The National Academies Press

Currently Skimming:

Pages 15-22

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.

From page 15... ... PROOF OF DISPARATE TREATMENT AND DISPARATE IMPACT A Proof of Disparate Treatment: The Arlington Heights Factors As one article notes, "[t] Read the entire page →
From page 16... ... ‘Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination.'"193 Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court held in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,194 in the absence of direct proof, indirect, circumstantial proof, if sufficient, may establish discriminatory intent. Read the entire page →
From page 17... ... . able group.'"206 In making a determination of whether invidious discrimination was a motivating factor concerning a policy, program, or action, the court must make "a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence as may be available."207 The court may consider evidence such as "the historical background of the decision, the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision, legislative or administrative history of the decisionmaking body, and any other evidence relevant to a showing of discriminatory purpose."208 In Western States Paving Co., the court, in a decision on remand from the Ninth Circuit, held that the plaintiff's Section 601 claim for damages could proceed against the Washington State DOT,209 because its DBE program was not a facially neutral one; rather, "it was specifically race conscious. Read the entire page →
From page 18... ... The plaintiffs sought to enjoin MTC permanently "from making any funding decision that has an unjustified disproportionately adverse impact on AC Transit riders of color"222 and "from supporting the funding of…any improvement or expansion in service that detracts from the equitable funding of services that benefit AC Transit riders."223 In a 2008 opinion, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim of intentional discrimination but denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and allowed the case to proceed to trial on the disparate-impact claim on the basis of California Government Code Section 11135,224 discussed later.225 The court rejected the plaintiffs' Title VI claim, finding that the plaintiffs had no evidence of direct discriminatory intent and that even applying the Arlington Heights factors, the "totality of the circumstances shown by Plaintiffs' indirect evidence" did not evince intentional discriminatory intent.226 The court observed, for example, that the defendant produced evidence that it has no authority to redirect earmarked federal funds and "has provided preventative maintenance funding to AC Transit to use for operating expenses whenever AC Transit sought such funding."227 The court held that "[t] he circumstances include too many strong contraindications of discriminatory motive that preclude drawing any reasonable inference of discriminatory intent."228 As one example, the court discussed the MTC's treatment of the whitest of the seven major carriers, Golden Gate Transit, almost two-thirds of whose passengers are white in a transit area that is majority minority. Read the entire page →
From page 19... ... ,243 which may be eligible for capital expenditures or preventive maintenance;244 there are ADA set-aside funds and other funds that may be allocated by the MTC.245 There are state committed funds based on state statutes and statewide voterapproved propositions, as well as regional measures passed by voters in the Bay Area.246 There are other uncommitted funds that may be available to the MTC.247 Although the court found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated some instances of disparate impact,248 "on balance, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that MTC's funding practices regarding committed funds have a significantly disproportionate adverse impact on the Plaintiff Class."249 Furthermore, the "Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing a prima facie case of showing a significant disparate impact with respect to uncommitted funds."250 The plaintiffs did establish a prima facie case regarding Resolution 3434,251 a strategic long-range plan for transit expansion projects.252 Because the plaintiffs 240 Id. Read the entire page →
From page 20... ... The "MTC's practices…are subject to a complex array of statutory, regulatory and administrative constraints, not to mention numerous, and sometimes competing policy goals, which require making difficult trade-offs."255 The court held that it could not "say that MTC has failed to show a substantial legitimate justification for Resolution 3434…."256 When a plaintiff in a disparate-impact case makes a prima facie case, but the defendant responds by demonstrating a substantial legitimate justification for its actions, the plaintiff "must then show an equally effective alternate practice that results in less racial disproportionality."257 However, in Darensburg, the court ruled that the plaintiffs did not show that their alleged less discriminatory alternative "would be equally effective while causing less racial disparity."258 2. Committee Concerning Community Improvement v. Read the entire page →
From page 21... ... timely-filed claims in context.'"275 Second, the court held that evidence of "gross statistical disparities" may be used to satisfy the intent requirement of Title VI when the evidence "tends to show that some invidious or discriminatory purpose underlies the policy."276 Statistical evidence of discriminatory impact does not relieve the plaintiffs of their burden of showing a defendant's intent to discriminate.277 However, statistical evidence along with the Arlington Heights factors may be "considered in determining whether there is evidence of intent or purpose to discriminate…."278 Although the court earlier stated that "it is the rare case where impact alone will be sufficient to invalidate a challenged government action,"279 the court held that the statistical evidence and other factors were "evidence of discriminatory impact which, in turn, has created a sufficient inference of discriminatory intent to permit [the plaintiffs] to present their MTSA claim to a factfinder."280 Thus, on the plaintiffs' claim based on the MTSA, the court reversed the district court and remanded. Read the entire page →
From page 22... ... ecause the underlying claim challenges the total allocation of subsidies to the NYCTA and the commuter lines, the district court should have first assessed whether any measure or combination of measures could adequately capture the impact of these subsidies upon NYCTA and commuter line passengers."295 The Second Circuit concluded that the farebox recovery ratio was not a sufficient basis for a finding of disparate impact, in part because the ratio "does not reveal the extent to which one system might have higher costs associated with its operations -- costs stemming from different maintenance requirements, schedules of operation, labor contracts, and so on."296 The court further concluded that there was no reason to assume that each system's expenses had a "proportionate relationship," because the systems were "fundamentally different" in how they carry passengers and in their frequency of stops and operating sched 289 Id. (stating that courts considering claims under analogous Title VI regulations have looked to Title VII disparate impact cases for guidance) Read the entire page →

From page 15...

... PROOF OF DISPARATE TREATMENT AND DISPARATE IMPACT A Proof of Disparate Treatment: The Arlington Heights Factors As one article notes, "[t]

Read the entire page →

From page 16...

... ‘Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination.'"193 Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court held in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,194 in the absence of direct proof, indirect, circumstantial proof, if sufficient, may establish discriminatory intent.

Read the entire page →

From page 17...

... . able group.'"206 In making a determination of whether invidious discrimination was a motivating factor concerning a policy, program, or action, the court must make "a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence as may be available."207 The court may consider evidence such as "the historical background of the decision, the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision, legislative or administrative history of the decisionmaking body, and any other evidence relevant to a showing of discriminatory purpose."208 In Western States Paving Co., the court, in a decision on remand from the Ninth Circuit, held that the plaintiff's Section 601 claim for damages could proceed against the Washington State DOT,209 because its DBE program was not a facially neutral one; rather, "it was specifically race conscious.

Read the entire page →

From page 18...

... The plaintiffs sought to enjoin MTC permanently "from making any funding decision that has an unjustified disproportionately adverse impact on AC Transit riders of color"222 and "from supporting the funding of…any improvement or expansion in service that detracts from the equitable funding of services that benefit AC Transit riders."223 In a 2008 opinion, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim of intentional discrimination but denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and allowed the case to proceed to trial on the disparate-impact claim on the basis of California Government Code Section 11135,224 discussed later.225 The court rejected the plaintiffs' Title VI claim, finding that the plaintiffs had no evidence of direct discriminatory intent and that even applying the Arlington Heights factors, the "totality of the circumstances shown by Plaintiffs' indirect evidence" did not evince intentional discriminatory intent.226 The court observed, for example, that the defendant produced evidence that it has no authority to redirect earmarked federal funds and "has provided preventative maintenance funding to AC Transit to use for operating expenses whenever AC Transit sought such funding."227 The court held that "[t] he circumstances include too many strong contraindications of discriminatory motive that preclude drawing any reasonable inference of discriminatory intent."228 As one example, the court discussed the MTC's treatment of the whitest of the seven major carriers, Golden Gate Transit, almost two-thirds of whose passengers are white in a transit area that is majority minority.

Read the entire page →

From page 19...

... ,243 which may be eligible for capital expenditures or preventive maintenance;244 there are ADA set-aside funds and other funds that may be allocated by the MTC.245 There are state committed funds based on state statutes and statewide voterapproved propositions, as well as regional measures passed by voters in the Bay Area.246 There are other uncommitted funds that may be available to the MTC.247 Although the court found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated some instances of disparate impact,248 "on balance, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that MTC's funding practices regarding committed funds have a significantly disproportionate adverse impact on the Plaintiff Class."249 Furthermore, the "Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing a prima facie case of showing a significant disparate impact with respect to uncommitted funds."250 The plaintiffs did establish a prima facie case regarding Resolution 3434,251 a strategic long-range plan for transit expansion projects.252 Because the plaintiffs 240 Id.

Read the entire page →

From page 20...

... The "MTC's practices…are subject to a complex array of statutory, regulatory and administrative constraints, not to mention numerous, and sometimes competing policy goals, which require making difficult trade-offs."255 The court held that it could not "say that MTC has failed to show a substantial legitimate justification for Resolution 3434…."256 When a plaintiff in a disparate-impact case makes a prima facie case, but the defendant responds by demonstrating a substantial legitimate justification for its actions, the plaintiff "must then show an equally effective alternate practice that results in less racial disproportionality."257 However, in Darensburg, the court ruled that the plaintiffs did not show that their alleged less discriminatory alternative "would be equally effective while causing less racial disparity."258 2. Committee Concerning Community Improvement v.

Read the entire page →

From page 21...

... timely-filed claims in context.'"275 Second, the court held that evidence of "gross statistical disparities" may be used to satisfy the intent requirement of Title VI when the evidence "tends to show that some invidious or discriminatory purpose underlies the policy."276 Statistical evidence of discriminatory impact does not relieve the plaintiffs of their burden of showing a defendant's intent to discriminate.277 However, statistical evidence along with the Arlington Heights factors may be "considered in determining whether there is evidence of intent or purpose to discriminate…."278 Although the court earlier stated that "it is the rare case where impact alone will be sufficient to invalidate a challenged government action,"279 the court held that the statistical evidence and other factors were "evidence of discriminatory impact which, in turn, has created a sufficient inference of discriminatory intent to permit [the plaintiffs] to present their MTSA claim to a factfinder."280 Thus, on the plaintiffs' claim based on the MTSA, the court reversed the district court and remanded.

Read the entire page →

From page 22...

... ecause the underlying claim challenges the total allocation of subsidies to the NYCTA and the commuter lines, the district court should have first assessed whether any measure or combination of measures could adequately capture the impact of these subsidies upon NYCTA and commuter line passengers."295 The Second Circuit concluded that the farebox recovery ratio was not a sufficient basis for a finding of disparate impact, in part because the ratio "does not reveal the extent to which one system might have higher costs associated with its operations -- costs stemming from different maintenance requirements, schedules of operation, labor contracts, and so on."296 The court further concluded that there was no reason to assume that each system's expenses had a "proportionate relationship," because the systems were "fundamentally different" in how they carry passengers and in their frequency of stops and operating sched 289 Id. (stating that courts considering claims under analogous Title VI regulations have looked to Title VII disparate impact cases for guidance)

Read the entire page →

← Previous Chapter Skim

Next Chapter Skim →

This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.