Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability (2021) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix C: Impacts of Regional Missile Defense on U.S. and Russian Nuclear Deterrents
Appendix C: Impacts of Regional Missile Defense on U.S. and Russian Nuclear Deterrents
Pages 95-98
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From page 95... ...
IMPORTANCE OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES Both the United States and the Russian Federation structure their nuclear deterrents around a nuclear triad consisting of ICBMs, sea-launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear heavy bomber * "End-game guidance" refers to guidance on board the interceptor itself.
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From page 96... ...
The 2012 study concluded that "no interceptor with fly-out speeds less than or equal to 5.0 km/sec based in Poland or Romania or elsewhere in Europe can engage or interfere with Russia's nuclear deterrent ICBMs or submarine-launched ballistic missiles."109 The joint committees' analyses show that interceptor missiles deployed in Redzikowo, Poland, will not have the kinematic possibility of intercepting Russian ICBMs flying from Vypolzovo to Washington, DC, unless the interceptors have a burnout velocity greater than 5.5 km/s (see Figure C-1)
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From page 97... ...
APPENDIX C 97 FIGURE C-1 Track of a Russian ICBM (the large red arc) and an interceptor launched from Poland assuming burnout velocities of 5.5 to 6.0 km/s.
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