The Effects of a Threatening Rumor on a Disaster-Stricken Community (1958) / Chapter Skim
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Chapter IV. Interpretations of the Data
Chapter IV. Interpretations of the Data
Pages 51-76
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From page 51... ...
In general, these hypotheses predict specific relationships between demographic, social, and threat-related variables in the population, and disaster behavior. Second, an application of a game theoretic model was developed, and an attempt was made to fit the data to the model.
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From page 52... ...
01 level of confidence. Because of this finding and others previously reported showing the critical relationship between geographical proximity to threat and threat-oriented behave ors, it seemed ap propriate to restrict ourselves to the city-flooded and saturation samples in the testing of many of the hypotheses.
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From page 53... ...
(Another interesting comparison would have been between roles of responsibility and sources checked. However, there were so few respondents who sought confirmation from unofficial sources that such a comparison was not possible.
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From page 54... ...
There was no relationship found between living in a disasterstruck area and attempts to assist community members either in fleeing, preparing for disaster, spreading the rumor, or calming others, nor for all of these combined. However, indivicluals who did not live in previously flooded areas communicated the denial message to others significantly more often (see Table 28~.
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From page 55... ...
The difference in credibility of sources was checked against further attempts at confirmation made by the recipients of messages. This test yielded non- significant results ~ People who received threat messages from unofficial sources were no more likely to seek additional verification than were individuals who heard the threat message from officials.
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From page 56... ...
On the other hand, there is little cost to displaying caution in the acceptance of denial messages. Further, unofficial sources accounted for most of the threat messages which were later being denied.
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From page 57... ...
~. No relationship was found between education and age with either the source of attempted confirmation, or the likelihood of seeking confirmation of the threat message.
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From page 58... ...
~ ~ no tendency Ior people exposer to previous rumor to listen to more denials or denial sources before accepting the truth of the denial.
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From page 59... ...
we would expect suchpeople to be galore likely than others to seek confirmation. In te s tiny thi s hypothe si s, we us ed all individual s who believed the false report, regardless of their geographical location, since distance from the threat Is clearly incorporated in the hypothesis.
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From page 60... ...
speed of flight are also highly correlated: TAB LE 3 2 RELATIONSHIP BE T WEEN DANGER ES TIMATES AND CONFIRMATION AT TEMP TS E stimate s of Danger to Property ~ ,, Certain of Damage Doubtful of Damage Total Yes Attempted Confir mation No Total 18 49 16 34 56 67 23 So TABLE 3 3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DANGER ESTIMATES AND FLIGHT BEHAVIOR Estimates of Danger to Property . Certain of Damage Fled immediately afte r fir st me s sage: Fled later, or was stop ped in preparation Believed, but did not flee Total: 35 28 4 67 Doubtful of Damage Total 37 8 14 24 36 18 91 1 _ The Chi-square is 32.
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From page 61... ...
Using the entire sample (flooded anti nonfloodeci) , the previous evacuation experience of the respondent and his place of residence are the only variables related .
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From page 62... ...
T abl e 3 4 sho ws th at only the r e sp ondent' s p e r c epti on of the threat message, once he hack heard it, had a measurable effect on his behavior. The respondent who flees believes the threat message, thinks himself to be in serious danger, and is slow to accept denial.
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From page 63... ...
The variables listed in Table 35 did not show statistically significant relationships to flight/non-flight behavior TABLE 3 5 VARIABLES NOT SHOWN TO BE RELATED TO FLIGHT BEHAVIOR Biographical Data: Sex Age Education F acilitie s: Automobile Sensitizing Experiences: Socio-Economic Status Length of Residence in Port Jervis Telephone O ~ Previous Disaster Experience Previous Evacuation Exposure to Previous Rumor Host to Flood Victims Re sponsibilitie s: Familial Re sponsibilitie s Numbe r in Hous ehold Number of Children Location of Family; Attempts to Communicate win Family Situation at Time of Hearing False Report: Time Heard Report Location and Activities at Time of Threat Message Nature and Size of Group With at Time of Threat Message Threat Message: Sourc e, Channel and Content Noise and Sirens Heard before Hearing Threat Mes sage Confir mation Atte mpt s: Sour c e, Channel and Fr equency Attempts to As sist Community Members Denial Me ssage: Number of Time s Heard Denial Mes sage Content of the Denial Message Number of Sour ce s to B elief in Denial Denial Communication Attitudes Toward Disaster Groups Advice Given to Other s We do not wish to conclude, because these variables were unimportant as predictors of behavior in this situation, that they might not be relevant in other disaster situations.
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From page 64... ...
Because of the complexity of this relationship, the complete results are presented below. TABLE 3 7 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEX AND DENIAL SOURCE LEADING TO BELIEF Source Leading to Belief Male Female Loudsp Baker Radio Word of Mouth at Communication Center Phone to Communication C enter Official on Street Friend or Stranger Water Didn't Come 7 3 6 17 4 4 1 2 1 l 5 10 28 35 64
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From page 65... ...
There is no difference between the number of sources males and females listened to, up to and including belief, nor is there any difference in the number of denial messages they heard.
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From page 66... ...
the degree of rationality, which will be defined as the degree of conformity to a minimax strategy in a properly weighted game theoretic matrix, and (2) the degree of homogeneity, which will be defined as the degree to which behaviors summered over individuals reflect individual behaviors; i.
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From page 67... ...
on the basis of empirical evidence that a human placed in a situation of uncertain outcome similar to that of a finite two-person game actually makes his choices on the basis of a mini~'ax principal whe re the entrie s in the game matrix ar e regrets . If the human is considered as the first player, and nature, or some other opposing force the second, then the human plays as though the minimum entry in every column is zero.
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From page 68... ...
lected. When the individual assigns subjective probabilities to the choices of the opponent and chooses his own strategies on a probability basis, we say that he is using a "mixed strategy.
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From page 69... ...
The descriptive account of the Port~Jervis situation yields one striking intuition: The predefinition of the consequences of a break in the Wallenpaupack Dam affecter} the behavior of city residents. Protocol data indicate that discussion of the consequences of this catastrophe had taken place in the city during the days before the spread of the false report.
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From page 70... ...
Mes sage s from official sources carried no more weight, behaviorally, than messages from other sources. Port Pelvis represents a situation in which people were aware long enough in advance of a preci sely defined threat, and had discussed it so thoroughly that advice on which activity to perform became irrelevant.
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From page 71... ...
Although we attempt here to fit a minimum regret weighting, on an intuitive basis, there is little reason to assume that it will provide the best fit with this kind of data. The use of the mocle!
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From page 72... ...
Dr. Murray Gerstenhaber suggested the use of this model after determining from a general description of respondent behaviors that people acted in what he felt, intuitively, to be a reasonable fashion.
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From page 73... ...
the valley, because the valley (river) position is inherently danger ous, and because the water will strike there sooner.
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From page 74... ...
. The conditions which were initially stated for rational and homogeneous behavior, as those terms were defined, are fulfilled in the Port Jervis situation: (1)
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From page 75... ...
* Other applications of game theoretic models to defense against disaster have been attempted (14~.
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