Marine Salvage Capabilities: Responding to Terrorist Attacks in U.S. Ports — Actions to Improve Readiness (2004)

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1Federal officials and industry leaders have recentlyfocused national attention on the security of U.S.seaports and posed serious questions about how best to prevent future terrorist incidents in and around these facilities. Equally important, however, are ques- tions about U.S. capabilities to respond adequately to a terrorist incident should one occur. Ports and water- ways are vital to the nation’s economic well-being, and the closure of major harbors would have an enormous impact on both commercial and military operations. The response to such incidents would involve many government agencies and organizations at the federal, state, and local levels. With this in mind, the U.S. Navy Office of the Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SupSalv) asked the National Academies’ Marine Board within the Transportation Research Board to convene a workshop of marine transportation and sal- vage professionals as well as organizational stakehold- ers in government and industry. The workshop was designed to explore and evaluate current capabilities to respond to terrorist incidents in major U.S. seaports and to report on the current readiness posture and strategies to improve deficiencies. Given the current elevated threat level, the restruc- turing of parts of the federal government with the estab- lishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and variations in response missions of different federal agencies,1 it is timely to consider whether U.S. marine salvage capabilities are adequate for responding to terrorist-related incidents. It is critical that ports and waterways be kept open to provide services with mini- mal interruption. If a terrorist-related or other incident results in the blockage of a harbor or waterway, clear- ance of the channel, waterway, or harbor, or all three, will be a major focus of the response efforts. In addi- tion, many other issues, such as organizational and interagency coordination, must be addressed, especially if there are human casualties and public health impacts. The principal goals of the workshop were to share information among participants concerning current marine salvage response capabilities and to determine if there are major gaps or concerns regarding the current capabilities and agency roles. Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has given increased emphasis to maritime homeland security to reflect its leadership role in that mission area while continuing to have responsibility for maritime safety, protection of natural resources, maritime mobility, and national defense (e.g., ports and waterways security). Thus, for maritime incidents such as collisions, groundings, and shipboard fires, USCG usually takes the federal lead responsibility for response. If salvage response is needed, USCG typi- cally relies on the responsible party to provide com- mercial salvage capability. In the absence of adequate action by the responsible party, as well as in any case Executive Summary 1 The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and other agencies within DHS, the Navy, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Maritime Administration (MARAD), the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).

requiring salvage expertise, USCG calls upon the Navy for salvage assistance. Traditionally, the Navy has been the federal agency that maintains the ability to respond to maritime acci- dents requiring professional marine salvage services. SupSalv was established to meet military needs for maritime salvage and underwater search operations, and that remains its primary mission. To meet its responsibilities, SupSalv augments the Navy’s internal resources through competitive long-term contracts with commercial salvors to provide additional assets, personnel, and cutting-edge technology as needed. Because of its unique capabilities and recognized expertise in the field, SupSalv also has the discretionary authority, under the Salvage Facilities Act (P.L. 80-513, 10 U.S.C. Sections 7361-–7367), to provide and pro- mote domestic marine salvage facilities and capabilities for private-sector as well as public-sector vessels. The Navy’s ability to exercise that authority with respect to the private sector has been, and continues to be, con- strained by budgetary considerations and shrinking internal salvage resources. In 1982, the Marine Board conducted a comprehen- sive study of U.S. salvage needs and capabilities and published Marine Salvage in the United States. This report was followed by a 1994 Marine Board report, A Reassessment of the Marine Salvage Posture of the United States, which describes the Navy’s salvage resources and its contribution to the nation’s salvage capabilities. The overall organization of the Navy’s sal- vage mission has remained much the same since 1994, but there has been a continuing decline in the number of vessels and other resources. In addition, the 1994 report found that there is not enough marine salvage business to support a commercial salvage industry solely dedicated to traditional salvage work, and that reality continues today. Since the 1994 study, substan- tial changes have occurred in public and private sal- vage capabilities as well as in public expectations for the nation’s ability to respond to major incidents at sea. The major U.S. salvage companies recently formed the American Salvage Association (ASA) with the intent of agreeing to and defining joint interests of salvors for representation before federal agencies and the general public. In summary, there has been no significant increase in the number of domestic salvage vessels or their capabil- ities in recent years. Although marine casualties in U.S. waters are at a historically low rate, recent events— notably the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States and the attack on the USS Cole in the Port of Yemen—suggest that issues relating to national salvage capability have importance not only in terms of transportation, economic, and environmental concerns but also for homeland security. THE WORKSHOP The Workshop on Marine Salvage Response Capability, held at the National Academies on August 5–6, 2003, brought together experts in salvage response, govern- ment officials responsible for incident response, and rep- resentatives of stakeholder organizations. During the workshop, the role of salvage and the response to poten- tial terrorist incidents affecting U.S. ports and waterways were discussed, including the issue of organizational and interagency coordination. Specifically addressed were physical salvage and harbor clearance issues; financial, economic, and political issues; legal, forensic, and human casualty issues; and environmental issues. Before the workshop, the Committee for Marine Salvage Response Capability developed two scenarios involving terrorist incidents through a process of inter- views with experts and industry officials familiar with these ports and their vulnerabilities. At the beginning of the workshop, the committee introduced the partici- pants to the results of the hypothetical maritime terror- ist scenarios, which were developed for the purpose of exploring and testing salvage response capabilities— one in the Port of Houston, Texas, and the other in the Port of New Orleans, Louisiana. The committee made assumptions concerning what determined terrorists with sufficient assets could accomplish. The two ports selected are major, world-class commercial shipping complexes—both along the U.S. Gulf Coast—handling significant international and domestic waterborne com- merce. The Port of Houston is the second largest in the United States by tonnage carried and conducts a major trade in petroleum, chemicals, and other hazardous car- goes with large refineries and petrochemical plants along the waterway. The Port of New Orleans and other ports along the Mississippi River from Baton Rouge south handle more combined tonnage than any other U.S. port and accommodate a huge variety of large ocean-going ships, barges, tugs, and other vessels. The hypothetical scenario for Houston concerned a terrorist attack causing a collision between a cruise ship and a chemical tanker. Both vessels were sunk and were blocking the Houston ship channel. The chemical tanker exploded and the result was mass conflagration with a spill of an unknown mix and quantity of haz- ardous chemicals. The passenger ship was carrying 2,100 passengers plus crew. It became engulfed in fire, was flooded, and suffered an unknown number of human casualties. The prevailing winds carried a cloud of toxic chemical vapors and smoke from the collision site toward the city of Houston. The hypothetical incident for New Orleans resulted from a terrorist-caused explosion aboard a product tanker and sinking of the vessel in the Mississippi River, the disabling of the Algiers locks in the Gulf 2 M A R I N E S A LVA G E C A P A B I L I T I E S

Intracoastal Waterway (GICW), and the destruction of a state highway bridge across the Mississippi River. The product tanker was sunk across the river blocking the channel at Southwest Pass, and the GICW and Mississippi River were blocked at New Orleans because of the disabled locks and destruction of the bridge. There was a mass conflagration on the product tanker. After discussing these incidents, designated workshop participants divided into two panels—one government and one industry. These panels assessed likely salvage responses. The first panel included representatives of key federal agencies with authority and responsibility to respond to these types of incidents and specifically their marine salvage component. These panel members dis- cussed their anticipated overall salvage response and iden- tified their respective agency’s role in such an incident. They also described existing procedures for managing and implementing a coordinated response and providing the needed resources. The salvage industry panel first com- mented on the salvage problem presented and then dis- cussed the expected salvage response drawing on their knowledge and experience. At the end of the panel presentations, a general dis- cussion was held with questions or comments from the entire workshop. The results of these panel discussions set the stage for more detailed discussions with four breakout groups: (a) physical salvage and harbor clear- ance issues; (b) financial, economic, and political issues; (c) legal, forensic, and human casualty issues; and (d) environmental issues. Each of the four breakout groups used the informa- tion presented in plenary sessions to discuss the sce- nario results, responses, and likely impacts from their perspective. A moderator in each group summarized the results of the group discussions and presented it to the full workshop. Each group prepared a final summary of discussions including the participants’ views as to what the most useful next steps might be. A final plenary ses- sion gave all participants an opportunity to comment on each group’s results and offer other observations. The committee used these workshop results to prepare these proceedings, which include summaries of each group’s discussion, overall observations about the key issues, and committee recommendations for actions that the responsible agencies should take to improve future marine salvage readiness to respond to seaport terrorist incidents. Workshop participants considered the adequacy of salvage assets to respond to the hypothetical scenarios. Although many participants from the salvage industry believed that past performance on marine salvage prob- lems of similar magnitude shows that the industry has the needed capabilities, the question could only be addressed in a very general way given the time and lim- ited information available for the workshop. Perhaps a more pressing question was whether necessary capabili- ties will be maintained into the future given the nature of the industry and the overall business climate. Workshop participants, including experienced members of the marine salvage community, were not able to iden- tify specifically the existing physical capabilities that would be available to government responders and plan- ners for the hypothetical scenarios. Consequently, they were not able to provide an anticipated time frame for response, which is a critical component of readiness pos- ture. It is clear that physical salvage capabilities in the United States have not been documented and evaluated in sufficient detail to define whether the nation has an adequate readiness posture for responding to terrorist incidents in major seaports. The status of organizational capabilities2 for ade- quate salvage response was also addressed at the work- shop. Many participants believed that readiness in this area is improving but needs sustained attention in the future. A number of areas were discussed in which sal- vage input to the planning process could be enhanced for the purpose of improving readiness and the ability to deploy and utilize salvage assets when needed to respond to terrorist incidents. Several specific sugges- tions were offered for modifying ongoing planning efforts with homeland security initiatives. The workshop participants considered whether fur- ther tests and evaluations would help address remain- ing questions about the U.S. readiness posture. Whether the nation has adequate salvage resources, capabilities, and organizational structures to respond to a major terrorist incident in U.S. seaports remains an open question, particularly considering the magni- tude of economic and social impacts that might occur. The participants discussed the value of conducting drills and exercises as a method of more specifically evaluating capabilities and identifying needs. These exercises were considered a useful step to evaluate more completely where improvements in salvage readi- ness would bring concrete results. Both tabletop and field exercises have been used in similar fashions and could be designed specifically to answer questions about salvage assets as well as organizational issues. Also addressed at the workshop were a number of other issues of concern to the marine salvage commu- nity and those responsible for planning and managing salvage response. Participants identified unresolved reg- ulatory and policy issues that could affect the ability of government and industry to maintain an acceptable readiness posture. These issues included questions 3E X E C U T I V E S U M M A RY 2 Organizational capabilities are defined as the makeup and capabil- ities of intra- and interagency planning groups, the adequacy of response plans, the expertise of the planners and responders, and the methods of implementing response actions when needed.

about funding, liability, planning processes, and proto- cols for addressing impacts not directly a part of salvage but having an effect on salvage operations. All of these issues could not be covered during the time given for the workshop. Therefore, these issues remain an impor- tant aspect of future work to improve capabilities within the government and private sector. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The workshop discussions and the results of each breakout group’s consideration of the questions posed focused on two general areas of concern regarding capabilities—physical capabilities and organizational capabilities. Although discussions about responses to hypothetical scenarios were not detailed enough to highlight the need to obtain or maintain specific phys- ical assets, they did provide an overall sense that, although U.S. commercial salvage capabilities are sig- nificant, more work is required to define the physical assets and organizational competency necessary to meet a terrorist threat. In reviewing the workshop results, the committee concludes that further work in four areas is necessary to improve the nation’s readi- ness posture regarding marine salvage capabilities: (a) maintaining an inventory and evaluation of available physical salvage assets, (b) conducting tabletop exer- cises to test physical and organizational readiness pos- ture, (c) improving salvage expertise and input to the planning and response networks, and (d) conducting further study of related legal, regulatory, and policy issues. The committee’s recommended next steps in these four areas are described in more detail in the following sections. Inventory of Marine Salvage Assets Because the workshop did not have the time or resources to conduct a comprehensive review of phys- ical assets in the marine salvage industry and the rele- vant government agencies, definitive conclusions about readiness were not possible. In addition, many workshop participants believed that specific answers to questions about the adequacy of response or readi- ness are very dependent on the specifics of the incident and are difficult to generalize. Nevertheless, the com- mittee believes that response planners need to have access to an inventory of salvage assets maintained by responsible government agencies and the salvage industry and that a gap analysis—an assessment of salvage needs compared with available assets—should be conducted, taking into account the need for timely response. Therefore, the committee makes the following rec- ommendations: • SupSalv, in consultation with USCG and the com- mercial salvage industry, should maintain an inventory of available marine salvage and firefighting assets. The inventory should be updated at regular intervals with sufficient frequency to maintain current information. • SupSalv should conduct a series of gap analyses by comparing available assets with those required to respond effectively to a range of potential marine ter- rorist activities as well as other major marine salvage incidents. The analyses should consider all critical sal- vage response measures including rescue towing, harbor and channel clearing, dredging, search and recovery, patching and refloating of vessels, and marine firefight- ing. The adequacy of anticipated response times on a regional basis should be included in the gap analyses. • The USCG should promulgate final rules for ves- sel response plans as soon as is practical to provide nec- essary guidance on effective response times for salvage operations. • If the gap analyses show that current marine sal- vage assets are insufficient to respond to plausible ter- rorist threats in U.S. seaports and waterways, responsible federal agencies should consider revising the existing national salvage policy to provide for the necessary salvage capability in the future. Marine Salvage Response Exercises The committee believes that a logical next step in eval- uating marine salvage readiness is to conduct detailed exercises using plausible terrorist incidents, the realistic complements of response systems and equipment, and the complete response organizational structure. Such an exercise would be designed to assess the U.S. readiness posture in the event of a terrorist act affecting U.S. har- bors and waterways with a particular focus on the marine salvage component. Specifically, the committee recommends the following: The responsible federal agencies should plan and conduct a high-level tabletop salvage response exer- cise. Participants in the exercise should be senior members from the relevant agencies and private orga- nizations who are capable of making the decisions necessary to ensure proper responses. The exercise could follow scenarios similar to those used in the workshop. The exercise should be carefully planned and led by an experienced facilitator. Additional exer- cises should follow the first for the purpose of testing different scenarios in different locations. Responsible agencies should conduct a supplemental exercise utilizing the same scenarios as those for the high- 4 M A R I N E S A LVA G E C A P A B I L I T I E S

level tabletop exercise to test the interactions necessary to identify and mobilize the salvage assets necessary to clear harbors and channels so that the ports can be reopened in the most efficient fashion. This exercise should include representatives from the Navy, the salvage industry, and other related stakeholders. In addition, individual agencies should conduct their own exercises, designed to test the responses necessary to support the opening of the port or ports in the most efficient manner. An example would be an exercise con- ducted by the FBI to determine the most efficient han- dling of the crime scene, thereby allowing clearance operations to proceed in a timely fashion. Other agen- cies might include USACE, USCG, NSTB, and local fire and police departments, among others. Public affairs specialists from the various federal entities participating in the exercises should also be involved. Such a procedure would acquaint public affairs specialists with salvage efforts and should pre- pare them to handle the myriad public affairs challenges in an actual salvage operation. Salvage Response Organizational Structures The committee considered the results of workshop dis- cussions and concerns about how existing organiza- tional structures are implemented within the responsible federal agencies and how these organizations receive and utilize expertise and advice about marine salvage opera- tions and capabilities. The committee concluded that response readiness could be significantly enhanced by improved interagency coordination. Organizational structures need to be revised at several levels in order to include salvage expertise in both planning and response operations. Specifically, the committee has the following recommendations: • The membership of the Secretary of Homeland Security’s National Maritime Security Advisory Committee should be modified to include a marine salvage expert. • The Coast Guard Director of Homeland Security should develop a liaison position with SupSalv. • The structure of the National Response Plan should provide for the inclusion of salvage expertise in the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Legislative, Regulatory, and Policy Issues The workshop participants identified a number of unre- solved legislative, regulatory, and policy issues associ- ated with marine salvage operations resulting from terrorist acts. The committee noted that marine salvage companies are not guaranteed immunity during response operations and thus there is the potential for civil or criminal liability if pollution incidents occur during salvage operations. Industry participants believed that this potential is a serious disincentive for salvors to undertake some salvage operations. Other participants were concerned that there are inadequate funding methods in place to cover effective salvage response resulting from terrorist attacks. A number of funding options could be explored, including expansion of existing systems or development of new ones pat- terned after successful funding mechanisms that are now in place. Workshop participants, noting the use of “standby” salvage in other parts of the world, discussed the potential for increased use of standby salvage capa- bility as a mechanism to fill the gap in salvage capacity in the United States and to ensure timely response in emergency situations. Another issue identified by workshop participants was the absence of a process for designating places of refuge or safe havens when a vessel has experienced serious damage. Past experience has shown that this deficiency can present a critical obstacle to effective sal- vage operations. Some issues were also identified in the workshop that relate to topics other than salvage but affect the conduct of salvage operations. For example, environmental impacts and public health considera- tions need to be an integral part of any crisis manage- ment decision-making process. Participants noted that a protocol for addressing public health impacts of a ter- rorist event or consequent salvage operations is not clearly defined and that this lack contributes to the potential vulnerability of the public during a terrorist event. In addition, the absence of a protocol for addressing human casualties in maritime incidents could result in potential confusion over jurisdiction and logistics for effectively addressing decedent affairs. Because these policy issues need to be resolved before salvage response readiness can be ensured, the commit- tee recommends that a study of outstanding legal, regu- latory, and policy issues be conducted to determine how best to address the following concerns: • The development of an appropriate process within the emergency response organizations to fund adequately salvage operations resulting from a terrorist event; • The development of a process to designate places of refuge or safe havens for the conduct of salvage operations; • A perceived need for responder immunity and consequent civil liability for nonnegligent salvage oper- ations that result in pollution or other unintended or unavoidable damages; • The establishment of a protocol for addressing public health impacts of a terrorist event or consequent salvage operations; 5E X E C U T I V E S U M M A RY

• The establishment of a protocol for addressing human casualties and decedent affairs for maritime casualties; and • The establishment of standby salvage capability in some particularly vulnerable and busy port and harbor. 6 M A R I N E S A LVA G E C A P A B I L I T I E S