Perspectives on Urban Infrastructure (1984) / Chapter Skim
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4 Politics and Urban Public Facilities
4 Politics and Urban Public Facilities
Pages 143-177
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From page 143... ...
The link between political gain and the development of an urban infrastructure has been a continuing feature of American 143
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From page 144... ...
Boss Tweed had created a political machine for building and expanding urban infrastructure (Durand, 18981. Construction projects had obvious merits to a politician intent on both personal gain and the distribution of favors.
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From page 145... ...
It illustrates the sizable political gain to be had from the expansion of basic urban systems. Building streets and widening boulevards need not be a process controlled by property owners at their convenience or superintended by local government on some rational basis.
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From page 146... ...
Local politicians read the mood of the voters as being antitax and antidebt. As the Cleveland Plain Dealer commented in a 1910 editorial (May 11, 19101: "It is clear that a two-thirds affirmative vote for city bridge bonds could not be secured either now or in any circumstances likely to soon develop....The important consideration is that the bridge be built right and soon." The popular failure of the bridge issue was clearly rooted in some perception of voter self-interest.
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From page 147... ...
Public Works as Political Strategy Tweed in New York City and Eirick in Cleveland demonstrate the extent to which the development of urban public facilities has
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From page 148... ...
The bridge issue differentiated Eirick from a mass of Republican politicians and brought him a much wider base of electoral support and the reelection he sought. Political need, in short, pressed both Tweed and Eirick to adopt public facility development as a strategy for electoral success.
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From page 149... ...
Large portions of the current bill for infrastructure rebuilding have been around for a lengthy period of time. The infrastructure crisis is not simply one of recent vintage, reflecting-some underspending in the last 4 or 6 years; rather, the needs for physical improvement of many cities have been known and deferred over an extended period.
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From page 150... ...
The decay of these structures and systems cannot be attributed simply to a decline in urban capital spending following such crisis events as the collapse of capital spending in New York and Cleveland, the austerity faced by such older cities as Detroit and Boston, and the broad impact of Proposition 13 on California
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From page 151... ...
Boston's capital program grew from $31.5 million in 1969 to $109 million in 1976, the peak spending year for the decade. This capital spending funded a great many projects and supported a substantial volume of private investment and development, particularly in the central business district.
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From page 152... ...
The expansion of capital spending in Boston provided the opportunity for greater expenditures and greater response to infrastructure needs- but that response did not take place. New York City provides a final case of the capital investment environment since the 1960s.
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From page 153... ...
The demands of urban growth have nonetheless demancled a single-minded emphasis on infrastructure construction in local capital programs. The development of arterial streets and storm drainage projects for fringe areas dominated San Antonio's capital spending and bond programs during the 1960s and early 1970s.
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From page 154... ...
The growth orientation of the capital program, in turn, provided a means of expanding the urban population and the consequent water and sewer revenues. Growth did not just imply some larger and more impressive city; it provided real short-term returns to a city manager with a persistent fiscal problem.
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From page 155... ...
Spend enough capital dollars, provide for enough new development in outlying areas, and a city manager could benefit a whole range of groups and individuals in the development business without being forced to choose among them. With a sufficiently large capital program and a commitment to growth, some cities have managed years of local development and expansion with little or no political conflict.
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From page 156... ...
With some rough estimate of that useful life, it is simple to estimate how much spending and effort be it street resurfacing or sewer replacement should be carried out in a given year and maintained on a regular basis. The great appeal of standards is that they are rational.
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From page 157... ...
Oakland's maintenance engineers thought a 10-year resurfacing cycle was appropriate in the 1950s, at a time when the city could afford a substantial street program. By 1980 a 25- or 30year standard seemed more plausible and acceptable outside the public works department.
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From page 158... ...
. One older city that has paid attention to the condition of its physical plant." Cincinnati's capital improvement plans dating back to the late 1940s have emphasized the importance of city streets (Cincinnati City Planning Commission, 1949:13~: "Keeping them in good condition must not be overlooked." At that time the city accepted the need for a 20-year resurfacing cycle, requiring annual expenditures of some $400,000, and the city manager in 1956 implored the city council to maintain that level of funding.
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From page 159... ...
A standard's lack of political appeal is likely to pose similar problems for an appointed city manager. Street resurfacing, as with most other public works activities justified by a standard, carries no effective short-term costs and few benefits.
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From page 160... ...
That arrangement nonetheless left the city with the responsibility for storm drainage improvements beyond the existing combined sewer system. Storm drainage projects were regularly at the bottom of the priority list of capital improvement projects during the 1970s, despite the complaints of citizens and the requests of city engineers.
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From page 161... ...
Yet Cleveland's expenditures on local sewer and storm drainage projects during the 1970-1980 period amounted to almost $45 million, financed from both other general obligation bonds and federal aid. Despite the city's reputation for governmental and political difficulties, Cleveland has succeeded in meeting a substantial portion of the identified needs for local sewer improvements.
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From page 162... ...
There were often some capital improvement funds available for the annual resurfacing effort by city personnel, but they depended on the city's fiscal condition and rarely met the requirements of a standard or the budget request by the highway maintenance staff. For example, when federal revenue sharing began in 1972 it provided a bonus in city revenue and an extra $200,000 for the resurfacing program.
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From page 163... ...
Until 1979 the resurfacing program had been carried out by city personnel directly. After 1979 the city contracted for resurfacing, with the engineering, design, and contract preparation performed by the city's engineers - a different part of the public works bureaucracy from the maintenance staff.
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From page 164... ...
"GOODIES" The real political value of urban infrastructure improvements is to be found in their specifics projects that benefit and are visible to a specific ward, neighborhood, or city block. Specific projects provide a form of political currency, which can be exchanged and doled out, employed to reward and punish, to build political coalitions and win votes.
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From page 165... ...
Cleveland presents perhaps the clearest example of the relationship between political gain and infrastructure investment. A large share of the city's capital spending has traditionally been oriented to specific neighborhood improvements that could win votes at the polls or in the city council.
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From page 166... ...
Cleveland has always had a substantial and well-funded street resurfacing program. During the 1960s the city regularly resurfaced between 20 and 25 miles of local streets, in addition to other street improvement and reconstruction projects.
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From page 167... ...
Where bridges serve a clear constituency, they have been fixed. Cleveland resembles other cities in responding to bridge needs (as well as other major public facilities)
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From page 168... ...
Yet it is likely that these new policies simply reflect the latest trend and more vocal public demands and thus represent only a temporary shift. The conditions of scarcity that have affected street resurfacing, storm drainage, and bridge replacement have regularly forced cities to choose among competing needs and competing locations.
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From page 169... ...
Boston: City of Boston. Cincinnati City Planning Commission 1949 1951-1955 Program of Capital Improvements.
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From page 170... ...
There is a tendency to approach major public works through the domed stadium or convention center syndrome, thinking about the publicity involved and the community support engendered by spectacular projects, ground Creakings, and dedications, rather than face the future costs of operating such facilities. These real problems are often masked by the fact that capital improvements and operations come from separate budgets.
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From page 171... ...
(2) It fails to address the real problem of politics in urban infrastructure.
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From page 172... ...
In Cincinnati, with no ward system, the political process recognized that streets were not the highest infrastructure priority. ~ do not think that the solution to the urban infrastructure problem is to return to the approach of Boss Tweed minus the corruption.
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From page 173... ...
Politics Solves Infrastructure Problems" or "Cleveland: A Mode] for Local Government." ~ am not sure where the chapter is headed in its description of the differences between the newer, growing cities, such as Phoenix, and the older cities, such as Oakland and Cincinnati.
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From page 174... ...
The point is that the public is not willing to pay for it all, so we have to decide what to continue to provide. The alternative approaches to the political process appear to be these: (1)
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From page 175... ...
POLITICS AND URBAN PUBLIC FACILITIES 175 the facts, solicit the support of business and community groups, use the specific examples of problems as symptoms of the total problem, and develop comprehensive plans for resolving it.
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From page 176... ...
When department heads forget this role and instead become mere political brokers, they assume inappropriate roles. Savannah, which has a politically strong mayor and an effective city manager, also has had a stable political system.
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From page 177... ...
This requires improved information as well as an improved process by which the information is translates} so that department heads, political leaders, interest groups, and the general public can understand what the choices are. One serious problem in improving the use and translation of information is the tendency to rely on anecdotes as evidence, and particularly on inaccurate anecdotal information.
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