Configuration Management and Performance Verification of Explosives-Detection Systems (1998) / Chapter Skim
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5 Life-Cycle Management Plan
5 Life-Cycle Management Plan
Pages 33-50
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From page 33... ...
· the operational phase, which includes initial deployment and normal use and operation · the retirement phase, which includes removal and disposal of a system 33 Each of the above life-cycle phases encompasses quality assurance, performance verification, and configuration management of hardware, software, and firmware.1 However, as shown in Figure 5-2 only the manufacturing and operational phases receive oversight by the FAA through the management plan because these phases are where the FAA acts in its role to ensure proper explosives-detection performance (through certification or through purchase for airport deployment) and where changes to design or configuration that affect detection performance of manufactured units in the airport are likely to occur.
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From page 34... ...
This plan defines and documents the FAA's configuration-management, performance-verification, and quality-assurance requirements for the following stakeholders: CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION OF EXPLOSIVES-DETECTION SYSTEMS Monitoring testings Operational phase Initial deployment Operation Testing Maintenance Incorporation of upgrades a Retirement phase Removal Disposal the FAA during certification or baseline, qualification, and verification testing of explosives-detection equipment (this would include control of test objects, procedures, and test results and accompanying documentation) explosives-detection equipment manufacturers during the certification, manufacturing, and operational phases of the life cycles · the air carriers and other end users, with regard to deployed explosives-detection equipment, during the operational life cycle (this would include control of operating and maintenance procedures)
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From page 35... ...
i, - ~ . Development testing ,, Pilot design testing Pilot unit Precertification testing Certification testing Production/manufacturing CAD drawings Formal qualification testing Deployment Verification testing Evaluate and correct failure (see figure 5-7)
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From page 36... ...
Valiclate secondary standard bag set. Participate in the development of manufacturing change classification levels ancl proceclures.
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From page 37... ...
Preparing performance specifications and testing protocols for deployed explosives-detection equipment will be fundamentally different from, and more difficult than, developing certification standards and test protocols. In developing the performance specifications and testing protocols for the FAA certification testing, the FAA evaluated the threat to aviation security and set amounts and types of explosives that must be detected.
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From page 38... ...
One resource available to all stakeholders to aid in identifying the best practices used in industry, government, and academia for manufacturing and management is the Best Manufacturing Practices Center of Excellence, as discussed in Box 5-1. CO N F I G U RATIO N MANAG EM ENT PLAN A configuration management plan is a document that defines how configuration management will be implemented for a particular acquisition program or system (DOD, 1995~.
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From page 39... ...
39 · have a process in place to determine the degree and criticality of changes in the EDS or noncertified explosives-detection equipment · notify the FAA of changes in configuration-management practices · implement version control, inclusive of baseline management, as a minimum requisite for certification Recommendation. To maintain the configuration of explosives-detection equipment during certification testing, the panel endorses and recommends continued documentation of equipment configuration and changes to this configuration through use of the FAA's Configuration Log as described in their 1993 Management Plan for Explosives Detection System Certification Testing.
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From page 40... ...
should be included in a third-party configuration audit. Configuration Management of Software for Explosives Detection Equipment Although software, hardware, and firmware form an integrated system, configuration management of software is a unique case due, in part, to the ease with which changes can be made to software code by a vendor (locally or remotely)
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From page 41... ...
The FAA should develop and maintain control of a digital database that contains information collected during certification testing of explosives-detection equipment. Control of this database by the FAA in a manner similar to how they control the primary standard bag set, without release to equipment manufacturers or any other party, would provide assurance of comparability of tests performed at different times.
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From page 42... ...
, support equipment, test personnel, and test procedures · configuration management of the test protocol, including test objects, collected data, test requirements, and documentation · determination of test duration and frequency · determination of funding requirements Recommendation. The FAA should require a wide variety of tests for maintaining EDS certification, including qualification testing and periodic verification testing of detection performance levels (using a secondary standard bag set)
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From page 43... ...
The FAA should · continue to support the development and validation of test objects, simulated explosives, and associated test articles · continue to work with the International Civil Aviation Organization on the development of simulated explosives and other test objects to encourage development of internationally recognized standards · develop a secondary standard test article with each manufacturer that will meet the FAA's and the end user's needs for daily testing of explosives-detection equipment in airports develop a secondary standard bag set that consists of a number of representative international passenger bags . that do not contain threat objects and a number of bags containing simulated explosives at an amount that represents a threat quantity of explosives (the simulated explosives should mimic the threats in the primary standard bag set used for certification and that have been validated for the explosives-detection technology)
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From page 44... ...
for the subsystems or components on which subsystems depend (e.g., voltage or current levels) measure and record critical system parameter and subsystem test parameter values during certification testing to determine baseline test parameter values establish critical test parameter and subsystem test parameter value ranges, based on certified baseline test parameter values, that may be used as an indication that the overall system meets certified performance (parameter values measured in the field could be referenced against the established parameter value ranges to infer performance)
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From page 45... ...
Furthermore, Figure 5-8 indicates the dependence of each successive level of performance verification on the previous level. For example, the quality of the primary standard bag set, and analogously the secondary standard bag set, is dependent on the understanding of the real threat.
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. _ CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION OF EXPLOSIVES-DETECTION SYSTEMS , articles \ / Secondary standard bag set \ Primary standard bag set \ "Real threat" ._ a)
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From page 47... ...
A quality system structure should be put in place for The FAA would benefit from applying the principles of ISO 9000 to its Aviation Security Program. For example, the FAA's internal quality system could track the FAA's conformance to its Management Plan for Explosives Detection System Certification Testing (FAA, 1993)
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From page 48... ...
Recommendation. The FAA should · define and record its critical test and evaluation procedures, equipment performance requirements, and datahandling procedures · monitor its requirements and procedures by its quality system identify in their quality plan all objects (e.g., secondary standard bag set)
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From page 49... ...
Therefore, the baseline configuration established prior to certification should be maintained throughout the certification process. Diligent use of the Configuration Log, as defined in the Management Plan for Explosives Detection System Certification Testing (FAA, 1993)
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From page 50... ...
The FAA should, however, strongly encourage manufacturers to submit equipment that possess a completely compiled software code. If, during certification testing, the FAA determines that any of the appropriate Recertification requirements have not been met for example, if Priority 1 or 2 problems are encountered the certification process should be stopped immediately.
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