Skip to main content

Currently Skimming:

The Convergence of Violent Extremism and Radiological Security: Proceedings of a Workshop - in Brief
Pages 1-12

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 1...
... PRESENTATIONS BY WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS Historical Perspectives The first panel provided historical perspectives on violent extremism and radiological security and background on efforts to address these threats. Risto Volanen, State Secretary of Finland (Retired)
From page 2...
... Linkages Among Extremism, Terrorism, and Radiological Security In the next panel session, presenters gave their perspectives on linkages between major workshop themes. Roman Lunkin, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS)
From page 3...
... The data also indicate the most frequent sources of CBRN attacks, organizations receiving the most fatal CBRN attacks, those with the most total CBRN attacks, and those with the most fatalities from these attacks. Relying on these and related analyses, ten emerging hot spots concentrated in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia have been identified.
From page 4...
... ISIS and other terrorist groups have had access to radioactive materials in Syria and Iraq as well as the technical expertise to make dirty bombs. Although it remains unclear if ISIS actually intended to engage in radiological terrorism, their activities in the Middle East and in Europe relied on innovative elements, including drones, which may pose serious challenges for nuclear security.
From page 5...
... The IAEA emphasizes nuclear security, but it can only inform and recommend, not compel action. FIGURE 8 Highly sensitive portable and stationary software In contrast to the largely static nuclear security regime, and hardware complexes for radiation survey and radiation terrorist groups and nuclear technology are dynamic and monitoring.
From page 6...
... For example, the Department of Energy has an incident response program to investigate and resolve reports of stolen or misplaced radioactive materials and attempts to assemble improvised nuclear devices. Juba Rautjarai, Radiation Regulatory Agency of Finland (retired)
From page 7...
... FIGURE 10 Spark Plasma Sintering technology for ionizing radiation sources fabrication based on 137Cs ceramic core. SOURCE: Presentation by Evgeny Papynov on secure matrixes for ionizing radiation sources, December 12, 2018.
From page 8...
... FIGURE 12 Locations and profiles of deep injection disposal of liquid radioactive waste in Russia. SOURCE: Presentation by Vladislav Petrov on experimental and theoretical modeling of radio nuclide migration and safety, December 12, 2018.
From page 9...
... SOURCE: Presentation by Mikhail Diordiy on spent radiation sources storage in containers to prevent terrorism and extremism, December 12, 2018. COMMENTS OF INDIVIDUAL WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS During the discussions following each presentation, individual participants highlighted emerging challenges, as well as positive developments for increased security.
From page 10...
... Breakout Group 2: Organizational and Policy Issues Many group members identified the 2021 review conference, called for pursuant to the Amended Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (A/CPPNM) , as an opportunity to address gaps in the global security regime for nuclear and radioactive material.
From page 11...
... Several participants urged the prompt establishment of the aforementioned working group of experts, including but not limited to U.S., Russian, and European specialists, that could provide details of radiological security to the IAEA and directly to governments participating in the review of the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Individual participants also raised the following topics for future discussion: Reducing Likelihood of Threats • Encouraging U.S., Russian, and other interested researchers to join forces in providing affordable alternatives for 137Cs.
From page 12...
... • Importance and cost of radiation monitoring of surface and subsurface water resources near waste sites for radiation-contaminated material and uncontrolled junk sites for scrap metal. Improving Responses to Threats • Identifying successes and missed opportunities in providing local law enforcement personnel with radiation detectors, related equipment, and expert support for identifying inadequately controlled sources.


This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.