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2 8 Committee Recommendations to Improve Salvage Readiness The United States has considerable capabilities torespond to a terrorist attack on major seaports.Physical assets and professional personnel are available within responsible federal agencies or can be readily mobilized from the private sector, and organiza- tional capabilities are in place or under active develop- ment within the new homeland security infrastructure. Nevertheless, the committee concludes from the evi- dence presented that more needs to be done to retain confidence that the United States will continue to have an adequate readiness posture. These needs arise from the fact that terrorist threats are complex and could have widespread impacts and the fact that detailed assessments of marine salvage response readiness have not been conducted. In addition, little attention has been given to com- prehensive training or drills involving the myriad gov- ernment and industry entities that are necessary for a major marine salvage operation (NRC 1994, 1997). For example, salvage and marine firefighting companies in the United States have had a proven track record over the last 20 years. Response has generally been timely and effective, although some recent events sug- gest that rapid response could be enhanced if more salvage-capable tugs and other major equipment were available. Nevertheless, a complete inventory of salvage assets that have access to U.S. waters is not currently available and such an inventory is vital to fully assess needs. An inventory could be used to allocate salvage assets in the event of a major incident. It also could pro- vide the basis for a needed gap analysis that would match available assets with needs. With regard to organizational readiness, there is a need to more completely address salvage response plans and to upgrade the organizations that implement them. For example, in the case of incidents like those described in this workshop, existing plans would be implemented under the Initial National Response Plan. Although sal- vage would be a critical function to reestablish use of a navigation channel, no formal consideration of salvage needs and capabilities exists as any part of the existing planning process, nor do salvors or the U.S. Navy Office of the Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SupSalv) take any formal part in that process. There is currently a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking dealing with salvage and firefighting planning requirements for tankers trad- ing in the United States, but no other requirement for salvage contingency planning exists. To address deficiencies in the current organizational readiness posture, the committee endorses the need to carry out a series of comprehensive exercises or drills that would identify problems that can only be under- stood partially with existing data. For example, the complexities of coping with the aftermath of any ter- rorist attack are daunting, and the economic impact of closing a port or ports will only compound those com- plexities. Terrorist attacks can be coordinated to affect more than one port, can cause extreme damage, or can simply close a vital shipping channel. The planning to enable a response effort flexible enough to address dif- ferent scenarios in different geographic locations must therefore be diligently pursued, particularly since there are myriad agencies and organizations involved. The conduct of carefully planned exercises and drills has
proved to be extremely helpful in the past for preparing for similar disaster response. The necessity to hold exercises or drills emerged from much of the workshop discussions. The problems of initiating interagency actions necessary to coordi- nate, assess, and handle the aftermath of the closings of major ports can best be understood by exercises or drills involving the relevant local and national organi- zations. In particular, the issues involved in the mobi- lization of the proper salvage and harbor clearance resources might also be best understood by well- planned exercises. Different scenarios involving differ- ent geographic locations can be included in the exercises to determine the type of salvage assets needed and to identify mobilization needs. Exercises will be most productive if they are conducted to allow interac- tion at two levels: one to enable all relevant agencies to interact and the other to allow detailed interactions to assess the issues involved with supporting aspects such as the mobilization of the proper salvage assets to restore port traffic in the most efficient fashion. The workshop discussions and the results of each groupâs consideration of the questions posed focused on two general areas of concern regarding capabilities, both physical and organizational. Although discussions were not specific enough to highlight the need to obtain or maintain specific assets, they suggest that more work is needed to accurately define the extent of both physi- cal assets and the organizational competency to meet a terrorist threat. The committee reviewed the workshop results and concluded that several key steps could address a num- ber of unanswered questions and improve the nationâs readiness posture regarding marine salvage capabilities. These key action items are (a) maintaining an inventory and evaluation of available physical salvage assets, (b) conducting tabletop exercises to test the physical and organizational response readiness posture, (c) revising organizational structures to include salvage expertise and input in both planning and response operations, (d) and conducting further study of related legal, regula- tory, and policy issues. The committeeâs recommended next steps in these four areas are described in more detail in the following sections. INVENTORY OF SALVAGE ASSETS Because the committee did not have the time or resources to conduct a comprehensive review of physi- cal assets in the salvage industry and the relevant gov- ernment agencies, conclusions about readiness lacked good documentation. In addition, many workshop par- ticipants believed that any answers to questions about the adequacy of response or readiness were very depen- dent on specific assumptions about the incident and the need for specific capabilities. Therefore, the committee concluded that it would be highly valuable for response planners to have access to an inventory of salvage assets that would be maintained for reference by the responsi- ble agencies and the salvage industry. In addition, the committee concluded that a gap analysis should be pre- pared to assess salvage needs and compare them with available assets, taking into account the need for timely response. Specific committee recommendations are as follows: ⢠SupSalv, in consultation with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the commercial salvage industry, should maintain an inventory of available salvage and marine firefighting assets. The inventory should be updated at regular intervals with sufficient frequency to maintain current information. ⢠SupSalv should conduct a series of gap analyses by comparing available assets with those required to respond effectively to a range of potential terrorist activities as well as to other major salvage incidents. The analyses should consider all critical salvage response measures including rescue towing, harbor and channel clearing, dredging, search and recovery, patch- ing and refloating of vessels, and marine firefighting. The adequacy of anticipated response times on a regional basis should be included in the gap analyses. ⢠USCG should promulgate final rules for Vessel Response Plans as soon as practical to provide neces- sary guidance on effective response times for salvage operations. ⢠If the gap analyses show that current salvage assets are insufficient to respond to plausible terrorist threats in U.S. seaports and waterways, responsible federal agen- cies should consider revising the existing national salvage policy to provide for the necessary salvage capability in the future. The committee believes that the inventory and gap analyses are necessary first steps in an overall process of readiness enhancement. The workshop discussions showed that only general observations are possible with the current level of knowledge about specific assets, and it is difficult to move beyond these generalizations with- out concerted efforts to prepare an inventory and match it against needs. MARINE SALVAGE RESPONSE EXERCISES The committee concluded that a logical next step to eval- uate marine salvage readiness more completely and accu- rately would be to conduct detailed exercises incorporating plausible terrorist incidents, the entire 2 9C O M M I T T E E R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S T O I M P R O V E S A LVA G E R E A D I N E S S
complement of response systems and equipment, and the total response organizational structure. Such exercises would be designed to assess U.S. salvage readiness pos- ture in the event of a terrorist act affecting U.S. harbors and waterways. Specific committee recommendations are as follows: ⢠Responsible federal agencies should plan and con- duct a high-level tabletop salvage response exercise. Participants in the exercise should be senior members from the relevant agencies and private organizations who are capable of making the decisions necessary to ensure proper responses. The exercise could follow scenarios similar to those used in the workshop. The exercise should be carefully planned and led by an experienced facilitator. Additional exercises should follow the first for the purpose of testing different scenarios in different geographic locations. ⢠Responsible agencies should conduct a supplemen- tal exercise utilizing the same scenarios as the high-level tabletop exercise to test the interactions necessary to identify and mobilize the salvage assets necessary to clear harbors and channels so that the ports can be reopened in the most efficient fashion. This exercise should include representatives from the Navy, the salvage industry, and other related stakeholders. ⢠In addition, individual agencies should conduct their own exercises designed to test the responses nec- essary to support the opening of the port or ports in the most efficient manner. An example would be an exer- cise conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to determine the most efficient handling of the crime scene so that clearance operations could proceed in a timely fashion. Other agencies might include the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, USCG, National Transportation Safety Board, and local fire and police departments, among others. ⢠Public affairs specialists from the various federal entities participating in the exercises should also be involved. Such a procedure would acquaint public affairs specialists with salvage efforts and should pre- pare them to handle the myriad public affairs challenges in an actual salvage operation. REVISION OF SALVAGE RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES The committee considered the workshop discussions and concerns voiced about how existing organizational structures are implemented within the responsible fed- eral agencies and how these organizations receive and utilize expertise and advice about marine salvage oper- ations and capabilities. The committee concluded that response readiness could be significantly enhanced by improving interagency coordination and agency plan- ning and comprehension of marine salvage work. The existing organizational structures need to be revised at several levels in order to include salvage expertise in both planning and response operations. The committee made the following specific recommendations: ⢠The membership of the Secretary of Homeland Securityâs National Maritime Security Advisory Com- mittee should be modified to include a marine salvage expert. ⢠The USCG Director of Homeland Security should develop a liaison position with the Supervisor of Salvage and Diving. ⢠The structure of the National Response Plan should provide for the inclusion of salvage expertise in the National Incident Management System (NIMS). STUDY OF LEGISLATIVE, REGULATORY, AND POLICY ISSUES Finally, the committee recommends that further study of certain important policy issues is critical to main- taining an adequate readiness posture. The workshop participants identified a number of unresolved legisla- tive, regulatory, and policy issues associated with sal- vage operations resulting from terrorist attacks. The committee noted that marine salvage companies are not guaranteed immunity during response operations and thus there is potential for civil or criminal liability if pollution incidents occur during salvage operations. Many industry participants believed that this potential liability is a serious disincentive for salvors to undertake some salvage operations. Concern was also expressed that adequate funding methods are not in place to cover an effective salvage response to terrorist attacks. A number of funding options could be explored, including expansion of existing sys- tems or development of new ones patterned after success- ful funding mechanisms that are now in place. Workshop participants, noting the use of standby salvage in other parts of the world, discussed the potential for increased use of standby salvage capability as a mechanism to fill the gap in salvage capacity in the United States and to ensure timely response in emergency situations. Another issue identified by workshop participants was the absence of a process for designating places of refuge or safe havens for the conduct of salvage operations. Past experience has shown that this lack can present a critical obstacle to effective salvage actions. Some issues identi- fied in the workshop relate to topics other than salvage but have an effect on the conduct of salvage operations. For example, environmental impacts and public health considerations need to be an integral part of any crisis 3 0 M A R I N E S A LVA G E C A P A B I L I T I E S
management decision-making process. Participants noted that a protocol for addressing public health impacts of a terrorist incident or consequent salvage operations is not clearly defined and this deficiency con- tributes to the potential vulnerability of the public during a terrorist incident. In addition, the absence of a protocol for addressing human casualties in maritime incidents could result in potential confusion over jurisdiction and logistics for the effective handling of decedent affairs. Because these policy issues need to be resolved before salvage response readiness can be ensured, the commit- tee recommends that a study of outstanding legal, regu- latory, and policy issues be conducted to determine how best to address the following concerns: ⢠The development of an appropriate process within the emergency response organizations to fund adequately salvage operations resulting from a terrorist incident; ⢠The development of a process to designate places of refuge or safe havens in which to conduct salvage operations; ⢠The potential need for responder immunity and consequent civil liability for nonnegligent salvage oper- ations that result in pollution or other unintended or unavoidable damages; ⢠The establishment of a protocol for addressing pub- lic health impacts of a terrorist incident or consequent salvage operations; ⢠The establishment of a protocol for addressing human casualties and decedent affairs for maritime incidents; and ⢠The establishment of standby salvage capability in some particularly vulnerable and busy port and harbor areas. REFERENCES NRC National Research Council NRC. 1994. A Reassessment of the Marine Salvage Posture of the United States. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. NRC. 1997. Marine Board Roundtable on Search and Recovery of Air Crashes at Sea. A Summary of Meeting Discussions including Key Issues and Questions Related to Future Needs. Washington, D.C. 3 1C O M M I T T E E R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S T O I M P R O V E S A LVA G E R E A D I N E S S
