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Pages 18-22

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From page 18...
... 18 III. PREEMPTION In a negligence action, the courts must determine whether a defendant had a duty toward others and if so, what standard care was required to avoid legal liability.
From page 19...
... 19 In aviation negligence cases, courts typically determine preemption issues under the FAAct based on implied preemption. In one case, the Supreme Court stated that implied preemption can arise as follows: Pre-emption occurs when Congress, in enacting a federal statute, expresses a clear intent to pre-empt state law, when there is outright or actual conflict between federal and state law, where compliance with both federal and state law is in effect physically impossible, where there is implicit in federal law a barrier to state regulation, where Congress has legislated comprehensively, thus occupying an entire field of regulation and leaving no room for the States to supplement federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of Congress.136 More recently, the Supreme Court commonly refers to two categories of implied preemption: field and conflict.
From page 20...
... 20 B Remedial Actions under the FAAct The courts have found that the FAAct does not preempt a remedial cause of action to recover for the injuries suffered in an aircraft accident.
From page 21...
... 21 Occasionally, this exclusive federal authority to regulate can result in a determination that certain actions against airport proprietors are preempted. For example, in one case, a plaintiff tried to bring a negligence action against an airport proprietor based on decisions about the capabilities of navigational aids at the airport.
From page 22...
... 22 the regulations issued by the Secretary cover the subject matter of the two allegations." 169 In one instance in this case, the federal agency had adopted maximum speed limits for trains in that location "after the hazards posed by track conditions were taken into account," and as such, the "speed limits must be read as not only establishing a ceiling, but also precluding additional state regulation." 170 In another instance, an agency manual provided that states could select crossing systems and then implement them in accordance with federal standards. The Court determined that the manual only stated the proper features of crossing systems and did not mandate legal requirements for installation.

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