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10 Adaptive Management for Ecosystem Restoration in the I(lamath Basin This report has clescribecT many ways in which the status of I(lamath basin ecosystems can be improved for the benefit of enciangerecT or threat- enecT species ancT other fish ancT wilcTlife resources. The report also shows that geographic expansion of restoration efforts beyond the lakes ancT the main stem of the I(lamath River is necessary for recovery of listecT species. Recovery efforts will require adjustments in policies of agencies, in coop- eration between institutions, ancT human use of resources in the basin. Ecosystem management in the I(lamath basin today is cTisjointecT, occa- sionally clysfunctional, ancT commonly aciversarial. Thus, it often is ineffi- cient or ineffective in clearing with issues relatecT to restoration of listecT species in the basin. Cooperation among agencies has been poor; potential restoration activities have been generally restricted to actions or operations of the I(lamath Project; ancT local communities, stakehoiclers, ancT incTiviclu- als that control resources critical to long-term solutions often have been alienatecT, uninterested, or simply left out. Changes that occurrecT cluring consultations leacTing to the biological assessment ancT opinions of 2002 appear to show some movement toward remedies for these deficiencies, but much remains to be clone, ancT an overall integrated strategy still is missing. This chapter discusses alternative or mocTifiecT management frameworks that might allow resources for recovery to be usecT more effectively than in the past. First, the potential value of aciaptive management is explorecT. The chapter then presents specific examples of policy instruments, approaches, ancT activities that may facilitate environmental restoration. The last section suggests specific changes in management that probably wouicT improve the in. . . .. . 331
332 FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN efficacy of public anti private investments in habitat or minimize the costs to private landowners as they acljust to the neecis of listed species. ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT AS AN ORGANIZING FRAMEWORK Regional restoration programs which typically are large, complex, anti fraught with uncertainties anti competing interests must include a process for implementing restoration activities anti a means of measuring their effectiveness. The concepts of aciaptive assessment (analysis leacling to aciaptations) anti aciaptive management Adjustment of management in light of new information) are often suitable for those purposes; for brevity, they are referred to here collectively as aciaptive management. Adaptive management is a formal, systematic, anti rigorous program of learning from the outcomes of management actions, accommodating change, anti improving management (Holling 19781. Its primary purpose is to establish a continuous, iterative process for increasing the probabil- ity that a plan for environmental restoration will be successful. In prac- tice, aciaptive management uses conceptual anti numerical moclels anti the scientific method to develop ancI test management options. It requires the explicit recognition that management policies can, with appropriate pre- cautions, be applied as experimental treatments (Walters 19971. Decision makers use the results as a basis for improving knowledge of the system anti adjusting management accordingly (Haley 1990, McLain ancI Lee 1996). Adaptive management is being applied to major ecosystem restoration projects in the Florida Everglades, Chesapeake Bay, ancI California's Sacra- mento ancI San loaquin River system (CERP 2002, CALFED 2002), ancI it recently has been used in an evaluation of flow regimes for the GrancI Canyon (NRC 1999) ancI the Trinity River component of the I(lamath River system (USFWS/HVT 19991. The following description of the aciap- tive management process is drawn from the CALFED Sacramento-San Joaquin Comprehensive Stucly working paper (2002), the appendix to USFWS/HVT (1999), Nagle ancI Ruhl (2002), ancI other sources. Not all features of aciaptive management will be applicable to the I(lamath basin, given legal constraints arising from the federal EnciangerecI Species Act (ESA; Chapter 91. The general principles of aciaptive management clo, how- ever, provide useful guidance as managers consider development ancI imple- mentation of recovery plans. Adaptive management on the Trinity River could serve as a useful model for the rest of the basin. Ecosystem Management ant! Adaptive Management Ecosystem management refers to policy goals clirectecI at ensuring the sustainability of natural resources in ecologically functional units (Grumbine
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION 333 19941. Grumbine defines adaptive management as a set of policy tools intenclecI to move clecision-making from a process of incremental trial anti error to one of experimentation that uses continuous monitoring, assess- ment, anti recalibration. Ecosystem management anti aciaptive management are not interchangeable, but they are nearly inseparable (Nagle anti Ruh! 20021. Successful ecosystem management usually requires some form of aciaptive management, anti use of aciaptive management in the context of natural-resources conservation generally requires that goals be expressed in terms of ecosystem management. Through research aireacly completecI, scientists anti managers have come to unclerstancI much about Klamath basin ecosystems anti the species that clepencI on them, but many of the important ecological anti human processes anti interactions that animate the ecosystem remain unknown. Furthermore, ecosystem processes, habitats, anti species are moclifiecI con- tinually by changing environmental conditions anti human activities. Pres- ently anti in the future, uncertainty is inevitable. Adaptive management provides an iterative process for continually reducing uncertainty by refin- ing the implementation of environmental restoration projects in response to information from monitoring anti scientific analysis. Extreme events such as drought, floocI, anti unexpected human actions are anticipated by a properly clesignecI aciaptive-management program. Adaptive management incorporates processes for early detection anti inter- pretation of the unexpected anti for maximizing the learning opportunities associated with these events. Adaptive management is valuable in that it treats all responses, expected or not, as learning opportunities. An example of an inciclental experiment from the Klamath basin is the variation of water levels of Upper Klamath Lake over the last 15 yr. Drought anti human management have caused the water level of the lake to fluctuate over a range of about 6 ft (Chapter 31. Changes in water levels now can be compared with changes in water quality (Chapter 3) or in sucker popula- tions (Chapter 61. A number of other experiments, plannecI or inadvertent, have occurred in the basin, such as changes in seasonal anti annual flows at Iron Gate Dam; they provide useful information about recovery, but in many cases monitoring programs have been inadequate to support analysis anti interpretation that wouicI leacI to adaptation of management basecI on the new information. Key Components of Aclaptive Management The key components of aciaptive management are as follows: · Definition of the problem. Examples are loss of critical habitat for species anti the neecI for protection anti restoration of habitat for species, such as those listecI uncler the ESA.
334 FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN · Determination of goals and objectives for management of ecosys- tems. Examples are restoration of habitat protection anti recovery of en- ciangerecI species anti other fish anti wilcIlife resources at minimum social or economic cost. · Determination of the ecosystem baseline. The ecosystem baseline inclucles all relevant information, past anti present, such as physical, chemi- cal, anti biological features anti benchmark indicators of the abundance of critical species. The baseline is the reference condition against which pro- gress toward management goals is measured. · Development of conceptual modlels. The analytical basis of aciaptive management typically is a set of conceptual anti numerical moclels. For example, conceptual ecological moclels convert broacI, policy-level objec- tives into specific, measurable indicators of the status of natural anti human systems. Conceptual mocleling requires knowlecige of ecosystem functions, of alteration or clegraciation, anti of potential improvements. This informa- tion is framed in terms of major stressors anti indicators (ecological at- tributes) that provide the most useful measures of ecological anti social response to change. The conceptual mocle! can be used to identify a small number of representative biological, chemical, anti physical indicators of system-wicle responses to restoration on various spatial anti temporal scales. The indicators then can be used in cleveloping moclels or protocols for monitoring anti testing the efficiency of the restoration efforts. Performance measures are clevelopecI for each of the elements (icleally for both stressors anti inclicators) anti are used as the stanciarcis for evaluating the restoration program. · Selection of future restoration actions. The conceptual moclels shape the character of restoration actions by identifying key kincis of uncertainty or by revealing the extent of confidence that a particular action will achieve a given objective. On the basis of past anti current conditions of the ecosys- tem, anti insights from the conceptual moclels about the ecological anti social consequences of management actions, managers apply two processes for changing management activities: identification of alternative-manage- ment procedures to achieve objectives anti selection of alternatives that appear to move the system toward management objectives. One aspect of the selection process shouicI be the social anti economic costs of achieving an objective. When two alternatives are effective, lower cost is preferred. If alternative actions are proposed for the same purpose, comparison (per- haps in consecutive years) leacis to selection of the action that most effi- ciently achieves the objectives. · Implementation of management actions. A group of scientists anti agency managers collectively is responsible for determining the criteria anti procedures for management actions. This work requires coordination, or- ganization, anti accountability among the agencies, which can be clifficult if
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION 335 the agencies have conflicting missions, as is the case in the Klamath basin. Experts in mocleling, simulation, experimental design, ancI prediction fore- cast responses to managerial actions. Each iteration of simulation is tested through post-auclit comparisons of observed ancI expected results. As part of an evaluation program, agency managers may support short-term and long-term experiments, such as alternative water levels or stream flows, habitat restoration efforts in selectecI areas, or other ecosystem changes. Experiments often involve major change, as wouicI be the case for closure of the Iron Gate or Trinity Hatchery or removal of major clams (Chapter 81. · Monitoring of the ecosystem response. "It is critical to monitor the implementation of restoration actions to gage how the ecosystem responcis to management interventions. Monitoring provides the information nec- essary for tracking ecosystem health, for evaluating progress toward res- toration goals ancI objectives, ancI for evaluating ancI updating problems, goals ancI objectives, conceptual moclels, ancI restoration actions. Moni- toring requires measuring the baseline condition, abundance, clistribu- tion, change or status of ecological indicators" (CALFED Bay-Delta Pro- gram 20001. · Evaluation of restoration efforts ant] proposals for remeclial actions. After implementation of specific restoration activities ancI procedures, the status of the ecosystem is regularly ancI systematically reassessed ancI cle- scribecI. Comparison of the new state with the baseline state is a measure of progress toward objectives. The evaluation process feecis clirectly into aciap- tive management by informing the implementation team ancI leacling to testing of management hypotheses, new simulations, ancI proposals for adjustments in management experiments or clevelopment of wholly new experiments or management strategies. Status of Adaptive Management in the Klamath Basin There has been little effort to implement aciaptive-management strate- gles in the Klamath basin, except through the Trinity River Restoration Program, which clears only with the Trinity River. Even the 2002 biological assessment of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), which prescribes Klamath Project operations for the next 10 yr, gives only weak indications of mechanisms for adapting to new information. One exception is the proposed water bank, which if properly structured will provide annual information on the quantities of water available for voluntary transfer across uses ancI locations, ancI on the economic ancI social value of such water. This information can then be used by USER to manage the water bank ancI to clevelop more accurate estimates of water availability for both agricultural ancI environmental uses in the basin, ancI to establish a long- term mechanism to aciciress clemancis for water.
336 FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN Ecosystem management in the I(lamath basin typically has pursued the wiclely recognized alternatives to aciaptive management: cleferrecI ac- tion ancI trial ancI error involving crisis management In the cleferrecI- action approach, management methods are not changed until ecosystems are fully unclerstoocI (Walters ancI Hiliborn 1978, Walters ancI Holling 1990, Wilhere 20021. This approach is cautious but has two notable drawbacks: cleferral of management changes may magnify losses, ancI knowlecige acquired by cleferrecI action may reveal little about the re- sponse of ecosystems to changes in management. Stakehoicler groups or agencies that are opposed to changes in management often are strong proponents of cleferrecI action. Crisis management is common throughout the I(lamath basin ancI per- meates most restoration efforts, particularly on the tributaries. The ap- proach often involves restoration actions, but neglects assessment (Wilhere 20021. Thus, management becomes basecI principally on casual observa- tions ancI anecclotal reports. Trial ancI error without assessment ancI aciap- tation unclervalues information, which is the most critical neecI in restora- tion, ancI overvalues action for its own sake. The trial ancI error without assessment ancI adaptation may cause more harm than goocI, but its ben- efits typically cannot be cleterminecI. The legislative potential for watershed planning ancI restoration basecI on an aciaptive-management framework aireacly exists through the I(la- math Act (Public Law 99-552), which was passed by Congress in 1986. The act lecI to formation of the I(lamath River Basin Conservation Area Resto- ration Program, which inclucles the I(lamath Basin Restoration Task Force. The task force is comprised of fecleral, state, ancI local officials ancI repre- sentatives of several tribes ancI other stakehoiclers, inclucling the private sector. In aciclition, other committees, organizations anti act hoc working groups, such as the Upper I(lamath Basin Working Group, the I(lamath Basin Ecosystem Foundation, anti several watershed councils have been created for improvement of clialogue among parties in the basin, anti for clevelopment of solutions to water issues within the basin. The task force anti other groups have facilitatecI discussion, but it is not clear that any group has contemplatecI extensive use of adaptive management. Consicler- able public anti private funcis have been invested in restoration anti man- agement of the ecosystems of the I(lamath basin. It is not clear what ben- efits have been clerivecI from the investments, or how management will be improved as a result. Adaptive management as appliecI to the I(lamath basin wouicI neecI to function within the legal framework of the ESA (Chap- ter 9), but the key point of the process is to set goals, clevelop a plan, determine whether it is achieving specific goals, and make adjustments as needed to be effective. This approach is both ecologically and socially responsible, given that ultimately all agencies and other stakeholders have
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION 337 limited resources with which to operate. As specific goals are achieved, resources become available for other socially desirable purposes within and outside the basin. POLICY OPTIONS AND RESTORATION ACTIVITIES Federal legislation and regulations, including the ESA and Federal Tribal Trust responsibilities, supercede state laws, including state water law. Thus, water demands for ESA purposes or to meet treaty obligations to Indian tribes have generally been upheld by federal courts (see, for example, the Winters Doctrine). Since such federal rulings reinforcing the ESA or tribal water needs typically do not apply to all waters in a basin or watershed, the Prior Appropriation Doctrine is still the major allocation device for waters in much of the West, including the I(lamath basin. The prior appropriation system requires that the first individual to divert water for a beneficial use shall have the right to do so into perpetuity ("first in time, first in right" ). The right of use generally is defined in terms of a given amount of water at a particular point of diversion. The rights of later diverters are junior (subordinate) to the right of the first diverter (senior right); in times of shortage, those holding water rights with earlier diversion dates are the last to be denied water. These water rights are established and protected by the states in which the diversions occur, usually by a state department of water resources. The prior appropriation system of rights provides an efficient mecha- nism for allocating water during times of shortage, but has many limita- tions (Getches 20031. One is that the use of water by the holders of senior rights (seniors) may in some cases be of lower economic or social value than that of holders of junior rights (juniors). For example, a senior may divert water onto pastureland, of low economic value while a junior has the opportunity to use water to produce crops of high value. In a time of drought, there may not be sufficient water for both users, and only the crop of lower value would receive water. A related issue is that the most senior water rights are for diversions, primarily to agriculture. Values of flow in the stream itself have only recently been recognized as beneficial. As a result, seniors have the potential to divert all usable flow, thus dewatering portions of streams, even if the marginal value of water in the stream could produce substantially higher benefits than the diversion. Another shortcoming of the prior-appropriation doctrine as applied by most states is that water rights are defined for a specific location. Thus, water rights are tied to a particular parcel of land unless a change is ap- proved by a state authority. Defining water rights as appurtenant to land creates inflexibilities in the use of the water (for example, it restricts water trading), which leads to substantial economic and social costs with respect
338 FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN to maximizing the value of water to society, as clemonstratecI in the ex- ample of the preceding paragraph. Because of problems with the prior-appropriation doctrine, states be- gan using water markets about 30 yr ago (Colby Saliba ancI Bush 1987, National Research Council 1992, Getches 20031. The idea of a water mar- ket is that willing buyers ancI sellers shouicI engage in transfers of water, thereby increasing the value of water to society. To use the preceding example, the junior may be willing to pay more for water than the senior can realize from using it. In such a case, both parties wouicI gain ancI society wouicI have realizecI greater value through the transfer. To facilitate creation of a water market, states have changed laws ancI rules to allow a water right to be separated from the lancI to which it was originally appliecI. In such cases, the right is reclefinecI as a particular flow or volume of water instead of a diversion at a particular location. Thus, a downstream user can purchase water from an upstream user. The magni- tucle of the gain from such a transaction is cleterminecI by the seller's in- crease in returns (over the value of the water on site) plus the aciclitional increase in income or averted loss realizecI by the downstream purchaser. Obviously, tracles will not occur unless they are of mutual benefit to buyer ancI seller. The existence of a market also allows other prospective water users to obtain water that was previously unavailable. For example, conser- vation groups or fisheries agencies may purchase water for maintenance of stream flows that benefit fish ancI wilcIlife (Colby 1990, Aciams et al. 19931. In some western states (such as, Coloraclo ancI Arizona) municipalities purchase agricultural water rights through water markets to meet rising water clemancI clue to resiclential growth. Water markets create their own problems. They inclucle so-callecI thircI- party effects by which someone who is not party to the sale may be harmed. For example, harm couicI come to an irrigator who has been using return flows from an upstream irrigator. If the upstream irrigator ceases irrigation, there wouicI be no return flows for the neighboring irrigator. In aciclition, some return flows create wetiancis or supplement grounc~water supplies; if the water is moved to a new location as a result of a water transfer, these local benefits may be lost. Water markets also may affect rural communities. If large amounts of water are clivertecI from agriculture to other uses, rural communities, in- clucling Indian tribal groups, who clepencI on the economic activity gener- atecI by irrigated agriculture will suffer. Thus, although the traclers gain from the existence of markets ancI society gains from water transfers to use of higher value, rural communities may lose economic viability. Despite the problems created by water markets, their use is increasing throughout the West. Many of the western states allow water to be soicI or
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION 339 leasecI. Permanent transfer of water rights occurs in the case of a true water market, but a water bank typically involves the temporary transfer (lease) of a water right. Water banks are particularly useful cluring drought. Water banks also recluce some of the adverse effects of a permanent transfer of a water right. Farmers ancI rural communities often are more supportive of the water-bank concept than of sales of water rights (I(eenan et al. 1999). Water banks hoicI promise for water problems such as those of the I(lamath basin. As noted earlier, Indian tribal claims to waters of the upper I(lamath basin must be aciciressecI as part of the acljuclication process. Re- maining water rights then will be assigned basecI on clemonstratecI proof of the initiation of beneficial use. IncleecI, the recent USBR biological assess- ment (2002) contains a 10-yr plan that calls for creation of a water bank of 100,000 acre-ft of water per yr (see Table 1-1 for comparison with total annual flows). The water wouicI come from grounc~water ancI from surface water within ancI outside the I(lamath Project. USBR wouicI purchase the water, which wouicI be used for environmental purposes. The I(lamath basin shows one of the necessary conditions for a water market or bank to be successful: a pronounced difference in the value of water across crops anti other uses. For example, crops of both low anti high value are grown in the I(lamath Project ancI in the basin. In aciclition to providing a mechanism by which USBR couicI purchase water for environ- mental uses, a properly structured water bank wouicI allow irrigators to tracle among themselves. In a hypothetical analysis of the events of the 2001 water year in the I(lamath basin, laeger (2002) has shown that a fully functioning water bank wouicI have reclucecI losses to agriculture by over 50°/0. A water bank also couicI allow irrigation water to be shifted to nonagricultural uses. For example, the California water bank, which is aciministerecI by the California Department of Water Resources, reserves a small portion of each exchange between farmers to be used for environmen- tal purposes in the Sacramento-San loaquin clelta. The necessary economic conditions exist for a water bank in the I(la- math basin, but institutional conditions clo not. Specifically, before water can be traclecI, water rights must be clearly clefinecI. In California, such rights have been establishecI by the state. Oregon, however, has not finished the acljuclication process for water rights in its portion of the I(lamath basin. In the short term, water banking will neecI to rely on water sales from the California portion of the basin or among farmers in the I(lamath Project who have water available for transfer, such as from wells. Even a limitecI water bank that is basecI on acljuclicatecI surface water in California or from grounc~water in the I(lamath Project has the potential to improve water allocation in the basin.
340 FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN IMPROVEMENT OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE KLAMATH BASIN The present management structure for restoring the two sucker species ancI coho salmon in the Klamath basin consists of the fecleral agencies involvecI in the ESA Section 7 (add) consultations USBR, the U.S. Fish ancI WilcIlife Service (USFWS), ancI the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) anti, less clirectly, a number of other fecleral ancI state agencies, such as the U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of LancI Management, U.S. Fish ancI WilcIlife Service National WilcIlife Refuges, the Natural Resource Conser- vation Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Army Corps of Engineers, the California ancI Oregon Depart- ments of Environmental Quality, ancI state water-resources departments. Because the ESA is fecleral legislation, USBR, USFWS, ancI NMFS are the primary agencies that responcI to ESA rules anti procedures for the Klamath Project. Given the conflicting objectives ancI missions of these agencies, however, tensions among them are inevitable. ESA processes also have been joined by a number of advocacy groups that oppose or support actions of the various fecleral agencies. For example, the National Research Council staff has iclentifiecI at least 29 environmental advocacy groups that have joined in litigation or taken positions against USBR anti at least seven water-user advocacy groups that have brought suit against or opposed actions of USFWS. In aciclition, stakehoiclers in ancI outside the Klamath Project anti local communities have not been aclequately incluclecI in actions implementecI uncler the ESA (Chapter 91. Entities outside the fecleral agen- cies fee! clisempowerecI by the present process (each et al. 20021. Their sense of powerlessness may contribute to the litigious nature of interaction among parties in the Klamath basin. The current management structure inclucles the Klamath Basin Ecosys- tem Restoration Office (ERO), which fills two important functions in imple- menting the ESA in the Klamath basin: it provides money for research on the status of suckers in the upper basin, ancI it reviews USBR's biological assessments anti prepares the USFWS biological opinions for the Section 7(a)~2) consultations. In fulfilling these functions, it operates essentially as a regulatory agency ancI couicI be viewed as an adversary to regulatecI parties (in this case, USBR ancI the irrigators in the Klamath Project). It also funcis "restoration activities anti practices" as part of the recovery program for the listecI species. The activities anti practices may leacI to changes in lancI-use patterns on private lancis in support of the sucker-recovery efforts. The ERO serves as both a regulator ancI a funding agency; it is staffed primarily by USFWS personnel. It apparently cloes not effectively monitor ancI evaluate the success of its restoration actions. As noted earlier in this chapter, monitoring ancI evaluation are the most critical components of
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION 34 aciaptive management for measuring the success of any ecosystem-restora- tion effort ancI incorporating new knowlecige into the management process. In fact, USFWS ancI the ERO clo not appear to have an operational recovery plan for the two sucker species (Chapter 91. The unclerlying presumption of ERO managers appears to be that ex- pencliture of money by the ERO on selectecI restoration actions is an accept- able measure of performance. In this regard, the ERO functions in a man- ner similar to that of many fecleral ancI state agencies in the basin that mistake input for output when evaluating their performance. Fecleral ancI state emergency funding to assist farmers ancI agencies in 2001 was well intenclecI but only exacerbated the problem of accountabil- ity. Similarly, the recent farm bill legislation that earmarked $50 million specifically for the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (NRCS 2003J ancI similar U.S. Department of Agriculture programs in the basin raises the issue of accountability in the absence of any central plan for recovery of the suckers. It is clear that the present level of emergency ancI supplemental funding for the basin may not be sustainable. Managers, therefore, neecI to have mechanisms in place to ensure that such funcis, when available, are achieving the goals of the ESA recovery plans or, where appropriate, are being spent effectively in assisting stakehoiclers as they acljust to the conse- quences of the ESA. Management of species in the I(lamath basin shouicI have two goals: maintenance ancI recovery of listecI species ancI, among the actions that meet this objective, minimization of cost to society. The first goal is man- ciatecI by the ESA; the second is not the main objective of the ESA but is consistent with it (Chapter 91. The present management system in the I(la- math basin is not icleal for reaching either goal. If institutional deficiencies in the I(lamath basin couicI be remecliecI, the likelihoocI of achieving the recovery of species ancI minimizing costs wouicI increase. The clesign of research shouicI begin with a broacI set of objectives ancI scientific hypotheses; such breadth may require information from sources beyond local agencies ancI their supporting scientists ancI staff. The strong focus on water levels in Upper I(lamath Lake ancI flows in the main stem, although driven by a clesire to clear with issues over which the fecleral agencies have immediate control (through USER operations), is indicative of an excessively narrow consideration of possibilities for restoration at the expense of other activities ancI solutions that may be effective over the long term. Furthermore, locations of restoration activities ancI their effects on water quality ancI habitat shouicI be consiclerecI in the acquisition of lancI or other major investments. The assignment of priorities shouicI recognize budgetary limitations of the agencies ancI others. Estimation of the cost effectiveness of restoration efforts is neeclecI, as are the integrated monitor- ing ancI assessment programs to evaluate them.
342 FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN Management requires external oversight by a committee or group ca- pable of resolving conflicts between fecleral agencies. There appears to have been closer collaboration between USBR, USFWS, anti NMFS in clevelop- ing their most recent biological assessment anti biological opinions than in previous years (Chapter 1), perhaps in response to external review. There is no guarantee, however, that such collaboration will continue anti some mechanism shouicI be in place for coordination of fecleral management efforts. For example, such a management role couicI be playecI by the Com- mittee on Environment anti Natural Resources of the National Science anti Technology Council; this committee of the executive branch was founclecI for such purposes. At the same time that there is neecI for oversight of fecleral agencies, the management structure for ecosystem restoration neecis to involve local groups anti private lanclowners as well in the clesign of restoration activities anti investments. As a part of these efforts, fecleral management agencies shouicI recognize the nature of incentives in the ESA for private lanclowners to participate in ecosystem recovery. Specifically, the ESA may prohibit taking of enciangerecI species by private lanclowners; it cloes not contain provisions that encourage lanclowners to increase the abundance of fish populations. IncleecI, lanclowners who increase popula- tions of enciangerecI species on their lancI may face increased government regulation. Thus, although the ESA cloes not prohibit the use of incentives that wouicI encourage lanclowners to promote the welfare of enciangerecI species, it is often viewed by lanclowners as more stick than carrot. This perception couicI be changed by cooperative arrangements that promote the welfare of the listecI species without threatening lanclowners. Third, the management structure shouicI, through monitoring anti eval- uation, improve the efficiency of expenditures for both research anti resto- ration activities. That requires better mechanisms for setting spending pri- orities. Research demonstrates that cumulative effects are typical of stream restoration anti that threshoicis for recovery require implementation of cor- rective measures on a geographically broacI scale (Aciams et al. 1993, Li et al. 1994, Wu et al. 20001. The present pattern of fecleral, state, anti private lancI acquisition for restoration in the upper I(lamath basin shows little evidence of being guiclecI by any systematic plan. The process-orientecI issues clescribecI above can be aciciressecI by use of the aciaptive-management framework, subject to the limitations imposed by the ESA. The I(lamath River Basin Restoration Task Force (I(RBRTF) or some other broacIly constituted group may be a logical starting point in cleveloping anti implementing a set of basinwicle restoration activities. At a minimum, an aciaptive management approach, whether through an existing group or through a new entity, wouicI aciciress current shortcomings that arise from a lack of clearly clefinecI benchmarks anti a failure to monitor the biological anti economic efficiency of current expenditures. The use of
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION 343 external advisory groups or panels for oversight wouicI also provide fresh perspective ancI perhaps recluce some of the tensions anti distrust inherent in the current system. CONCLUSIONS The listing agencies for enciangerecI ancI threatened species in the I(la- math basin accept aciaptive management as a principle for pursuing restora- tion of these species, as cloes USBR. Even so, working examples of aciaptive management in the upper I(lamath basin are virtually absent. Erratic funcI- ing, lack of recovery plans, absence of systematic external review of re- search, anti other deficiencies having to clo with lack of continuity have been the clirect cause of deficiencies in aciaptive management. Adaptive management is an icleal approach for the I(lamath basin inso- far as the effects of specific actions intenclecI to benefit the enciangerecI anti threatened species cannot be evaluatecI fully except on a conclitional trial basis. Conclitional trials require thoughtful design anti organized monitor- ing that will reveal responses to management actions. Efforts to implement ESA requirements for the benefit of fishes in the I(lamath basin cannot succeed without aggressive pursuit of aciaptive management principles, which in turn require continuity, master planning, flexibility, anti conscien- tious evaluation of the outcomes of management.