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Conclusions
Pages 48-49

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From page 48...
... New requirements on handling critical components, the prevalence of counterfeits, analyzing vulnerabilities, and determining appropriate risk responses are time-consuming and potentially overwhelming to the engineering resources available to the program offices. Current policy requires that program offices obtain all-source intelligence information on potential threats, determine the level of risk to their weapon system, and then proactively develop risk mitigation strategies that may require alteration of their program plans through the 48
From page 49...
... However, by providing standardized, approved assessment tools and access to both component expertise and threat information through a central organization that is resourced appropri ately, the USAF would realize reduction in time and effort and generate improved results in both system security and reliability. The assessment of threats facing the microelectronics community is daunting, but the USAF can mitigate many of the immediate challenges by implementing better OPSEC policies for all weapon systems -- not just those in the early stages of the acquisition life cycle.


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