Adapting to Shorter Time Cycles in the United States Air Force Proceedings of a Workshop Series (2021) / Chapter Skim
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1 Workshop One, Part One
1 Workshop One, Part One
Pages 2-12
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Deborah Westphal, chairman of the board, Toffler Associates, referenced a 2016 article in Fortune,1 in which then-CEO of the Corporate Executive Board described a survey of 25,000 people from various organizations. The survey revealed that the integration of information and communication technology across enterprises was decreasing the speed of decision making, owing to the burden some layers of connections that had to be made and the number of people involved in decision making (e.g., 60 percent of those surveyed had to interface with at least 10 people to make a decision, and half of those people had to interface with 20 others to make a decision)
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; former Pacific Air Forces Vice Commander; former Commander, Kenney Warfighting Headquarters and Combined/Joint Task Force (JTF) Operation Northern Watch; dean, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies; and senior military scholar, Center for Character and Leadership Development, USAF Academy, described several examples of rapid adaptation during his experiences in major theater war and disaster response.
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Gen. Deptula next discussed Operation Northern Watch (1998–1999)
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Dr. Chellappa asked how to attract a workforce for future defense operations when talented individuals often pursue employment with high-paying social network companies.
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contact their opposite numbers in Strategic Air Command, which had experience tracking mobile ballistic missiles and had developed a target-hunting strategy. Simply by connecting working-level Majors with Strategic Air Command, she helped short-cut what otherwise could have been a lengthy top-down-driven inquiry and response process, enabling rapid implementa tion of a counter-Scud search strategy.
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was a successful approach to fill capability gaps. The development planning organization at Wright Patterson Air Force Base was strong both technically and operationally; however, no similar infrastructure exists today.
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Central Command Joint Force Air Component, and Air Force Space Command, discussed speed as a function of war, and time and speed as a function of systems development requirements. He pointed out that definitions of speed vary depending on the audience and the function -- for example, it could take 3 days to order munitions, build them up, and deliver them to the flight line; it could take 3 seconds for a flight leader to retarget if supported by the right communications and navigation system.
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Dr. Lewis responded that the Space Development Agency is new, relies on a "can-do" attitude, and has a lean organization.
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Dr. Barry commented that Krushchev's focus on public "one-upmanship" gave the impression that the Soviets were the "pioneers of the universe." However, in the early days of the space race, the Soviets did not even have a space program; they had several individual space projects that were pursued to give the impression that the Soviet Union had a technological advantage over the West.
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This allowed them to provide propaganda points quickly to the Soviet leadership. Although Korolev and his space projects had top priority access to the resources of the Soviet state, the close association of the Soviet leadership with the space program became a liability when the United States won the race to the moon.
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