Skip to main content

Currently Skimming:

4 Evolving the Decision-Making Paradigm
Pages 27-43

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 27...
... UAS operations must demonstrate an "equivalent level of safety" to manned aircraft. The FAA approach was to require UAS to be "remotely piloted," meaning that the unmanned aircraft was expected to behave in the airspace system exactly like a manned aircraft, including communications between air traffic control (ATC)
From page 28...
... This order mandates that safety risk management (SRM) must include the following steps: • Conduct systems analysis to establish an understanding of systems design performance; • Identify and document hazards that have the potential to affect safety risk; • Analyze safety risk to determine the severity and likelihood of potential effects; • Assess safety risk to establish safety performance targets or rank hazards on risk; and • Control safety risk by implementing controls for hazards with unacceptable risk.
From page 29...
... The FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016, Section 2213, calls for a study of probabilistic assessments of risks to streamline the integration of unmanned aircraft systems into the National Airspace System. The current DIAAT approach is not (quantitative)
From page 30...
... There are very few commercial unmanned aircraft with airworthiness certificates. Experimental, Restricted Category, or Special Airworthiness certification is normally required, with the last two being the only options for beyond visual line of sight.
From page 31...
... ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: MISSING DIMENSIONS IN CONSIDERATIONS OF UAS RISKS AND BENEFITS The FAA's comprehensive set of analysis methods and processes for safety risk management and system safety assessment has long served to ensure safety within the manned aircraft sector. However, unmanned systems ­present many new and unique challenges and opportunities, and thus it is important to recognize that a broader view on risk analysis is needed, in at least four ways: 1.
From page 32...
... As shown in Figure 4.1, UAS operations span a broad range, from low-risk, low-consequence to high-consequence operations, thereby requiring different approaches depending upon the size and mission of the UAS. Over the past 12-24 months, the FAA has shifted its focus on UAS integration from full integration of larger, predominately military UAS into the National Airspace System to the integration of small commercial and consumer drones operating at lower altitude and lower risk.
From page 33...
... of the committee that this work will continue and that SC-228 will complete the standards for UAS DAA and C2 for Classes A, B, C, and G airspace and all sizes and missions. UAS RISK ANALYSTS VERSUS MANNED ANALYSTS The unique nature of UAS operations opens the door to reconsider who is best suited to conduct the risk analysis for different classes of UAS, as well as what regulatory institutional mechanism is best suited to ensure and incentivize safety.
From page 34...
... , should be part of the equation. UAS operations should be allowed if they decrease safety risks in society -- even if they introduce new aviation safety risks -- as long as they result in a net reduction in total safety risk.
From page 35...
... RTCA's SC-228 UAS committee has relied heavily on NASA's simulation and testing to develop and validate the safety assessments that serve as the foundation of their standards for detect and avoid and command and control. For the fast-paced small UAS industry, comparative risk analysis (CRA)
From page 36...
... . Recommendation: Where operational data are insufficient to credibly estimate likelihood and severity components of risk, the FAA should use a comparative risk analysis approach to compare proposed UAS operations to comparable existing or de minimis levels of risk.
From page 37...
... In implementing the recommended PRA approach, a similar -- but scalable -- construct could be useful for UAS software. One such approach has been proposed by ASTM Standard F3201 "Standard Practice for Ensuring Dependability of Software Used in Unmanned Aircraft Systems,"9 which bases the required software assurance activities on an operational risk assessment -- and which takes into account the concept of operation of the UAS -- rather than the traditional functional risk assessment.
From page 38...
... To that end, the FAA should establish and maintain technical training programs to ensure that agency risk decision professionals can fully comprehend the assumptions and limita­ ions of the probabilistic risk analysis techniques appropriate to current and future UAS t operations. As highlighted above, the FAA administrator recognized several years ago the need for government to move faster in addressing the burgeoning UAS industry.
From page 39...
... For example, it is common practice in manned aviation for underwriters to adjust insurance rates based on a number of factors ranging from the technology, to the type of operation, and to other operational factors including maintenance and inspection protocols, operator training, and the implementation of safety management systems and processes in the operation. In addition, in the automotive industry insurance rates are influenced by many factors, including risk associated with the vehicle type, vehicle location, the nature of vehicle operations (commercial or private)
From page 40...
... The FAA also implemented the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Test Site Data Collection and Analysis program to collect operational and test data from all of the test sites (FAA, 2018)
From page 41...
... To the credit of both, the Unmanned Aircraft Safety Team (UAST) has been formed as a joint effort to begin addressing these issues and tasked to develop safety recommendations and enhancements relative to UAS operations based on the data.
From page 42...
... The persistent development of modeling and simulation tools in every engineering domain, and integration tools for multiphysics modeling, makes it possible to synthesize data sets where empirical data are impossible or infeasible to obtain. Physics-based air traffic simulations that incorporate unmanned aircraft, for example, can inform encounter models and perhaps reveal rare hazards that require scrutiny.
From page 43...
... The FAA should also consult with the Drone Advisory Committee to help define the minimum operational safety data set and plan for collecting, archiving, and disseminating the data. Recommendation: For operations approvals for which there are no standards, as operational data are collected and analyzed, the FAA should, as part of Improved Safety Risk Management, • Publish requirements for operational approvals with associated restrictions that can be adjusted and scaled based on industry past experience and the accumulation of related data; • Expand single operation approvals as experiential data accumulate and risks are assessed; • Permit repeated or routine operations based on the accumulation and analysis of additional data; and • Continuously update operational approval practices to incorporate emerging safety enhancements based on industry lessons learned until standards have been established.


This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.