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APPENDIX B PRESENTATIONS, BREAKOUT SESSIONS, AND VISITS Washington, D.C., July 19, 2012 Plenary Presentations  U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Response to the Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Recommendations for this NAS Study, Mike Johnson, Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Rob Taylor, Deputy Director of the Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  U.S. Nuclear Industry Response to the Fukushima Nuclear Accident & Recommendations for this NAS Study, Marv Fertel, President and Chief Executive Officer, Nuclear Energy Institute  Union of Concerned Scientists Views on the U.S. Response to the Fukushima Accident and Recommendations for this NAS Study, Dave Lochbaum, Director, Nuclear Safety Program, Union of Concerned Scientists; Ed Lyman, Senior Scientist, Nuclear Safety Program, Union of Concerned Scientists Washington, D.C., September 6-7, 2012 Plenary Presentations  TEPCO Overview of Fukushima Accident, Shin Takizawa, Manager, Nuclear International Relations and Strategy Group, Nuclear Power and Plant Siting Administrative Department, Tokyo Electric Power Company; Toshiaki Sakai, General Manager, Construction Engineering Center, Construction Department, Tokyo Electric Power Company; Yasunori Yamanaka, Manager, Nuclear Safety Engineering Group, Nuclear, Asset Management Department, Tokyo Electric Power Company; Kenji Tateiwa, Manager, Nuclear Power Programs, Tokyo Electric Power Company Washington Office  INPO Overview of the Fukushima Accident Timeline, William E. Webster, Jr., Senior Vice President; Steven W. Meng, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  Comments from Ichiro Fujisaki, Ambassador of Japan to the United States Prepublication Copy B-1

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Appendix B: Presentations, Breakout Sessions, and Visits Breakout Sessions Session 1: Accident Progression, Management, and Recovery Moderator: B. John Garrick, committee vice chair Rapporteur: Kevin Crowley, study director Invited Participants: Industry  William Berg, Senior Licensing Engineer, GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy  Randall Gauntt, Sandia National Laboratories, Severe Accident Analysis Department  David Hembree, Vice President, Emergency Response, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)  Steven W. Meng, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, INPO  Toshiaki Sakai, General Manager, Construction Engineering Center, Construction Department, TEPCO  Shin Takizawa, Manager, Nuclear International Relations and Strategy Group, Nuclear Power and Plant Siting Administrative Department, TEPCO  William E. Webster, Senior Vice President, Industry Evaluations, INPO  William T. Williamson, Reactor Engineer Specialist, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Government  Richard Lee, Chief, Fuel and Source Term Code Development Branch, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, USNRC Session 2: Response of Physical Plant during Accident Moderator: Joseph Shepherd, committee member Rapporteurs: Ourania Kosti, senior program officer and Micah Lowenthal, CISAC board director Invited Participants:  Mark Ajluni, Nuclear Licensing Manager, Southern Nuclear Operating Company  Randy Ferrer, Senior Design Engineer, Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC  Neil Gannon, Vice President of Nuclear Operations, PPL Susquehanna  Jeff Gasser , INPO  Robert Paley, Senior Evaluator Performance Improvement and Learning, INPO  Kenji Tateiwa, Manager, Nuclear Power Programs, TEPCO  Yasunori Yamanaka, Manager, Nuclear Safety Engineering Group, Nuclear Asset Management Department, TEPCO Prepublication Copy B-2

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Appendix B: Presentations, Breakout Sessions, and Visits Tokyo, Japan, November 26-28, 2012 Plenary Presentations  Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, Kiyoshi Kurokawa, Chair, Academic Fellow, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies  Lessons-Learned by TEPCO from the Fukushima Accident, Akira Kawano, General Manager, Tokyo Electric Power Company  Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, Koichi Kitazawa, Chair, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident  Response of the Onagawa Plant to the Great East-Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, Akiyoshi Obonai, Deputy Manager of Nuclear Power Department, Tohoku Electric Power Co., Jun Iida, Assistant Manager of Nuclear Power Department, Tohoku Electric Power Co., Kazuo Hirata, Assistant Manager of Civil & Architectural Engineering Department, Tohoku Electric Power Co.  Nuclear Regulation Authority: Overview, Timeline for Establishment, Current and Future Plans, Toyoshi Fuketa, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulation Authority Breakout Sessions Session 1: Accident Progression Analysis Moderator: Michael Corradini, committee member Rapporteur: Arthur Motta, committee member Questions: 1. How much fuel damage/core melting occurred in the reactors? 2. Did the core penetrate and react with the pressure vessels? 3. Did the core/pressure vessel material pierce the containment? 4. Is there evidence (e.g., vessel wall temperatures), other than from severe accident codes, that could indicate whether the lower head of the reactor vessel at any unit was penetrated and whether there was some amount of core-concrete interaction? 5. Is there any evidence of steam explosions and/or core material underneath the reactor? 6. Is there any evidence of recriticality? 7. Are there measurements of airborne concentrations of radionuclides (or accumulation of ground deposition) that would enable validation of core degradation timing and extent? 8. How were total release inventories of radionuclides estimated during the accident? 9. Is there any evidence of continued release of radionuclides by an airborne pathway from the plant site (such as the release of iodine vapor or radionuclide aerosol release) subsequent to the time at which core degradation was arrested at all three units? 10. Is there evidence of damage to any systems, structures, or components (beyond the damage to the electrical power lines and towers) of Units 1-6 due directly to the seismic events? 11. What is the current status of the cooling systems? To what extent were the reactor and their PV piping systems damaged during the earthquake? Prepublication Copy B-3

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Appendix B: Presentations, Breakout Sessions, and Visits 12. What is the current status of electrical equipment and diesel generators? 13. How useful were the severe accident codes (e.g., MAAP, RELAP) for assessing core damage in real time? 14. How was the lack of information and uncertainty of parameters (e.g., IC, SRVs, RCIC, HPIC, RPV integrity) managed during the accident? 15. Were reactor simulators used to assess the condition of the reactors and/or potential operator responses? 16. What lessons have been learned in the operation of safety systems (RCIC, IC) during the accident? For example, was the IC properly used in Unit 1? If not, how would it be changed in the future? Invited Participants: Industry  Toshihiko Fukuda, General Manager, Nuclear Quality and Safety Management Department, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)  Shinichi Kawamura, General Manager, Nuclear Seismic Engineering Center, General Manager, Nuclear Safety System Engineering, TEPCO  Rikiro Kikuchi, Group Manager, Architectural Engineering Group (Seismic Integrity), Nuclear Seismic Engineering Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department, TEPCO  Hideaki Kiyoura, Deputy Manager, Seismic Integrity Engineering Group, Nuclear Seismic Engineering Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department, TEPCO  Shinya Mizokami, Deputy Manager, Nuclear Reactor Safety Engineering Group, Nuclear Asset Management Department, TEPCO  Kumiaki Moriya, Corporate Chief Engineer, Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, Ltd.  Masahisa Ohtsuki, General Manager, Nuclear Power Plant Management Department, TEPCO  Junichi Taira, Environmental Evaluation Group, Nuclear and Siting Headquarters, TEPCO  Shin Takizawa, Manager, Nuclear International Relations and Strategy Group, Nuclear Power and Plant Siting Administrative Department, TEPCO  Nobuyuki Ueda, Nuclear Safety Division, Japan Nuclear Safety Institute (JANSI)  Yasunori Yamanaka, Group Manager, Nuclear Reactor Safety Engineering Group, Nuclear Asset Management Department, TEPCO Government  Kiyoharu Abe, Senior Technical Advisor, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES)  Toyoshi Fuketa, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulation Authority  Haruataka Hoshi, Severe Accident Evaluation Group, Nuclear Energy System Safety Division, Incorporated Administrative Agency, JNES Prepublication Copy B-4

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Appendix B: Presentations, Breakout Sessions, and Visits  Akitoshi Hotta, Principal Officer, Severe Accident Group, Nuclear Energy System Safety, JNES  Hiroshi Yamagata, Senior Coordinator for Severe Accident Measures, Secretariat of Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) Academia/Professional Organizations and Societies  Michio Ishikawa, Former President and CEO, Japan Nuclear Technology Institute  Hideki Nariai, Professor Emeritus, University of Tsukuba  Koji Okamoto, Department of Nuclear Engineering and Management, University of Tokyo  Ayao Tsuge, President, The Japan Federation of Engineering Societies Session 2: Off Site Emergency Response and Regulatory Oversight Moderator: Paul Locke, committee member Rapporteur: Shelley Hearne, committee member Questions: 1. What offsite protection measures were taken during and after the accident? For example, was potassium iodide distributed to the population and, if so, how? 2. What was the public’s reaction to these measurements and their adequacy? 3. How were decisions on managing the health impacts from the accident, to either workers or the surrounding population, made and communicated? 4. What were the criteria used with respect to intervention on food? How are the Nobuyuki HAMADA publications that review the food safety regulations put into place in Japan after the declaration of nuclear emergency conditions viewed by experts and the public? 5. Describe coordination of response in terms of the evacuation plan (e.g., communication with residents on explanation of the accident and evacuation directions). How well were the responses coordinated between TEPCO, government, and international organizations? 6. What lessons were learned in emergency response decision making and communication? 7. Can you explain the problems that arose in attempting to use the Network System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI)? 8. What changes do you anticipate making, if any, to improve the SPEEDI system and its use in planning the evacuation strategy? 9. Did NISA have on-site inspectors? Did they play any role in accident response? 10. Did NISA have an independent emergency control center? Did it play any role in accident response? 11. What regulatory requirements establish criteria for seismic and tsunami design requirements? 12. Has the Japanese regulator imposed special requirements for:  Station blackout events—such as a minimum coping time without restoration of AC power.  Emergency lighting?  Backup station to the control room, from which critical safety functions can be managed? Prepublication Copy B-5

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Appendix B: Presentations, Breakout Sessions, and Visits  Anticipated transients without scram  Strainer requirements for protection of recirculation flow from the suppression pool from clogging.  Hydrogen control 13. Does the regulatory agency use performance indicators to assess the adequacy of safety culture of plant management? 14. Does the Japanese regulatory process incorporate risk analysis to prioritize safety requirements and regulatory oversight activities? 15. Are plants required to comply with deterministic safe shutdown requirements? 16. Are there requirements for the protection of critical safety equipment from internally initiated flooding? If so, why were they ineffective in protecting against the tsunami? 17. Under what conditions can the regulator order shutdown of a plant? 18. Under what conditions can the regulator require backfits to the plant? 19. Were the venting system and emergency management procedures implemented at the plant in response to regulatory requirements or as voluntary initiatives? 20. Did the regulator perform an independent review of the adequacy of these beyond design basis requirements? Invited Participants: Industry  Akira Kawano, General Manager, Nuclear International Relations and Strategy Group, Nuclear Power and Plant Siting Administrative Department, TEPCO  Akira Suzuki, Group Manager, Radiological Health and Safety Center, Nuclear Power and Plant Siting Administrative Department, TEPCO  Tatsuya Taminami, Group Manager, Nuclear Security and Industrial Safety Management Group, Nuclear Power Plant Management Department, TEPCO Government  Toshihiro Funahashi, Senior Staff, Emergency Response Training Group, Nuclear Emergency Response and Preparedness Department, Incorporated Administrative Agency, JNES  Toshimitsu Homma, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)  Kazumi Miyagi, Assistant Director-General, Nuclear Energy Response and Preparedness Department, Incorporated Administrative Agency, JNES  Tatsujiro Suzuki, Vice Chairman, Japan Atomic Energy Commission Central  Tomoho Yamada, Secretariat of Nuclear Regulation Authority  Tetsuro Yamaguchi, Deputy-Director Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Division Secretariat of NRA Prepublication Copy B-6

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Appendix B: Presentations, Breakout Sessions, and Visits Academia/Professional Organizations and Societies  Takashi Sawada, Secretary General, Director, Atomic Energy Society of Japan  Ayao Tsuge, President, The Japan Federation of Engineering Societies Session 3: Accident Management and Operator Training Moderator: Emilie Roth, committee member Rapporteur: Najm Meshkati, committee member Questions: 1. Was the organizational structure and staffing within the plant sufficient to cope with severe accidents, in particular co-incident failures or events impacting two or more plants on the same site? Was essential information about the state and operations of the units passed on efficiently from one shift to the next? 2. Can you explain the chain of decision-making/command for emergency response that was specified in regulatory and TEPCO policies and procedures (e.g., Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act, Nuclear Operator Emergency Action Plan, Nuclear Emergency Response Manual)? 3. In what ways was the chain of command that developed during the Fukushima accident different from the chain of command that was specified in documented policies and procedures? What factors do you believe contributed to this? 4. Given the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, what changes, if any, do you anticipate making to the formal command-and-control chain for emergency response within the plant? 5. What changes do you anticipate making, if any, to the physical command and control sites (e.g., the plant control room, the Emergency Response Center, the off-site center, the emergency response center) and/or to the communications available among them? 6. What, if any, severe accident management guidelines were in place at the time of the accident? Were these guidelines followed in accident response? 7. What kind of engineering support was available within the plant to support decision making? 8. Do you anticipate the need for any decision-aids (e.g., simplified computer decision making codes) to support decision-making during severe accidents? 9. What role did external advice (e.g., from IAEA, the U.S. Department of Energy, or U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) play in managing the accident? 10. How does training account for design-specific unit characteristics? 11. How are plant personnel trained on severe accident management procedures? How often does training occur? 12. How often are operators trained on simulators for response to design basis events? 13. Were the severe accident management procedures used by operators? Were the procedures useful and if so how? Were there aspects of the Fukushima accident that went beyond what the procedures covered? 14. Given the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, what changes do you anticipate making, if any, to procedures for handling severe accidents? Prepublication Copy B-7

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Appendix B: Presentations, Breakout Sessions, and Visits 15. What changes do you anticipate making, if any, to personnel training for handling severe accident events? 16. What changes do you anticipate making, if any, for improving the safety culture? Invited Participants: Industry  Naoki Anahara, Group Manager, Human Resources and Ethics Development Group, Nuclear Power and Plant Siting Administrative Department, TEPCO  Akira Kawano, General Manager, Nuclear International Relations and Strategy Group, Nuclear Power and Plant Siting Administrative Department, TEPCO  Shinya Mizokami, Deputy Manager, Nuclear Reactor Safety Engineering Group, Nuclear Asset Management Department, TEPCO  Hiroshi Nakano, Group Manager, Operation Planning Group, Nuclear Power Plant Management Department, TEPCO  Masahisa Ohtsuki, General Manager, Nuclear Power Plant Management Department, TEPCO  Masaru Oowada, Chief assistant, Human Resources and Ethics Development Group, Nuclear Power & Plant Siting Administrative Department, TEPCO  Tatsuya Taminami, Group Manager, Nuclear Security and Industrial Safety Management Group, Nuclear Power Plant Management Department, TEPCO  Masahiro Yamamoto, Group Manager, Quality and Safety Assessment Group, Nuclear Quality and Safety Management Department, TEPCO  Yasunori Yamanaka, Group Manager, Nuclear Reactor Safety Engineering Group, Nuclear Asset Management Department, TEPCO Government  Kiyoharu Abe, Senior Technical Advisor, JNES  Toshihiro Funahashi, Senior Staff, Emergency Response Training Group, Nuclear Emergency Response and Preparedness Department, Incorporated Administrative Agency, JNES Academia/Professional Organizations and Societies  Mitsumasa Hirano, Professor, Tokyo City University  Kenkichi Hirose, Tokai Institute of Global Education and Research, Tokai University  Nobuhide Kasagi, Principal Fellow, Professor Emeritus, The University of Tokyo  Koji Okamoto, Department of Nuclear Engineering and Management, University of Tokyo Session 4: Risk Assessments Moderated by John Garrick, committee vice-chair Prepublication Copy B-8

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Appendix B: Presentations, Breakout Sessions, and Visits Rapporteur: Barbara Hamrick, committee member Questions: 1. What type of risk assessments were performed for the Daiichi and Daini units (i.e., probabilistic risk assessment [PRA] or deterministic risk assessment)? 2. What are the results of these PRAs? 3. Did the PRAs consider fire risk, flooding risk (including tsunamis), and seismic risk (each event separately or together)? What magnitude of these events was considered? 4. Do the PRAs consider long-term station blackouts? 5. Do the PRAs consider common mode failures across multiple units? 6. Do the PRA results include consideration of events initiated from operating modes other than full-power operation? 7. Were the PRAs reviewed and revised throughout the life of the plants? 8. Do the plants use on-line risk monitors to indicate to the operators when the unit is in a high risk state, for example when equipment from one safety train is undergoing maintenance or testing? Invited Participants: Industry  Toshihiko Fukuda, General Manager, Nuclear Quality and Safety Management Department, TEPCO  Shinichi Kawamura, General Manager, Nuclear Seismic Engineering Center, General Manager, Nuclear Safety System Engineering, TEPCO  Koichi Miyata, Group Manager, Nuclear Safety Group, Nuclear Quality and Safety Management Department, TEPCO  Hitoshi Muta, Senior Researcher, Probabilistic Safety Assessment Group, Nuclear Energy System Safety  Toshiaki Sakai, General Manager, Construction Engineering Center, Construction Department, TEPCO  Shin Takizawa, Manager, Nuclear International Relations and Strategy Group, Nuclear Power and Plant Siting Administrative Department, TEPCO  Tomoyuki Tani, Group Manager, Civil Engineering Group (Geological Survey), Nuclear Seismic Engineering Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department, TEPCO Government  Haruo Fujimoto, Director, Probabilistic Safety Assessment Group, Nuclear Energy System Safety Department, JNES  Yoshinori Moriyama, Associate Vice-President, JNES  Masao Ogino, Senior Staff, Severe Accident Evaluation Group, Nuclear Energy System Safety Department, JNES Prepublication Copy B-9

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Appendix B: Presentations, Breakout Sessions, and Visits  Hiroshi Yamagata, Senior Coordinator for Severe Accident Measures, Secretariat of NRA Academia/Professional Organizations and Societies  Masayoshi Nakashima, Professor and Director, Disaster Prevention Research Institute Kyoto University  Takashi Sawada, Secretary General, Director, Atomic Energy Society of Japan  Hiroe Tsubaki, Vice-Director General and Director, Risk Analysis Research Center, The Institute of Statistical Mathematics  Akira Yamaguchi, Professor, Department of Energy and Environment Engineering, Osaka University Session 5: Hydrogen Explosions Moderator: Quinn Brewster, committee member Rapporteur: Loring Wyllie, committee member Questions: 1. What is the current knowledge regarding pathways for hydrogen entry into the reactor buildings? What is the basis for the identification of these pathways? 2. How much hydrogen was estimated to be released into the buildings? 3. What were the ignition sources for the explosions? 4. How did the explosions affect the building structures? 5. What accounts for the differences in structural damage to Units 1, 3, and 4? Are there damage maps from each of the explosions? 6. Was removal of panels in Units 2, 5, and 6 effective in preventing explosions? 7. What was the basis for reinforcing the structure beneath the Unit 4 spent fuel pool? Is this basis documented? 8. How did the secondary damage (i.e., blasts and debris) from the explosions impact recovery operations? How much of debris around the reactor units was from the tsunami versus the explosions? 9. Did the explosions result in damage to the spent fuel pools or the fuel—for example, was any of the spent fuel damaged by portions of the crane that fell into the Unit 3 spent fuel pool? 10. What is the estimated impact of the reactor building upper level destruction on offsite releases of radioactive material? 11. What impact, if any, will damage to the spent fuel have on recovery operations? Invited Participants: Industry  Toshihiko Fukuda, General Manager, Nuclear Quality and Safety Management Department, TEPCO Prepublication Copy B-10

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Appendix B: Presentations, Breakout Sessions, and Visits  Rikiro Kikuchi, Group Manager, Architectural Engineering Group (Seismic Integrity), Nuclear Seismic Engineering Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department, TEPCO  Koichi Miyata, Group Manager, Nuclear Safety Group, Nuclear Quality and Safety Management Department, TEPCO  Shin Takizawa, Manager, Nuclear International Relations and Strategy Group, Nuclear Power and Plant Siting Administrative Department, TEPCO Government  Masao Ogino, Senior Staff, Severe Accident Evaluation Group, Nuclear Energy System Safety Department, JNES Academia/Professional Organizations and Societies  Michio Ishikawa, Former President and CEO, Japan Nuclear Technology Institute  Masanori Naitoh, Director, Nuclear Power Engineering Center, The Institute of Applied Energy  Takashi Sawada, Secretary General, Director, Atomic Energy Society of Japan Site Visits  November 29, 2012: Visit to Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant, Miyagi Prefecture, Japan  November 29, 2012: Visit to Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Plant, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan  November 30, 2012: Visit to Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan Washington, D.C., February 7, 2013 Plenary Presentations  NRC Regulatory Activities Following the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, Rob Taylor, Deputy Director of the Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C., June 24-25, 2013 Plenary Presentations  Overview of Nuclear Regulatory Commission responses to 9/11 terrorist attacks, Christiana Lui, USNRC Division Director, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, Division of Security Policy Prepublication Copy B-11

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Appendix B: Presentations, Breakout Sessions, and Visits  Origin and requirements for B.5.b mitigating strategies, Eric Bowman, USNRC Senior Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Policy and Rulemaking  Spent Fuel Pool study, Hossein Esmaili, USNRC Senior Reactor Systems Engineer, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Division of Systems Analysis; Jose Pires, Senior Technical Advisor for Civil/Structural Engineering, RES/Division of Engineering (supporting speaker); Donald Helton, Senior Reliability And Risk Engineer, RES/Division of Risk Assessment (supporting speaker); Keith Compton, Senior Reactor Scientist, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (supporting speaker) Breakout Session  Application of probabilistic risk assessment to multiple reactor units, Karl Fleming, President, KNF Consulting Services LLC Non-Plenary Presentations  Design basis threat for nuclear plants and spent fuel pools, Ralph Way, USNRC Senior Level Advisor, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, Division of Security Operations  Physical security of nuclear plants and spent fuel pools, Ralph Way, USNRC Senior Level Advisor, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, Division of Security Operations  Personnel security for nuclear plants and spent fuel pools, Mark Resner, USNRC Senior Security Specialist, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, Division of Security Policy  Physical security of independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs), Doug Garner, USNRC Security Specialist, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, Division of Security Policy  Zirconium fire experiments on BWR and PWR fuel, Ghani Zigh, USNRC Senior Level Advisor, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Division of Systems Analysis  Current security rulemaking (vulnerability assessments, ISFSI/Phase 1 study), Phil Brochman, USNRC Senior Program Manager, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, Division of Security Policy; Daniel Forsyth, USNRC Nuclear Engineer, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Washington, D.C., August 14, 2013 Plenary Presentations  Discussion with senior reactor operators about the Fukushima nuclear accident and management of severe accidents, James Scarola, Chairman, Fukushima Response Steering Committee, Nuclear Energy Institute (Chief Nuclear Officer); Phillip Amway, Prepublication Copy B-12

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Appendix B: Presentations, Breakout Sessions, and Visits Fukushima Fleet Technical Lead, Constellation Energy Nuclear Group (former Senior Reactor Operator); Derwood Tootle, SAM Project Manager, Hatch Nuclear Plant, Southern Nuclear (Senior Reactor Operator); Glen Morrow, Regulatory Assurance Manager, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Exelon Generation (Senior Reactor Operator) Washington, D.C., October 1-3, 2013 Non-Plenary Presentations  U.S. Government’s Response to the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, Dr. John P. Holdren, Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Forked River, New Jersey, USA, October 28, 2013 Site Visit  Visit to Oyster Creek Generating Station (Exelon Corporation) Baxley, Georgia, USA, November 15, 2013 Site Visit  Visit to Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant (Southern Company) Washington, D.C., December 5-6, 2013 Plenary Presentations  Design Basis Threats (DBTs) for Commercial Nuclear Reactors and Spent Nuclear Fuel, Dr. Patricia Holahan, Director, Division of Security Operations, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC); Dr. Ralph Way, Senior Level Advisor for Security, NSIR, USNRC; Mr. Jack Frost, Security Specialist, Reactor Security Licensing Branch, Division of Security Policy, NSIR, USNRC  Need for Expedited of Transfer of Spent Fuel from Pools to Dry Casks, William Reckley, Branch Chief, Policy and Support Branch, Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), USNRC; Kevin Witt, Project Manager, Policy and Support Branch, Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate, NRR, USNRC; Steven Jones, Senior Reactor Systems Engineer, Balance of Plant Branch, Division of Safety Systems, NRR, USNRC; Fred Schofer, Senior Cost Analyst, Rulemaking Branch, Division of Policy and Rulemaking, NRR, USNRC Prepublication Copy B-13

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Appendix B: Presentations, Breakout Sessions, and Visits Information Gathering Conference Calls  April 10, 2013: Nuclear Reactor and Plant Performance, Salomon Levy, S. Levy and Associates, Inc.; Craig Sawyer, consultant (formerly General Electric Co., retired)  April 30, 2013: How Probabilistic Risk Assessment is Used in Nuclear Plant Safety; John W. Stetkar, ACRS member; David H. Johnson, ABS Consulting; James R. Chapman, Scientech, Curtiss Wright Flow Control; Don Dube, Erin Engineering (formerly US NRC)  May 17, 2013: Emergency Preparedness, Charles (Milt) Murray, Inspection and Regulatory Improvement Branch, Division of Preparedness and Response, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, U.S. NRC; Chad Gorman, Director, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) Office, Response Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FEMA; Harry Sherwood, Professional Services Branch Chief, Technological Hazards Division National Preparedness Directorate, FEMA  May 20, 2013: Human Performance, Robert Beall, Project Manager, Rulemaking Branch, Division of Policy and Rulemaking, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation; Christian Cowdrey, Reactor Engineer, Operator Licensing and Training Branch, Division of Inspection and Regional Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation; Kevin Williams, Branch Chief, New Reactor Licensing Branch, Division of Preparedness and Response, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response; David Hembree, Vice President, Emergency Response, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO); Steven Meng, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, INPO  May 23, 2013: Use of severe accident management guidelines, Doug True and Jeff Gabor, ERIN Engineering and Research, Inc.  June 21, 2013: Training approaches to prepare personnel to skillfully handle complex, unanticipated, high risk, and high stress situations, Randall J. Mumaw, Associate Technical Fellow, Human Factors, Aviation System Safety, Boeing; James A. Wall, Executive Director, Texas Center for Applied Technology  November 13, 2013: Sara DeCair, Mike Boyd, and David Pawel, scientists in the Radiation Protection Division, Environmental Protection Agency; Jon Edwards, Director, Radiation Protection Division, Environmental Protection Agency Prepublication Copy B-14