... . Observers disagree on the quality of Japan's phased array radar technology.


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