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Appendix G: Summarization of Relevant Past Reports on USAF and DoD Microelectronic Supply Chain
Pages 75-85

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From page 75...
... and its suppliers "face a major integrated circuit supply dilemma that threatens the security and integrity of classified and sensitive circuit design information, the superiority and correct functioning of electronics systems, system reliability, continued supply of long system-life and special technology components." The task force emphasized the need to make semiconductor technology and manufacturing leadership a national priority. The report's recommendations are summarized below.
From page 76...
... • To assure DoD access to leading-edge trusted manufacturing facilities, the United States needs a broad national effort to offset foreign policies designed to encourage movement of leading-edge semiconductor manu facturing facilities to offshore locations. A coherent U.S.
From page 77...
... commercial semiconductor developers through the creation of courseware and industry information exchange programs; and – Institute a targeted program in the area of firmware integrity to rapidly develop, disseminate, and encourage adoption of improvements to this trust-related aspect of programmable parts, and in conjunction with the above, initiate a research program on "design for trust evaluation" along the lines of prior successful efforts on "design for testability." • DoD must continue to support research and development (R&D) of the special technologies it requires.
From page 78...
... 2  U.S. Department of Defense, 2017, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Cyber Supply Chain, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, February.
From page 79...
... – Each program manager should establish design elements and processes to identify and replace parts or subsystems with known or recently discovered vulnerabilities. • Deputy Secretary of Defense update the JFAC charter to: – Establish JFAC as a DoD-wide hardware and software assurance or ganization with a mandate to support program management offices, program executive offices, and sustainment activities.
From page 80...
... Military Service Chiefs should designate fielded weapons systems for development of initial sus tainment PPPs to demonstrate their effectiveness. • DARPA and IARPA continue R&D efforts to demonstrate a fully capable solution for split fabrication.
From page 81...
... AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT OF STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES (2018) A report from the DoD Inspector General's Office from 2018 assessed whether the USAF's Space Command "implemented an adequate supply chain risk management program for critical strategic systems" -- Space-Based Infrared System, USAF Satellite Control Network, Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals, and the Global Positioning System.5 The report found that Space Command, while establishing some initiatives, did not fully implement the DoD supply chain risk management policy.
From page 82...
... • The Air Force Space Command Commander develop a plan of action, with milestones, for the Space-Based Infrared System to comply with DoD sup ply chain risk management policy. • Establish controls and oversight and require personnel to develop internal procedures or establish contract requirements to improve the accuracy of the requests for supplier threat assessments and require the prioritization of the critical components on the requests and the inclusion of all key in formation needed by [REDACTED]
From page 83...
... • Ensure supplier security and use contract terms. 6  MITRE Corporation, 2018, Deliver Uncompromised: A Strategy for Supply Chain Security and Resilience in Response to the Changing Character of War, August, https://www.mitre.org.
From page 84...
... . • Mandate inclusion of software assurance tools/processes and indepen dent verification and validation using appropriate standards as part of future contracts for all USAF systems.
From page 85...
... • The Air Force should work with defense microelectronics agencies to deploy trusted methods compatible with offshore manufacturing. • Develop situational awareness hardware and analysis tools to establish base line embedded operational patterns and inform best mitigation strategies.


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