A Strategic Vision for Biological Threat Reduction The U.S. Department of Defense and Beyond (2020) / Chapter Skim
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5 Strategic Vision and the Way Forward
5 Strategic Vision and the Way Forward
Pages 105-124
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From page 105... ...
Likewise, an effective interagency mechanism will avoid unnecessary duplication, identify and close gaps, and explore possible synergies. CURRENT APPROACHES OF THE BIOLOGICAL THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM In the past, Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
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From page 106... ...
BTRP's current official mandate is to: • Consolidate and secure dangerous pathogen collections into central reference laboratories or repositories; • Improve the safety and security of biological facilities; • Enhance partner states' capabilities to detect, diagnose, and report bio terror attacks and potential pandemics; • Engage scientists with biological weapon-related expertise, wherever they may currently exist, in research that supports force protection, medical countermeasures, diagnostics, and modeling; • Foster cooperation and collaborative research with partner institutes and scientists to strengthen the joint capacity to rapidly and accurately detect and diagnose high-consequence infectious disease outbreaks and related biothreats, and be prepared to collectively take appropriate action; • Cooperate with partners to ensure the safety and security of dual-use research of concern; and • Engage partners across agencies and organizations within and beyond the United States to limit potential threats and risks associated with cyber security. Goals, Tools, and Approaches for Today and Tomorrow International engagement is one of the most cost-effective tools available to prevent adverse events rather than to respond to them after they occur.
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From page 107... ...
Based on study of the origins and evolution of BTRP, and changes in the scientific, social, political, and physical environment in which emerging infectious diseases have affected local populations and raise the prospect of regional and global spread, this chapter presents the committee's perspectives on the critical issues that underlay the development of a new strategic vision for the agency. The intent is to sharpen the program's focus, facilitate its adaptation to new realities, and better ensure the success of its mission.
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From page 108... ...
As the National Biodefense Strategy of 2018 states, the lines between naturally occurring and evolving infectious disease agents, accidents in the course of legitimate research deemed to be justifiable based on careful risk-to-benefit assessment, intentional misuse of biology, and surprises arising from the biotech revolution are becoming less distinct. This suggests the need for strategies to prevent both risks and threats, and to be prepared to act rapidly and effectively when the need arises.
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From page 109... ...
military deployed in areas where these phenomena are present, and are due to the potential of rapid global dissemination of infectious disease, including to the United States. Greater global connectivity increases the ease of transmission and broadens the reach of infection, which in turn demands faster, more effective response.
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From page 110... ...
For example, the U.S. Army and Navy overseas laboratories provide essential information on endemic infectious diseases and emerging outbreaks and have helped to identify and validate medical countermeasures or prevention strategies.
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From page 111... ...
U.S. biosecurity programs seek to work with countries that have special vulnerabilities to security and public health threats, the desire to build capability and capacity to detect, identify, and analyze emerging infectious diseases, and a willingness to cooperate with U.S.
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From page 112... ...
Preestablished laboratories, pre-deployed protective equipment and preexisting expertise in handling dangerous pathogens, pre-established supply chains, and pre-existing networks of people and their collaborative relationships would be invaluable in rapidly and effectively responding to an emerging infection or epidemic. Each of these organizations involved in the hypothetical scenario brings unique capabilities, from the expertise in CDC personnel, to the flexible funding of BTRP and logistical capabilities of DOD, the diplomatic relations conducted by State, the strengthened healthcare infrastructure developed and the Disaster Assistance Response Team deployed by USAID, and the decades of collaboration in the Institut Pasteur resulting in enhanced indigenous capability and operation in the country and the region.
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From page 113... ...
While there is no perfect solution to today's extremely complex global challenges in biosecurity, the committee fully appreciates that BTRP's engagement program is a critical component of DOD's mission to protect the nation and its military forces. Because of its knowledge on the ground and its position within DOD, BTRP not only knows, communicates with, and supports, but may also even deploy advanced technologies developed through DOD medical and non-medical biodefense research, development, testing, and evaluation programs (CRS, 2019)
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From page 114... ...
For example, a lack of domestic clinical and research laboratory infrastructure or poor domestic public health capabilities, insecure storage of agents and potentially infectious biological samples, limited training in biosafety procedures in the laboratory or clinical settings, and inadequate numbers of subject-matter experts to prevent and respond to infectious diseases may allow an outbreak to occur where it may have otherwise been preventable. Effective surveillance and improved infrastructure must also be paired with sustained efforts to identify opportunities to act prior to an outbreak.
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From page 115... ...
military forces. This is a major benefit of the efforts to assist international partners in upgrading high-containment infectious disease laboratories, to train local trainers in laboratory security and safety, and to help establish local, national, and regional disease surveillance networks.
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From page 116... ...
First, in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, the legacy of the previous years of civil instability, violence, oppressive government, widespread distrust of authority, and dire poverty contributed to the power of conspiracy theories fueling rumors and mistrust of government and, by extension, international responders. This insecurity and lack of trust contributed to the massive nature of the outbreak, including almost 12,000 Ebola deaths officially registered and the breakdown of the healthcare system and the suspension of routine health services.
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From page 117... ...
Geographic and Programmatic Flexibility for BTRP To the extent that BTRP, together with a range of domestic and international partners, can use its collective abilities to more rapidly and precisely anticipate the location and potential sources of biological threats and opportunities, it will increase its ability to articulate where and why it should engage in a variety of geographical areas and topics. The potential for a greater reduction of risk through earlier and sustained engagement based on trust and shared interests is enabled by the ability to act as soon as human and financial resources will feasibly allow.
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From page 118... ...
Yet there are Latin American countries at risk of outbreaks of major emerging infectious diseases, exemplified by the recent increase in incidence of yellow fever, dengue, and Zika viruses. Some Latin American countries also experience political and economic instability.
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From page 119... ...
If this is part of a larger DOD and interagency evaluation of efforts in a country or region, then these evaluations afford opportunities to refine the approach to engagement. This could mean modifying BTRP staffing needs, the composition of partners, revising their roles, creating new networks, and sharing lessons learned and best practices.
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From page 120... ...
Together with the ability to secure samples of infectious diseases, this can increase the likelihood that clinical research and trials of medical countermeasures or vaccines can be implemented, including assessment of innovative approaches developed through DOD research and development. The 2009 National Academy of Sciences report Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction encouraged the development of global networks of individuals and organizations with a common interest in biosecurity threat and risk reduction.
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From page 121... ...
In the future, greater engagement with GHSA, as well as similar linkages with other initiatives, such as the Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance consortium (Connecting Organizations for Regional Disease Surveillance, 2019) , the Bat Project, and the Alliance for Health Security Cooperation, could continue to extend the influence of BTRP and promote greater efforts toward biosecurity.
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From page 122... ...
To maximally contribute to U.S. and international efforts to reduce risks from natural, accidental, or intentional outbreaks and other bioincidents, BTRP must be allowed the resources and the platforms to be able to articulate its successes, including through participation in and organization of appropriate international scientific meetings and other modes of global communication.
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From page 123... ...
Still others focus on the promises and possible perils of biotechnologies. Taken together, the wide range of people and organizations involved in one or more aspects of countering biological threats requires more diligent awareness of others' programs and initiatives, their areas of geographic and substantive engagement, and their similarities and differences in goals and objectives among groups and organizations.
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From page 124... ...
Yet, building on two decades of experience and expertise by implementing the pillars of the proposed strategic vision articulated in this report, DOD's BTRP is well poised to seize opportunities prior to events and provide early warning of local and regional biological threats, thereby improving the biosecurity of deployed U.S. military forces and U.S.
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