Exploring Medical and Public Health Preparedness for a Nuclear Incident Proceedings of a Workshop (2019) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
2 Federal Planning for Nuclear Incidents
2 Federal Planning for Nuclear Incidents
Pages 5-34
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 5... ...
• Current models for nuclear detonation incorporate sophis ticated data on urban environments and are able to predict likely blast zones and fallout zones; the moderate blast zone is a focus of response planning because of the likelihood of survivors with injuries in that zone. Modeling has also shown that any form of sheltering is likely to save many lives during a nuclear event.
|
From page 6... ...
• DHS's Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans lays out a concept of operations for a response to a nuclear or radiological incident through the identification of primary authorities, coordinaion of jurisdictional planning efforts, and identifica t tion of federal response capabilities.
|
From page 7... ...
By 2008, DHS was aggressively pursuing nuclear response planning. This led to the publication of Planning Guidance for a Response to a Nuclear Detonation, with a second edition issued in 2010 (FEMA/DHS, 2010)
|
From page 8... ...
into its WMD response capabilities. The NRF annex, Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans (DHS, 2016b)
|
From page 9... ...
While obviously there are complications unique to the nuclear arena, response plans cannot be so specific to a nuclear attack that they take away from preparedness for other, higher probability disas ters, he said.
|
From page 10... ...
Buddemeier remarked that this updated modeling has helped to in form not only the federal Planning Guidance for a Response to a Nuclear Detonation (FEMA/DHS, 2010) , as mentioned by MacKinney, but also a variety of additional guidance documents that followed (DHS, 2016a,c;
|
From page 11... ...
FIGURE 2-2 Illustration of detailed improvised nuclear device effects analysis. NOTES: The dynamic fallout pattern of a 10 kt nuclear detonation in Washington, DC, based on a block-by-block assessment of prompt effects, overpressure, thermal effects, prompt radiation, and fallout dose and dose rate.
|
From page 12... ...
This zone would include significant structural damage, with blown-out building interiors, collapsed buildings, and fires, but survival would be much higher than in the severe damage blast zone. Buddemeier noted that because of the number of people in this zone who would survive but have significant injuries, the moderate damage zone is a priority in many response plans.
|
From page 13... ...
In addition, a starting assumption, which he hoped would not be the case in a real event but one that was useful for the purposes of modeling, was that some people were outside for the entire first 2 hours following detonation while others were indoors. Most would not survive in the severe damage zone (see the red circle in Figure 2-4)
|
From page 14... ...
Colored contours on the ground represent the dif ferent blast zones (red, orange, yellow) and the dangerous fallout zone (purple)
|
From page 15... ...
NOTES: Orange contour represents the maximum extent of the dangerous fallout zone 2.5 hours following detonation (this same area is represented by the purple shaded area in Figure 2-4) ; yellow contour represents maximum extent of the hot zone (18 hours after detonation)
|
From page 16... ...
In the Times Square example, assuming that everyone stands outside for 12 hours after detonation -- which Buddemeier noted is not recommended but is a helpful baseline assumption for modeling purposes -- almost 1.5 million people outside the severe and moderate damage zone would have significant radiation exposure. However, if everyone were to run into even a low-quality shelter, nearly 1 million of those people would be saved from significant exposure.
|
From page 17... ...
While both had the expected cap and stem mushroom cloud, both also had an air gap, and it was because of that air gap that there was no significant fallout (see Figure 2-8)
|
From page 18... ...
Although there is global fallout when a bomb is detonated that far off the ground, it is not the severe local fallout that causes the kind of issues he described in the NYC Times Square example. Addressing Today's Expanded Threat Base In the event of an imminent nuclear threat, as MacKinney had men tioned, people would likely have 10–20 minutes to find a good shelter, Buddemeier said.
|
From page 19... ...
after sheltering. "The bottom line," Buddemeier said, "is that ‘Get inside, stay inside, stay tuned' works for both a threat of attack as well as if an attack does occur." Saving Lives After a Nuclear Detonation Buddemeier said that for those who are unable to get into adequate shelters and for people who are injured by the prompt effects, a rapid response could save hundreds of thousands of lives.
|
From page 20... ...
Challenges in Nuclear Incident Preparedness and Response Yeskey listed several preparedness challenges in an all-hazards ap proach but also noted that the list specifically applied to a nuclear scenario because of the extent of patient movement and the need for specialty care. He predicted that in the event of a nuclear incident, many providers would offer support, but a methodical approach would be critical to a successful 1 For more information on the scenario, see https://communities.geoplatform.gov/geoconops (accessed December 10, 2018)
|
From page 21... ...
Lack of Medical Capacity The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) , with its 94 teams, including 57 medical teams and 2 critical care surgical teams, still lacks the capabilities and capacity to respond to all of these new 21st-century scenarios, including a nuclear scenario, Yeskey said.
|
From page 22... ...
He compared those recovery efforts to the nuclear scenario and the need to think not just about the immediate response to an event but also about the long-term recovery, including plans for displaced populations. ASPR Operational Guidance ASPR has been active in nuclear preparedness and response for more than 10 years and during that time has issued several operational guidance documents to help state, local, tribal, and territorial partners with prepared ness planning in their specific jurisdictions, Yeskey said.
|
From page 23... ...
Additional ASPR Responsibilities: Clinical Guidance, Stockpiling Medical Countermeasures, Medical Care, and Interagency Activities Clinical Guidance In addition to its operational guidance documents, ASPR has also issued clinical guidance. In Yeskey's opinion, a valuable reference -- and one that has been very well received by the medical community -- is the Radiaion Emergency Medical Management website, www.remm.nlm.gov.
|
From page 24... ...
Development of a Regional Disaster Health Response System While still in a pilot phase, Yeskey said, ASPR has been developing a tiered Regional Disaster Health Response System (RDHRS) aimed at
|
From page 25... ...
At the time of the workshop, the first pilot project was scheduled to begin on October 1, 2018.4 Following the pilot projects, Yeskey said, ASPR hopes to identify best practices and expand to additional states and partners nationwide. RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES AVAILABLE AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL This workshop was not the first time that the National Academies has evaluated medical preparedness to respond to a terrorist nuclear event, John Crapo, deputy program manager, National Nuclear Security Admin istration, DoE, began.
|
From page 26... ...
26 FIGURE 2-9 Notional depiction of a potential Regional Disaster Health Response System. SOURCE: Yeskey presentation, August 22, 2018.
|
From page 27... ...
. Based on a Federal Interagency Operational Plan, each federal region was to develop its own regional operation plan, and states and local jurisdictions would be encouraged to develop their own all-hazards plans with guidance from FEMA, Crapo said.
|
From page 28... ...
A new response framework is under development. bFEMA is considering the need to revise the existing nuclear and radiological incident annex to the National Response Framework as an annex to a forthcoming FIOPs for the response and recovery mission areas.
|
From page 29... ...
It identifies overarching coordinating respon sibilities of the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Commit tee, which provides direction for some 20 federal agencies, departments, and offices responsible for ensuring efforts of the federal government in preparing and planning for response, and of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program, which is specific to nuclear power plant response. Essentially, Crapo said, the annex lays out a concept of operations for a response to a nuclear or radiological incident by identifying the primary authorities (e.g., if an incident occurs at a DoD facility, then DoD is in charge)
|
From page 30... ...
capabilities, it produces situational awareness, supports planning efforts, and informs protective action decisions. It also comes with a fairly light laboratory analysis capa bility, Crapo noted.
|
From page 31... ...
Support and Coordination of Federal Response As defined in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans (DHS, 2016b)
|
From page 32... ...
He asked to what ex tent military intelligence is helping to define in an expansive way the nature of potential nuclear threats so that the agencies developing response plans can at least become aware of the broader range of actors and modalities that might be used in an attack.
|
From page 33... ...
According to MacKinney, the same plans that were developed for a response to al-Qaida are being used when considering a North Korean attack. ASPR's Regional Disaster Health Response System Jody Wireman, environmental health adviser, Defense Health Agency, asked for additional information on the rollout of RDHRS.
|
From page 34... ...
Risk Communication: Accessing Initial Models Ed McDonough, public information officer, Maryland Emergency Management Agency, asked Crapo what the time line would be for ac cessing the first DoE models that become available following a nuclear incident and whether state and local health agencies know how to access the models. Crapo replied that initial models should be available within 15–30 minutes of notification but would only be as mature as the infor mation that was provided as part of the modeling request, although they would also take into consideration available meteorological conditions to indicate how particles would disperse in the atmosphere.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.