Protecting U.S. Technological Advantage (2022) / Chapter Skim
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3 The New Competitive Landscape
3 The New Competitive Landscape
Pages 45-66
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From page 45... ...
After emerging from the war with an intact industrial base and thriving economy, the United States was the world's dominant economic power. In 1950, with just 5.9 percent of the world's population, the United States accounted for 27 percent of the world's gross domestic product (GDP)
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From page 46... ...
gross domestic product (GDP) as a percentage of world GDP, 1960–2020.
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From page 47... ...
The U.S. science and technology enterprise was committed to excellence, risk taking, talent acquisition from both domestic and international sources, and broad global engagement in research collaboration.
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From page 48... ...
By the 1970s, a vibrant research and innovation ecosystem, world-class universities serving a broad population, a strong national laboratory system, substantial and consistent government research budgets, highly visible leadership on the world's scientific and standards stages, and an aura of energy and invincibility combined to make the United States a mecca for international students. Just as Europe was once a top destination for U.S.
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From page 49... ...
The strong separation between military and commercial technologies also meant that foreign researchers could be provided with abundant opportunities to learn, create, and develop technologies in the United States and then stay to contribute their expertise, innovation, and energy to U.S. economic growth without raising national security concerns.
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From page 50... ...
It defines "fundamental research" as "basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific community, as distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial development, design, production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons." It then states: It is the policy of this Administration that, to the maximum extent possible, the products of fundamental research remain unrestricted. It is also the policy of this Administration that, where the national security requires control, the mechanism for control of information generated during federally-funded fundamental research in science, technology and engineering at colleges, universities and laboratories is classification.
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From page 51... ...
It is informed by risk acceptance position that the costs of losing some information of commercial or national security importance to other countries are outweighed by the benefits of openness. The policy simply does not envision the potential need to protect the U.S.
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From page 52... ...
Provisions in grants and contracts may designate results as requiring protection, restrict publication, provide for advance government review, or require approval of individuals performing the research. Although terms and conditions vary by federal agency, for example, grants and contracts typically encourage principal investigators working on unclassified projects who are concerned that their research results may be classifiable to bring those concerns promptly to the attention of the funding agency.
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From page 53... ...
The 1949 Export Control Act gave the U.S. government the legal authority to restrict exports to Soviet bloc countries, and an international committee, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, established by the Western bloc in 1950, developed lists of strategic technologies and materials subject to controls.5 Under the export control system, licenses are required to export certain items to certain destinations, with the requirements depending on both the item and the destination.
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From page 54... ...
In the life sciences, policies on "dual-use research of concern" establish mechanisms for identifying security risks that the research may pose and considering mitigation approaches.7 These mechanisms are required as a term and condition of U.S. funding and do not directly affect privately funded activities not conducted at federally funded institutions.
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From page 55... ...
; a welcoming immigration system for top global talent; and tax and investment structures that effectively lubricate the movement of technologies to business value. Global competition in science and technology grew as other countries witnessed the success of the United States in science, technology, and engineering and the profound importance of its higher education research institutions in enabling that success.
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From page 56... ...
SOURCE: Based on data from OECD, 2022. 800 90 700 80 Global Deal Value, in Billions of Dollars 70 US Share of Global Deal Value, Percent 600 60 500 50 400 40 300 30 200 20 100 10 0 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Fiscal Year Global Deal Value, in Billions of Dollars US Percent of Global Deal Value FIGURE 3-5 Global value of venture capital deals in billions of U.S.
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From page 57... ...
. China and the United States now award about the same number of doctoral degrees in science and engineering, and many of those degrees in the United States go to international students on temporary visas (as discussed below and in the next chapter)
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From page 58... ...
immigration reforms have allowed foreign students to work longer (through optional practical training) after completing their degrees, the number of temporary work visas is capped, even for those occupations in which workers are in high demand.
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From page 59... ...
The simultaneous expansion of the number and scope of "critical technologies" raises important questions about whether restrictions alone are addressing challenges to U.S. technology leadership or if they are having increasing adverse consequences, since the United States is no longer dominant compared with its competitors.
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From page 60... ...
Researchers also are concerned about the imposition of controls in formerly uncontrolled environments. Increasingly Complex Classification Program managers at federal agencies often place clauses in research contracts designed to ensure that work that might require protection is properly identified prior to publication and to restrict the participation of foreign nationals in such programs.
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From page 61... ...
. The Office of Science and Technology Policy is expected to release standardized requirements for establishing research security later in 2022.9 Export Control Expansion and Designation of Essential Technologies The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 called for the Commerce Department to establish export controls on "emerging and foundational technologies that are essential to the national security of the United States" (Fergusson et al., 2021)
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From page 62... ...
Although the legislation does not define the term "foundational," it is generally held to encompass security-relevant or economically relevant technologies on which future technology development depends. In November 2018, the Commerce Department listed 14 categories of emerging technology as essential for national security and sought comment on this list: biotechnology; artificial intelligence and machine learning; position, navigation, and timing; microprocessors; advanced computing; data analytics technology; quantum information and sensing; logistics; additive manufacturing; robotics; brain–computer interfaces; hypersonics; advanced materials; and advanced surveillance technologies.
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From page 63... ...
The report states that "departments and agencies may consult this CET list when developing, for example, initiatives to research and develop technologies that support national security missions, compete for international talent, and protect sensitive technology from misappropriation and misuse." Given the very broad reach of the items on this list, its widespread application is likely to heighten controls on research. And despite the fundamental research exclusion on export controls, previous National Academies reports have noted that the current regime is unnecessarily burdensome and counterproductive to national security objectives, and has impeded university research in a wide variety of areas (NRC, 2007 and NASEM, 2016)
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From page 64... ...
It also raises significant questions as to whether CFIUS or CFIUS-like processes can operate on the timescales necessary to ensure that research collaborations can keep pace with the speed of new science and technology exploration and innovation. This issue is particularly acute at university laboratories, where the annual calendar associated with new graduates, postdoctoral researchers, and faculty would be seriously impacted by approval processes that span months or years.
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From page 65... ...
interests of a more complex technology landscape and growing international competition in broad areas of research, development, and commercialization. Expanded efforts to protect or control a growing list of technology areas through restrictions on research, including areas of fundamental research and discovery, are not addressing ongoing concerns about these threats to U.S.
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