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The Channel Tunnel
Pages 139-154

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From page 139...
... if chosen, to be used at the Yew this approach will have organizational implications. The author draws on his Channel Tunnel experience to show how a safety culture that started out being safety-deparDnent-led developed to the point where line managers accepted the ownership of safety.
From page 140...
... The two remaining tunnels will thus be separated from the service tunnel, which should be a safe haven in the case of fire. Should it be necessary to ventilate the running tunnels, a supplementary ventilation system can be used that can operate bidirectionally, with United Kingdom fans blowing and French fans sucking and vice versa.
From page 141...
... They have included a two-track, 900-mm-gauge railway in each of the United Kingdom side tunnels for shifting muck, taking men and materials into the tunnels, and providing work rigs from which the fixed equipment was erected. The following statistics should be considered as a scale indicator: ~ 60 prime movers; 1,000 items of rolling stock, one-third of which were muck skips used to bring out ~ 7 million tons of chalk marl, and half a million concrete segments carried in, which, together with 123,000 cast-iron segments, hundreds of kilometers of pipework, and thousands of kilometers of cabling, amounted to a further 10 million tons of traffic carried.
From page 142...
... The principal cause for rejecting the proposed organization has been the failure to identify satisfactorily the safety chain from the operative to the chief executive. By its nature, the Channel Tunnel project started simple and became complex as further types of work were added before earlier phases were complete.
From page 143...
... EARLY STEPS, EASILY TAKEN TML management realized fairly early that they, like the construction industry generally, had a wrong safety culture. But safety cultures do not respond to "one, two, three, change" instructions.
From page 144...
... Let each line manager produce his own. Where appropriate, those gathering the accident figures can amalgamate these categories at the monthly safety meetings, tier by tier, feeding the results upwards.
From page 145...
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From page 146...
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From page 147...
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From page 148...
... Those on-site underground, or wherever, seeing management devoting time and energy to safety, became more convinced that safety was on the list of things, such as productivity, quality, materials control, and cost control, that managers traditionally cared about. TML realized that its work force, properly directed, was highly talented and that this talent could be used for bottom-up safety problem-solving.
From page 149...
... ; conducted field safety talks on particular issues; prepared in-house posters, frequently rude and often with caricatures of the well-known (Figures 4 and 5~; and created encapsulated cards as an aide memoire. TME's site was unionized, and somewhat atypically, the project team enjoyed excellent industrial relations.
From page 150...
... ~ W8U Sit ~~lS! FIGURE 4 Example of an in-house poster used to market a safety spectacles campaign at TME.
From page 151...
... The Channel Tunnel 151 ~ in, ~6 ~ _ -- - ~/~ ~: ~ ~—— 45~ it' MEEK ~~ ~ — W// - 2' -I -; -- -';'- ~ ~~ ~ by// \\N ACKNOWLEDGE THE WARNING : 1IlBYI{/ j3;NG ONE ARM;MO\IE 11 VI IITO/SAFEPLACE AND II STAND ST' LL WH;LE THE RAj~ PASSES. FIGURE 5 Example of an in-house poster used to market the TML track safety campaign.
From page 152...
... Needless to say, main controllers are again line managers in disguise. This takes the paper nicely back to the original theme: it is the line managers who must manage safety and control incidents and emergencies, just as they manage such things as costs, productivity, quality, and industrial relations.
From page 154...
... Another, more common example of the difference in cultures and national regulatory styles is the issue of smoking and drinking alcohol in the work place. English health and safety laws do not allow either activity, but French workers do both; they sometimes share cigarettes with their English colleagues at the midpoint, and bottles of champagne have also been available on special occasions.


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