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3 Benefits and Risks Posed by Confucius Institutes to Academic Institutions
Pages 27-34

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From page 27...
... academic institutions as well as to national security. The task was not to look at all dimensions of CIs, and the following analysis is subject to an important qualification: as the previous chapter notes, the structure, management, and programming of CIs vary widely across institutions.
From page 28...
... . CI instructors can also assist with teacher training and developing teaching materials.1 In addition, the added resources that come with a CI might enable the host institution to augment cocurricular programming, such as convening conversation groups for students studying Chinese or to meet visiting scholars from China.
From page 29...
... According to the terms of some agreements between CIs and their host institutions, Hanban retains the right to approve proposed expenditures of funds for CI activities and programs. Some observers have expressed doubt that a CI would receive approval for any events involving speakers critical of China's stance on sensitive topics, leading to self-censorship.
From page 30...
... In addition, once recommended, CI instructors might be appointed without going through normal hiring channels subject to faculty involvement and oversight, and once appointed, instructors might not be subject to the control of the relevant academic department or unit (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2019a)
From page 31...
... For faculty to adequately discharge their shared governance responsibilities, such as executing decision authority over potential CI instructors and determining the nature of course offerings and materials, there should be sufficient transparency in university operations. If confidentiality provisions or other measures make it difficult to obtain information, meaningful shared governance may become impossible.
From page 32...
... However, several committee briefings explicitly addressed this question, and the speakers at these briefings did not view CIs as a primary source of research security threats. Arun Seraphin, deputy director at the National Defense Industrial Association's Emerging Technology Institute, noted on July 20, 2022, that "the 2019 Bipartisan Report led by Senators Portman and Carper found no evidence that CIs are a center for Chinese espionage efforts or any other illegal activity."3 Kevin Gamache, associate vice chancellor and chief research security officer for the Texas A&M University System, told the committee on July 20, 2022, that CIs "are not a major concern because we no longer have a Confucius Institute within the A&M System.
From page 33...
... This is consistent with the surveys conducted by Fan, Pan, and Zhang, which revealed that CI teachers frequently espouse and disseminate positions held by the Chinese Communist Party and self-censor when encountering sensitive political topics abroad, as well as Ruth and Xiao, who state that CI teachers "are exceedingly likely to continue to
From page 34...
... . University Governance The background literature contains more evidence of issues relating to university governance.


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