Necessary DoD Range Capabilities to Ensure Operational Superiority of U.S. Defense Systems Testing for the Future Fight (2021) / Chapter Skim
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3 Testing for Future Combat: Multi-Domain Operations, Connected Concurrent Kill Chains, and Mitigating Encroachment
3 Testing for Future Combat: Multi-Domain Operations, Connected Concurrent Kill Chains, and Mitigating Encroachment
Pages 43-67
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From page 43... ...
This critical point was articulated when former Department of Defense (DoD) Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation (OT&E)
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From page 44... ...
The context for this chapter is about improving test range capabilities to support the assessment of multiple concurrent kill chains of systems and technologies and how those systems are connected together within a command-and-control structure to verify and understand the combat effectiveness and suitability within a multi-domain environment. The understanding of kill chains is paramount in assessing a system's operational effectiveness and suitability as well as the integration of new systems into existing kill chains.
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From page 45... ...
While some of these range capabilities have been highlighted in various reports, the committee paid particular attention to the challenges raised by test range personnel in the site visits and program representatives from the public workshop. The needed test range capabilities to support operational testing of multidomain systems and multiple concurrent kill chains include: • High-bandwidth connectivity across ranges, with multi-level secu rity provisions, and common data standards for interoperability (Eglin, Edwards, and Wright-Patterson Air Force bases; Missile Defense Agency [MDA]
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From page 46... ...
doctrines and con cepts of operation as well as creating cross-program and multi system test requirements to ultimately drive range capability requirements. • A defined funding approach to support the execution of "beyond program" multi-domain and multiple concurrent kill chain testing.
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Without a clear definition of MDOs, it is challenging to focus the test and evaluation (T&E) investment strategy to modernize range infrastructure in sup port of MDO testing.
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Both have real-time command and control communications inherent in the successful performance of their desired effects as well as a reliance on other systems to provide sensor information for adequate situational awareness for successful completion of kill chains.
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Testing Kill Chains The "kill chain" is a DoD term describing a process of military engagement. Christian Brose's 2020 book The Kill Chain describes it as 2 National Science Foundation, 2021, Solicitation 21-551, Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)
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From page 50... ...
These developmental and operational test objectives inform test infrastructure requirements for the ranges. However, emerging military technologies in areas such as directed energy weapons and hypersonic missiles are increasing the physical and technical demands on the nation's test ranges that affect the ranges' abilities to successfully conduct operational testing that examines a full engagement kill chain.
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launcher (TEL) through the MDO connected, concurrent kill chain cyberphysical system construct.
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From page 52... ...
In addition to the red force assets described in Figure 3.2, the scenario requires space-based sensors, airborne sensors, airborne jamming, land- or sea-based radar emitters, strike aircraft, and space-based communications assets be considered in test range planning. Some range-based capabilities required for the MDO connected, concurrent kill chain cyber-physical system construct example are that Range 1, Range 2, and the Virtual Range, as depicted in Figure 3.2, are connected with adequate bandwidth, availability of type and quantity representations of red capabilities, blue and red force monitoring for truth data, range coordination command and control, adequate distance for weapon type, and adequate electromagnetic spectrum for communications, radar, and jamming.
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From page 53... ...
While the Emerald Flag exercises bring testing a step closer to "testing like we fight," these exercises are rare, and test ranges do not currently have the infrastructure or capacity to support similar comprehensive testing of connected and concurrent kill chains. Additionally, participation in Emerald Flag is voluntary and based on interest and availability at the program level -- there is no oversight from service leadership or OT&E to coordinate programs or determine the objective of the exercises.
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, is DoD's corporate investment program which was established to modernize the DoD test infrastructure. Chapter 5 provides greater detail on test range funding, but it is worthwhile to note that a challenge for the current funding framework is that even if a network of test ranges secures CTEIP funds to build some infrastructure to support multi-domain and kill chain testing, there is no clear funding stream for the sustainment of that joint infrastructure and funding the execution of the testing if that infrastructure does not trace to program needs.3 3 Department of Defense (DoD)
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From page 55... ...
and rigorously measuring the extent to which their use improves operational outcomes.4 JT&E as it is currently organized is not a mechanism to connect mission threads, broad DOT&E test objectives, and the recurring execution of multi-system tests at events like Emerald Flag to address those objectives. The committee determined that a need exists for a joint program office to enable experimentation and testing of connected concurrently executed kill chains across systems and technologies in a sustained manner to 4 DoD, "FY19 Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E)
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The program office would work with existing DoD agencies to address cross-service policy and standards that are barriers to these types of tests, to work with Joint Staff on mission threads and with operational and developmental test and evaluation experts on system-ofsystems test objectives that will inform test infrastructure requirements, and to identify and provide funding for the execution of those tests that are not part of specific program objectives. This office would include representatives from Joint Staff, combatant commands (COCOMs)
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Box 6.1 in Chapter 6 provides a summary of the necessary range capabilities highlighted throughout this report that are critical for meeting operational testing needs through 2035. MITIGATING ENCROACHMENT TO SUPPORT FUTURE COMBAT TESTING Figure 3.2 illustrates the growing size and complexity of the battle space.
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, and representatives from the MDA and NTTR noted that encroachment was a growing concern for conducting operational tests at their locations. In the context of DoD test ranges, encroachment refers to any factors that obstruct, impede, or suppress the ability of the test community to conduct operational test and training exercises.
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From page 59... ...
This memo can be reversed at any time, leaving EGTTR vulnerable to the loss of critical mission space, even as plans are being put into place to expand the reach of EGTTR to allow for testing of 5th and 6th generation weapon systems through the Gulf Range Enhancement Program. Persistent External Encroachment Threats DoD Directive 3200.15 distinguishes between encroachment caused by external factors and encroachment caused by internal factors (DoD, 5 Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006, United States Congress 1331, https://www.boem.
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. Figure 3.3 illustrates the external encroachment threats identified by the REPI program from fiscal year 2020 (DoD, 2020b)
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. Naval test ranges face encroachment from windmill farms off the Virginia and North Carolina coasts, which threaten to infringe on the already limited available space on Atlantic test and training ranges (Niiler, 2019)
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Finding 3-4: As frequency is sold off, the test community loses the ability to conduct operational testing in live environments against certain threats. Conclusion 3-3: Encroachment leads to the inability to demonstrate mission capability and identify deficiencies due to lack of access to the physical and electromagnetic spectrum space with which to conduct test and evaluation.
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From page 63... ...
was placed into the center of test space at Eglin Air Force Base. This action directly resulted in the cancellation of 29 operational test profiles, including major test programs like the F-16, Small Diameter Bomb test program, Joint Standoff Weapon, and several other classified test programs.
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From page 64... ...
Given that there already exists a program to identify and mitigate external encroachment issues facing the test ranges, rather than suggest the establishment of a new program, the committee recommends the following: Recommendation 3-4: The Department of Defense should broaden the authority of the Test Resource Management Center (TRMC) to address issues of internal encroachment by reviewing internal range policies and actions to ensure that the test groups retain adequate mission space and prevent the placement of equipment or infrastructure that could potentially interfere with test operations.
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From page 65... ...
Given the existing encroachment issues facing U.S. military ranges, the growing need for adequate physical and spectrum space in which to conduct tests, and the difficulty of expanding the physical and spectrum boundaries of ranges within the United States, one potential approach would be to cooperate with foreign allies to invest in additional test range space.
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2020. "Air Force Calls for Expansion of Nevada Test Range." June 1.
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TRMC (Test Resource Management Center)
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