Scientific Aspects of Violent Extremism, Terrorism, and Radiological Security Proceedings of a Workshop–in Brief (2020) / Chapter Skim
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Scientific Aspects of Violent Extremism, Terrorism, and Radiological Security: Proceedings of a Workshop - in Brief
Scientific Aspects of Violent Extremism, Terrorism, and Radiological Security: Proceedings of a Workshop - in Brief
Pages 1-14
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responses to radiological incidents. Concluding observations by workshop participants are then presented, followed by a final section on technologies used at RADON's radioactive waste facilities.
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Ian Gordon, International Atomic Energy Agency. End of Life Management of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources.
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to radioactive sources that could be used, particularly in war-torn areas. But there cannot be assurance that inherent difficulties in safely handling and using dangerous radiological materials will continue to dissuade terrorists from using radiological weapons in the future.
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With empirically-informed notions of possible actor types, other data. Identifying geographical intersections of sub-state violence and radiological material dispositions, the methodology may offer new means of anticipating future risks Figure 4 Map display of open source radiological security data.
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Export control of radiologically active items is codified in international legally binding documents, international informal export control regimes, and national export control systems. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group provide a basis for such export control.
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carefully select location of safe evacuation points. On the scene, be alert for presence of radiological protection equipment such as shielding containers and materials including lead or concrete, maintain continuing access to radiation measuring devices, look for presence of nuclear hazard symbols, have personal protective equipment including appropriate clothing and safety gear for Figure 6 Zones of nuclear safety.
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Using remote diagnostic methods and robotic aids, two research nuclear reactors have been decommissioned at the Kurchatov Institute in only seven years. As a result of this work, more than 1,900 tons of solid radioactive waste and about 700 m³ of liquid radioactive waste have been removed from the Kurchatov Institute grounds; the activity of the removed radioactive waste has reached 113 TBq, and some 300 beryllium and graphite blocks have been removed from the cooling pond and reactor core.
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Handling of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste in Northwestern Russia. Beginning in the 2000s, the Kurchatov Institute has participated in work to decommission nuclear facilities and eliminate the nuclear legacy under the federal targeted program, "Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Russia" and the G-8 Global Partnership.
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During 2020, the creation of a technically modern, cost effective, and environmental friendly radioactive waste management system for disused radioactive sources of ionizing radiation treatment should be completely established. An im portant concern is prevention of access by terrorists to radioac Figure 13 Open and sealed sources for radiation therapy.
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Long-term storage of disused radioactive sources in specialized storage containers allow transportation to the final disposal site when necessary. Specialized containers that do not require extraction of the disused radioactive sources minimize the possibility of losing control of the sources through loss or theft while providing opportunities for temporary storage and then final disposal of the radioactive waste.
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OBSERVATIONS FROM BREAKOUT GROUPS AND FINAL DISCUSSION The statements in this section are those of individual participants and do not represent any group as a whole. Breakout Group 1: Overview of Violent Extremism and Radiological Security • The likelihood and danger of radiological terrorism are not fully appreciated by the general public.
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Breakout Group 3: Responses to Incidents Involving Radioactive Material • The highest levels of government will often be involved in responding to radiological incidents. Designa tion of a trusted spokesperson, ideally with a scientific background, who works with law enforcement, health, and radiation specialists is essential.
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• Improve connections between local law enforcement officials to radiation safety officers at user facilities.
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Suggested citation: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2020. Scientific Aspects of Violent Extremism, Terrorism, and Radiological Security: Proceedings of a Workshop -- in Brief.
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