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5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems
Pages 53-78

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From page 53...
... ASSESSMENTS OF IMPROVEMENTS FROM INFORMATION SHARING The joint committees' assessments of improvements that information sharing would provide to performance of Russian and U.S. regional missile defense systems were conducted in different ways to provide analyses that will be credible to their respective governments.
From page 54...
... Mutual Operational Interests The Russian Federation and the United States have a shared interest in each other having reliably operational, timely, and accurate means of detecting ballistic missile launches that may pose a threat to either country or their allies (see Box 5-1 for a detailed explanation of ballistic missile tracking)
From page 55...
... ____________________ * The joint committees use "boost phase" to refer to the powered flight phase, which itself may have multiple stages.
From page 56...
... The satellites were launched together and orbit with about 40 degrees separation in plane at an altitude of 1,350 km, with a 120-minute orbital period. 82 The STSS mission was to detect missile launches and to provide accurate tracking of midcourse reentry vehicles for ballistic missile defense.
From page 57...
... Such satelliteenabled midcourse tracking would also increase the sizes of areas defended by enabling interceptor missiles to engage attack missiles outside of the range of the interceptor launch site's ground-based radar system (an operating mode called "engage on remote," or EOR, in the United States)
From page 58...
... In all cases, better ground-based radar data significantly increase the accuracy of target location, and can reduce damage caused by falling debris the farther away from Earth a missile is struck. The benefit of sharing radar data is that if, at any time during the attack missile's flight, a radar system from one country or the other can track it, uncertainty in the missile's measured position decreases, and therefore the certainty in its trajectory and ultimate landing point increases.
From page 59...
... To analyze the benefits of sharing radar data, the joint committees examined three hypothetical Iranian launch locations: Tabriz, Mashad, and Zahedan. The first two of these are known missile launch/test sites, but Zahedan is not.
From page 60...
... Sankaran, consultant, 2016. FIGURE 5-3 Tracking time and duration by various U.S., NATO, and Russian radar stations of a hypothetical missile trajectory from Tabriz, Iran, to London, UK.
From page 61...
... Iran does not at present have long-range ballistic missiles or ICBMs, but Iran continues to develop its ballistic missile capabilities and has demonstrated a space launch capability. A hypothetical Iranian ICBM trajectory targeting the continental United States would overfly Russian airspace (more if targeting Los Angeles, less if targeting Washington, DC)
From page 62...
... With EOR operating mode, the U.S. regional BMD system in Europe could provide defense against Iranian or Pakistani missiles targeting the Russian Federation.
From page 63...
... Sankaran, consultant, 2016. FIGURE 5-6 EOR and LOR defended area plot: Extent of European territory defended by Russian BMD systems located in Samara for a hypothetical Pakistani attack with missile ranges varied from 50 km to 2,750 km.
From page 64...
... for hypothetical Iranian attack missiles with ranges varied from 50 km to 6,000 km. The areas shown are for single-shot defense.
From page 65...
... published Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. BoostPhase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives, which focuses primarily on boostphase defenses for global missile defense.
From page 66...
... It is this ability to fire the interceptor before the long-range radar detects an inbound attack missile, and the ability of the interceptor to be fired toward a more accurate envelope in space, that provides benefits to the BMD systems in the form of critical time (i.e., an earlier and more accurate interceptor launch)
From page 67...
... The joint committees have not suggested here which country would provide the sensors, nor have they analyzed costs; and they did not evaluate a range of options or alternatives. The joint committees do, however, note that a shared satellite constellation could provide real benefit to both the Russian Federation and the United States: Sharing the costs can significantly reduce the contribution from each country, and placing sensors in orbit may be an attractive alternative to the more difficult question of shared radar systems on sovereign soil.
From page 68...
... Korea Missile Threat Event 5 Peshawar, Pakistan Chelyabinsk, Russia 00:00:00 00:13:00 (2 simultaneous threats Musudan-Ri, North Kadena AFB, Japan 00:00:00 00:10:00 registered) Korea SOURCE: Created by J
From page 69...
... Sankaran, consultant, 2016, using Systems Tool Kit by Analytical Graphics, Inc. FIGURE 5-11 Snapshot of a hypothetical missile launched from Zahedan, Iran, toward Rota, Spain, being tracked by a simulated nine-satellite tracking constellation.
From page 70...
... Figures 5-13 through 5-17b show the times when the nine-satellite constellation can track a specified simulated missile threat. In Figure 5-13, the hypothetical attack missile (Missile Threat Event 1)
From page 71...
... FIGURE 5-14 Times when satellites in a nine-satellite equatorial constellation have line-of-sight geometry with Missile Threat Event 2 in Table 5-2 (Zahedan, Iran, to Rota, Spain)
From page 72...
... . The times when the satellites in the constellation have line-of-sight geometry with the second of the simultaneous simulated missile threats in Missile Threat Event 4 (Musudan-Ri, North Korea, to Tokyo, Japan)
From page 73...
... . The times when the satellites in the constellation have line-of-sight geometry with the second of the simulated simultaneous missile threats in Missile Threat Event 5 (Musudan-Ri, North Korea, to Kadena AFB, Japan)
From page 74...
... . The times when the satellites in a simulated nine-satellite constellation have line-of-sight geometry with the second of the simulated simultaneous missile threats in Missile Threat Event 5 (Peshawar, Pakistan, to Chelyabinsk, Russia)
From page 75...
... Benefits of Information Sharing for Midcourse Tracking Although the United States and the Russian Federation have, or will have, capable boostphase detection and early warning systems, and highly capable radar detection and tracking systems, what has eluded both countries for decades is a capability for adequate midcourse tracking. A satellite system for ballistic-missile tracking, in which both countries are involved from the beginning in the design, construction, and operation of the systems, would thus seem to be in the interest of both countries.
From page 76...
... Conversely, for the current study, the joint committees' task is to examine missile defense systems planned for deployment against regional threats in combination with the benefits and disadvantages of a range of cooperative opportunities in the context of strategic stability. Ultimately, the joint committees concluded that there are areas of technical cooperation that could benefit both Russian and U.S.
From page 77...
... . The joint committees suggest that this team might draft potential acquisition programs, including analyses of alternatives, across all areas of potential U.S.-Russian collaboration in missile defense, including additional opportunities beyond those identified in this report.


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