Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability (2021) / Chapter Skim
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4 Ballistic Missile Defense in the Absence of Cooperation
4 Ballistic Missile Defense in the Absence of Cooperation
Pages 39-52
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From page 39... ...
This confirms statements by Russian officials that current and planned U.S. regional missile defense cannot prevent a major attack or counterstrike by Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles or submarine-launched ballistic missiles.*
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From page 40... ...
regional ballistic missile defenses against perceived threats from Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran, the joint committees have used representative burnout velocities of both the attack missiles and deployed and/or planned interceptor missiles described in Chapters 2 and 3. The joint committees also considered kinematic capability, which is whether the interceptor has sufficient time to physically intercept the attack missile along its trajectory.† At least initially, the joint committees *
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From page 41... ...
EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. REGIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS AGAINST INTERMEDIATE- AND MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILE THREATS European Theater Figure 4-1 illustrates some of the elements of a regional ballistic missile defense system, including early warning and tracking radar installations, a satellite tracking system, and the collocated interceptor radar and launcher.
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From page 42... ...
42 REGIONAL BMD IN THE CONTEXT OF STRATEGIC STABILITY FIGURE 4-1 Possible scenario if interceptor(s) operates in regular operating mode.
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From page 43... ...
While burnout velocities of SM-3 IB and IIA interceptors have not been officially released, it is reasonable to postulate that SM-3 IB interceptors would have a velocity of around 3.5 km/s and the SM-3 IIA interceptors would have a burnout velocity of around 4.5 km/s.72 These systems can * Current Iranian ballistic missiles launched from inside Iran could reach only Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, all of which are NATO members.
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From page 44... ...
The defended areas presented in Figure 4-5 assume a launch-on-remote operating mode. In an LOR mode, the predicted intercept point can be calculated using sensor data from a remote sensor system (one not co-located with the interceptor launcher)
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From page 45... ...
In EOR mode, "the interceptor can be launched using any available target track, and engagement is controlled from in-flight target updates that can be provided to the interceptor missile from any Aegis AN/SPY-1 or AN/TPY-2 (FBX) radar."73 In other words, in the EOR mode the interceptors at Deveselu could engage an Iranian missile even if the SPY-1D radar co-located at Deveselu is not observing and tracking that particular Iranian missile.
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From page 46... ...
In fact, nearly all of Europe could be defended by 4.5 km/s SM-3 IIA interceptors against the analyzed threat if EOR is possible. EOR was demonstrated for the first time in a December 2017 test.74 Operating in EOR mode would require earlier, more accurate radar data, which could be obtained through the placement of more forward-based radars or a more cooperative exchange of data with the Russian Federation.
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From page 47... ...
resulting in different detailed results, but they are qualitatively similar to the minimum-energy-trajectory results obtained in this study. The 2012 study committee also examined the reduction in defended area if a shoot-look-shoot operating doctrine were employed.76 Asian Theater Short-range ballistic missiles from North Korea pose threats to all of South Korea, including U.S.
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Target sites in Japan would be at the low end of the known or assumed missile ranges of North Korean missiles; these missiles would have relatively short burn times and low altitudes. Figure 4-8 shows the area that Aegis ships with shipboard interceptors located in the Sea of Japan are kinematically capable of defending against such missiles, according to the 2012 National Academies study.77 The figure shows the results of calculations with various interceptor burnout velocities, ranging from 3.0 to 4.5 km/s, defending against a North Korean No Dong Mod 1/2 missile (1,200-1,500 km)
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From page 49... ...
with 95 percent probability of success requires 4 interceptors (recall that one interceptor package consists of 8 launchers, each having 4 interceptors, and that the predicted total of 480 interceptors will be deployed across the territory of the Russian Federation by 2020) .‡ The ratio of interceptors to attack missiles changes nonlinearly for the same probability of success as the number of attack missiles increases because of the potential for interactive effects.
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LIMITATION OF EXISTING AND NEAR-TERM CAPABILITIES Currently, the Russian Federation and the United States are deploying ballistic missile defenses that are at least kinematically capable of intercepting attack missiles from the countries identified in this report without any cooperation between them. Indeed, neither would be willing to depend exclusively on the other for the effectiveness of an important military capability.
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From page 51... ...
Enhancing U.S. and Russian ability to detect, track, and discriminate against attack missiles is, in the joint committees' judgment, an area where a cooperative approach may provide significant benefits to both countries.
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