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1 Introduction Thirty years ago, U.S.-flag commercial vessels typically went to sea with crews of more than 40 persons. Today, much larger U.S.-flag vessels depart on foreign voyages with crews of about 20. Many modern foreign vessels sail with crews in the middle to low teens. These reductions in manning levels reflect more than a century of gradual technical and organizational change. Sail gave way to steam, and steam has largely given way to diesel propulsion. Ship designers and builders have automated and mechanized many shipboard systems, adopted more durable coatings and paints, shifted some maintenance and cargo-handling duties to shore-based personnel, and made other transitions toward more efficient manning. In the United States, these innovations have involved the Coast Guard directly in setting manning levels in the past two decades. In the past each vessel's Coast Guard-issued Certificate of Inspection (COI) specified the minimum deck, engine, and radio complements necessary for safe navigation. In practice, ships typically carried up to twice the minimum required crew members, through collective bargaining between companies and their unions. With the advent of diesel propulsion, automation, and other labor-saving measures in the late 1960s, labor-management contracts began to settle on the COI requirements as minimum manning scales. Thus, Coast Guard manning decisions are taking on ever greater significance. These changes are far from having run their course. Ship technology is developing at an accelerating pace throughout the world. The accompa- nying organizational innovations in the past few years have gone beyond straightforward crew reductions in some nations to reorganizations of crews 1
2 CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFEI} and reallocation of tasks. The traditional division of crews into deck and engine departments, for example, is fading, as owners and operators seek to make the most efficient use of labor and new technology. In general, improved operating economics is the objective. Technolog- ical improvements, including automation, have resulted in improved fuel efficiency, higher reliability, and lower labor costs. In pursuing cost compet- itiveness, however, the U.S. merchant marine has been faced with foreign competition that has been even more intent on reducing crews. European and Asian operators have led the way for several decades. Europeans undertook the first major postwar crew reductions in response to labor shortages during the worldwide shipping expansion of the 1960s and early 1970s. More reductions came in the 1980s, as a globally depressed shipping market drove operators in many countries often with the aid of govern- ment research and development programs to cut costs and streamline operations by further automating ships. In the 1970s and 1980s, operators in Japan, Taiwan, and other Asian nations became leaders in applying ship technology and reducing crews. In that sense, this report does not address a new concept. Many tech- nological and organizational innovations now being examined in the United States have been tested thoroughly by other nations' fleets. Comparable progress in the United States, however, has been inhibited by a traditional lack of coordinated and shared effort on the parts of government, industry, and labor. It is not possible to approach optimization of manning without a realistic collaboration involving these three sectors. Nonetheless, the progress that has been made in the United States clearly demonstrates, albeit on a limited basis, what can be achieved. One emerging problem is the legal and regulatory framework of U.S. shipping. Unlike other statutes, those applying to the manning of ships lack a broad statement of regulatory purpose or policy that can be in- terpreted by regulators as technology advances and socioeconomic goals change. Instead, they specify manning practices based on outmoded ship- board divisions of labor (such as the increasingly obsolescent distinction between deck and engine departments) and watch-keeping practices (such as the requirement to employ enough personnel to keep three watches in traditional watch-keeping positions, even though most engine department personnel no longer stand watches). These requirements limit the effi- ciency with which shipboard labor can be used, without providing the safety assurance that is the purpose of regulation. Many nations have revised their manning statutes and regulations to accommodate these moves toward operating efficiency. Others, including the United States, have not. The result is that identical modern vessels may carry widely varying crew sizes depending on the flag they fly. Since the Coast Guard is responsible for ensuring that foreign-flag vessels do not
INTRODUCTION 3 present undue risks to U.S. ports and waterways, the agency is put in the anomalous position of permitting foreign vessels to enter U.S. ports with crews that would be illegal under U.S. safety regulations. To protect the environment and the safety of ships and seafarers, the Coast Guard should be authorized by law to update its regulatory practices. A regulatory framework that enforces half-century-old practices on a rapidly evolving industry can support neither safety nor competitiveness. Nor does it provide a rational basis for U.S. participation in international debate on manning practices. SAFETY CONCERNS Some operators, maritime labor unions, and regulators have voiced concerns that reductions in crews, if not managed properly, could degrade safety. Some believe maintenance is widely neglected. Others say fatigue- a perennial concern aboard ship has grown more widespread and more serious. Still others worry that the elimination of entry-level positions has degraded the skills of unlicensed crew members. These concerns, if substantiated, would be expected to manifest them- selves in increased accident rates, yet data to prove or disprove them are scarce. Available casualty and accident data bases are insufficient for firm judgments, and no full-scale statistical study of the problem has been done. As will be shown in Chapter 2, while rates of ship casualties and personnel injuries have declined steadily during the crew reductions of the past 20 years, the contribution of manning practices to this safety improvement is obscured by the fact that many new technological advances and safety requirements, with no bearing on manning, have occurred simultaneously. Anecdotal evidence of growing safety problems is compelling to many, but there is a lack of substantiating data to support or refute these perceptions. The methodical, step-by-step crew reductions of other nations' fleets, backed by years of experiment and analysis, lend confidence to the view that properly managed crew reductions need not compromise safety. Ilans- ferring that technology and operating practice to the U.S. maritime envi- ronment, however, will require comprehensive attention not only to the technology and personnel practices of the U.S.-flag fleet, but also to its regulatory and legal framework. MANNING REDUCTIONS IN THE WORLD'S FLEETS, 1950s-1980s Since World War II, several generations of vessels have been launched. Advances in automation, mechanization, and reallocation of crew members' responsibilities, have each permitted reductions in crew levels. All of these developments have been pioneered by Western European
4 CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY and Japanese operators, often with government assistance. The late 1950s saw containerization of cargo, and the late 1960s saw the first engine room automation; some engine room personnel were rendered redundant, while most of the rest were relieved of watch-standing responsibilities. The mid-1980s produced highly automated vessels like the products of the German "Ship of the Future" program: with propulsion, navigation, and communication controls centralized on the bridge; engine room layouts arranged for easy maintenance; and installation of a variety of automated safety equipment. These vessels were designed for crews as small as 11. (Those operating under the American flag, however, carry crews of 21.) In the late 1980s, European and Japanese governments supported even greater automation, centralizing navigation, engine control, commu- nications, and administrative functions on the bridge (which came to be called a "ship operation center"), and more mechanization and automa- tion throughout the vessel. Corresponding changes in crew members' job assignments were made in efforts to make the most effective use of both ship technology and labor. Table 1-1 compares the manning patterns of four representative gen- erations of ships, from the U.S.-flag steamship of the 1960s to the highly sophisticated Japanese "Pioneer" series. To illustrate the effect of current U.S. manning statutes and labor contracts, two manning scales are shown for the German "Ship of the Future," one for German-flag operation and the other for U.S.-flag operation. The First Generation Until the late 1960s, most ocean-going U.S.-flag cargo vessels were powered by steam and had separate engine and boiler rooms. The en- gine department on such a ship was typically manned by a chief engineer, a first assistant engineer, a second assistant engineer, three third assis- tant engineers, two electricians, three fire/watertenders, three oilers, and three wipers each standing three watches. Three licensed engineers, the fire/watertenders, and the oilers stood watches, four hours on and eight off, round the clock. The steward's department had seven to nine members. Food was purchased in bulk quantities sides of beef, bags of flour, and boxes of fruit and vegetables and reduced to meals by a staff of cooks, bakers, and utility messmen. Meals were served restaurant style. A room steward cleaned officers' quarters. The deck department consisted of as many as 18 members: a master, a chief mate, a second mate, three third mates, a boatswain, six able-bodied seamen (ABs), three ordinary seamen (OSs), two day men, and a carpenter. A mate, two ABs, and one OS stood each watch. The ABs and OSs also
INTRODUCTION TABLE 1-1 Crew Reductions, 1960s-1980s s Gelman "Ship U.S.-flag, of the Future" Japanese U.S.-flag Maintenance Early 1980s "Pioneer" Steamship, Department, Ship 1960s Late 1980s F.R.G.* U.S. Late 1980s Master 1 1 1 1 1 Chief Mate 1 1 1 1 2nd Mate 1 1 1 1 3rd Mates 3 1 1 Unlicensed deck personnel 13 3 6 Chief Engineer 1 1 1 1 1 1st Asst. Eng. 1 1 1 1 2nd Asst. Eng. 1 2 1 3rd Asst. Eng. 3 1 Electncian 1 1 Boatswain 1 1 Unlicensed eng. personnel 9 3 Maintenance personnel 5 Gen. purpose crew 4 4 Dual-licensed officer 4 Steward's/catenng personnel 8 4 2 3 1 Radio officer 1 1 1 1 TOTAL 45 21 14 21 1 1 *Gennan manning scale from Grove (1989), p. 4. did deck maintenance and anchored, moored, and unmoored the ship. A radio officer completed the crew. Progress Toward the Unattended Engine Room The initial postwar reductions in crew size were brought about by mak- ing vessel machinery self-regulating, centralizing controls, and automating certain functions. These developments culminated in the so-called "unat- tended engine room," which can be monitored from the bridge or other remote locations, and requires no watch-standing crew members in the engine room itself. Automated Boiler Controls The first engine department crew reduction in the postwar United States, in 1964, was enabled by installing automatic controls on propulsion
6 CREW SIZE AND MARTTIME SAFETY boilers. Boilers so equipped could be operated without constant human at- tendance, and thus allowed the requirement for three fireman/watertenders (one for each watch) to be removed from the vessel's Certificate of Inspec- tion (COI). A vessel with automated boiler controls still required constant attendance by an engineer and an oiler for each watch. In the early 1970s, the oilers were relieved of watch-standing by cen- tralization of machinery controls and installation of propulsion controls in the pilothouse. A single licensed engineer thus stood each watch alone. On oil tankers, the same technology huidic systems, electronic solid-state controls, and data logging devices was also used for cargo pump controls. The Unattended Engine Room Diesel propulsion came into common use in the late 1960s to early 1970s with utilization of slow-speed diesel plants. Greater economy than steam propulsion and better adaptability to full automation were the driv- ing forces for this trend. Slow-speed diesel propulsion entered U.S.-flag fleets in the 1970s. It let operators design machinery spaces for "period- ically unattended" operation, with computers to monitor and control vital systems. Periodically unattended machinery spaces could be unmanned for prolonged periods of time, and therefore did not require round-the-clock attendance by a licensed engineer. This innovation was accompanied by further crew reductions (for ex- ample, the elimination of one or more third assistant engineers). Its most important effect, however, was to free crew members from watch-standing, allowing them to do other jobs, such as maintenance; in this way it led eventually to the creation (in the United States) of the maintenance depart- ment, a more recent innovation discussed later in this chapter. In Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, and other countries, it opened the way for more sweeping change. Innovations in the Deck Department By a variety of labor-saving measures, vessel operators in the 1970s did away with the need for daymen, carpenters, and most ordinary seamen. Elimination of the Relief Person on Navigation Watches In the deck department, labor-saving devices and the increasing use of shore-based personnel for maintenance led to further crew reductions. For example, navigation watch-standing on the bridge traditionally required a licensed officer as well as a lookout and a helmsman (generally both ABs). A third unlicensed person (generally an OS) was used for relief helmsman and to serve as an additional lookout when needed. By the early 1970s,
INTRODUCTION 7 the relief person had been eliminated on many ships by placing sanitary facilities and drinking water on the same deck as the pilothouse, installing watch-call systems (which wake the members of the next scheduled watch), and other measures. Mechanization of the Deck Mooring, unmooring, and anchoring also became less labor intensive with the installation of constant-tension winches with strategically located controls, as well as lightweight synthetic mooring lines. New paints and coatings diminished the need for chipping and painting. Automated hatch covers also eliminated the need for much hand work. Containenzai'on of Cargo The containerization of cargo in the 196()s and 1970s further reduced crew tasks and eliminated most cargo handling by crew members. For exam- ple, containerization reduced the need for deck maintenance by eliminating most shipboard cargo-handling equipment. Technology in the Steward's Department The steward's department was also reduced by the application of technology. Microwave ovens and prepackaged meals eliminated most food preparation and service. Officers began to make their own beds and clean their own rooms. Microcomputers came into use for inventory control. Steward's departments aboard U.S.-flag vessels now are typically staffed by three or four persons, and often fewer. The Maintenance Department Aboard U.S.-Flag Vessels: Response to a Regulatory Impasse In many foreign countries, advancing technology and accompanying reductions in manning have prompted shipping companies, with the sup- port of safety regulators and unions, to break down some of the traditional departmental boundaries and eliminate the division of crews into watches. Many European and Asian ships, for example, have "general purpose" unlicensed crew members, who may work at either engine or deck respon- sibilities as needed. Some also use dual~ualified "watch officers," who have both engine and deck training (Grove, 1989~. In the United States, the flexibility necessary to make effective and safe use of personnel and new technology is not available under the manning statutes administered by the U.S. Coast Guard (46 U.S.C. § 8103-9308~. Those statutes, developed over many years on the basis of traditional
8 CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY practice, require the strict division of personnel aboard ship into deck and engine departments, even though it would be more efficient to assign them more flexibly (46 U.S.C. § 8104(e)~1~. In addition, they require division of those who serve in the deck and engine departments into three watches, although increasing numbers of shipboard workers do not stand watches (46 U.S.C. § 8104~. To provide some flexibility, the Coast Guard in the 1970s acquiesced to the establishment by the industry of the position of deck/engine mechanic. These day workers were assigned to the engine department but could be used both on deck and in machinery spaces. They usually had unlicensed engine training, as qualified members of the engine department (QMEDs). The Coast Guard in the late 1980s began to certificate some vessels with shipboard "maintenance departments." Maintenance departments are intended to provide the flexibility of assignments necessary to achieve manning levels of 20 or less, within the bounds of existing law. Maintenance personnel are permitted by the Coast Guard to perform both engine and deck jobs, as well as routine maintenance. They are not divided into watches. Maintenance departments generally have five members. Coast Guard policy requires generally that two members be QMEDs and the other three ABs. (Two of the AB positions may be filled by specially trained OSs.) Some vessels have been authorized to operate with three, rather than five, maintenance persons, dispensing with the two QMEDs. The department may be directed at different times by the master, the chief mate, and the chief engineer, but the master retains ultimate authority in allocating crew members' efforts. The result of the Coast Guard's authorization of maintenance depart- ments was to facilitate the distribution of labor more evenly between deck and engine personnel. Automation of engine rooms had done away with watch-standing in the engine department, thereby eliminating the need for some unlicensed engine department personnel. Meanwhile, complements of deck personnel, responsible for labor intensive but sporadic tasks such as mooring, remained relatively numerous. The establishment of mainte- nance departments permitted this unequal balance of labor to be corrected (personal communication, Sean Connaughton, February 6, 1990~. State of the Art and the Decade Ahead In the 1980s, again, operators overseas have led U.S.-flag fleets in manning-related innovations. This phase of innovation has emphasized the centralized control of all ship functions on the bridge, with more comprehensive automation of navigation, engine control, cargo operations, safety and emergency systems, and communications. These changes have
INTRODUCTION 9 been accompanied by reallocations of crew members' responsibilities and dramatic crew reductions and have been supported by careful analysis and experimentation (Grove, 1989; Yamanaka and Gaffney, 1988~. In state-of-the-art ships the bridge has become a "ship operation center," housing controls and monitors for all essential vessel functions. Many routine navigational tasks, such as chart updating, position plotting, and steering, have been automated: For example, aboard the German "Ship of the Future," eight of which were built by early 1989, the ship's position is determined automatically by a computer that integrates information from satellite navigation systems and other equipment. The position is displayed as a dot of light on an electronic chart. Ballast is adjusted from the bridge while the ship is underway. Logs, reports, certificates, documents, and letters are computerized, with electronic mail links via satellite to shore (Grove, 1989; Kristiansen et al., 1989~. The levels of automation in these ships, and other advanced vessels, not only reduce the need for the helmsman andin good visibility the lookout on the bridge, but also reduce the need for deck and engine personnel generally. The result is that some foreign vessels operate with very small crews. Some large Norwegian vessels sail with crews of 8 to 12 (Kristiansen et al., 1989~. The Japanese "Pioneer" vessels have 11-person crews (Grove, 1989; Yamanaka and Gaffney, 1988~. The German "Norasia" vessels carry 16 persons, but are designed to operate with 12 (Gaffney, 1989, p.8~. Japan, which has carried out the world's most ambitious reduced manning program, has mounted a research program to design a fully automated vessel, capable of operation from sea buoy to sea buoy by a single person or, ultimately, an advanced computer (Hamada, 1989~. These radical manning reductions have led some European and Asian shipping companies to eliminate or blur departmental distinctions with "general purpose" unlicensed ratings and dual-qualified officers (trained in both engine and deck skills). Further reductions may blur some distinctions between licensed and unlicensed personnel; in Japan, for example, some specially trained senior ratings already are permitted to serve in charge of bridge and engine watches (Yamanaka and Gaffney, 1988~. In the Netherlands, some ratings supervise anchor watches. West Germany General-purpose Ratings. Since 1987, the West German shipping in- dustry has provided only general-purpose training for its unlicensed per- sonnel, eliminating separate deck and engine specialties. These personnel are known as ship's mechanics and can advance to the position of ship's foreman. In preparation for this change, Hapag-Lloyd AG, a German shipping
10 CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY company, experimented over 18 months with 4 ships manned by 18 crew members, of whom 7 were general-purpose ratings. The success of this experiment led the German government in 1984 to change its manning regulations, allowing the crew of even the largest ship to be reduced to 19 persons, provided that manning was based on the general-purpose concept. Dual~ualifi~d Officers. To meet the operating requirements of state- of-the-art ships with controls and monitors centralized on the bridge, the German shipping industry has recently developed the concept of the "ship management officer." This officer would be responsible for the entire shipcargo, navigation, and maintenance and would need both technical knowledge and expertise in seamanship. A ship manned by such officers would have a master and four ship management officers; at present, German ships carry three deck and two engineer officers, in addition to the master (Froese, 1989~. In 1986 as a first step in that direction, the industrywith government support began offering officers with existing top-level deck or engine licenses the opportunity to earn medium-level credentials in the opposite specialties. Japan Japanese shipping companies, perhaps, have gone further toward de- partmental integration than those of any other flag. The initial experiments, in 1979, were succeeded by a carefully planned sequence of steps toward a new "Hypothetical Image of Seafarers." The goal was the complete elim- ination of departmental distinctions, and the substitution of a shipboard management team. In 1981, the first phase of these experiments began aboard several new vessels whose bridges were fitted with monitoring and control systems for propulsion machinery and safety systems; remote controls for mooring winches, cargo-handling equipment, and ballast; and satellite position loca- tion and communication systems. The distinction between deck and engine departments was removed for unlicensed personnel, and junior officers' po- sitions (third officer and third engineer) were filled by dual-qualified watch officers. This pattern of organization, with an 18-person standard crew, was incorporated in the manning laws in 1983, and its application was widened to more diverse types of ships. By April 1985, 145 ships were operating with 18-person crews (Anonymous, 1989~. Meanwhile, an experiment with 16-person crews had begun in 1982 aboard vessels with additional automated cargo-handling and navigation equipment. Watch officers replaced engine and deck officers up to the level of second officer and second engineer. In addition, specially trained ratings were used as watch-keepers on the bridge. The success of this experiment
INTRODUCTION 11 resulted in this manning pattern being put into law in 1986 and applied to 98 ships (Anonymous, 1989~. Also in 1986, experiments with 14-person crews were begun. The ves- sels' bridges were further automated, with all functions of the deck, engine, and radio watches centralized in a ship operation center configuration, and with additional labor-saving devices for mooring and unmooring. The 11-person Pioneer Ship experiments began in April 1987 aboard 7 new vessels. The main technical innovations were the placement of auxiliary engine and navigation controls on the wing of the bridge, a labor-saving galley, and "labor-saving oil processing devices with sufficient disposal facility" (Anonymous, 1989~. The Netherlands Dutch shipping companies pioneered the use of general-purpose rat- ings and dual-qualified officers, beginning as much as 20 years ago. Dutch officers are trained and licensed with major and minor specialties (naviga- tion and technical) and are expected soon to be completely integrated as "maritime officers" or "ship managers" (Cross, 1988~. Highly trained ship mechanics with general-purpose qualifications have been employed aboard Dutch ships since the late 1970s. However, they reportedly are generally used in traditional engine and deck specialties, since there has been too little highly skilled work available on today's modern automated ships. Vessels may carry one or two ship mechanics to maintain mechanical systems. More recently, they have been assigned as core crew aboard vessels manned largely with unskilled Third World crew members. In the guise of ship technicians, they may assume supervisory responsibilities in such cases. Two Models for Manning Innovation In developing new concepts of vessel manning, operators have generally adopted one of two general approaches to the allocation of management re- sponsibilities between ship and shore. The first might be called the "airline model," which involves shifting management and maintenance responsibil- ities from ship to shore, with the crew responsible mainly for operating the vessel from port to port. The other approach is to transfer management responsibilities from shore to ship to raise efficiency and improve the qual- ity of officers' jobs. A management team typically is formed consisting of the master and department heads and sometimes junior officers and senior ratings. The team may be responsible for operating expenses and bud- get, personnel, and maintenance, within overall guidelines set by company headquarters. The data and voice capabilities of modern communications systems permit adequate exchange of information between ship and shore.
12 CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY In this scheme, the chief engineer becomes a particularly important part of the team, responsible for planning and scheduling maintenance of all mechanical systems. MAKING THE BEST USE OF TECHNOLOGY Vessels now entering some U.S.-flag fleets embody the highest tech- nology available worldwide. For example, the European-built C-10 con- tainer ships recently put into service by American President Lines- comprehensively automated ships of the future with all control systems centralized on the bridgeare designed to operate with 11-member crews. Under current laws, regulatory policies, and labor-management contracts, however, they sail with crews of 21. The challenge to operators and regula- tors is to use available technology effectively, without compromising safety. At present there are three major obstacles to this goal. 1. The legal basis of manning decisions is antiquated and needs to be reexamined; its rigidity in the face of technological change (notably the division of crew into three watches and the prohibition of crossing departmental lines) has become glaringly obvious. 2. The Coast Guard has no human factors models to guide its manning judgments in vessel certification or accident investigation. With further crew reductions, the agency will need far better information and analytical tools to make manning decisions. In general, systems engineering and human factors methods are used little in the shipping industry. Research in all these areas is needed, with special attention to the unique features of work aboard ships, such as stress and fatigue. 3. The available data on vessel safety as a function of manning are inadequate to judge the safety of current crew levels, let alone those envisioned for the future. Further data and statistical studies will be required to confirm or eliminate those concerns. The Need for a Systems Approach to Manning Assessments In the United States, thus far, crew reductions have been accomplished by straightforward substitutions of technology for human beings, with little change in traditional work functions or overall work organization beyond the consolidation of responsibilities described above. However, the pace of change is continuing. Shipping companies have moved aggressively toward greater efficiency by automating and mechanizing their vessels. Resulting crew levels are approaching the minimum levels within the current U.S. manning statutes. Further crew reductions will depend on more radical changes in crew organization, such as general-purpose unlicensed personnel
INTRODUCTION 13 permitted to work in both engine and deck departments and dual-qualified officers who combine engine and deck training. In the interest of efficiency and safety, therefore, it would be useful to make a fresh and more comprehensive analysis of ship operations. With careful attention to workers' functions and the fundamental ship design, vessels could be developed to run safely with much smaller crews. Such studies have been carried out in countries around the world and the results are already seeing service (Grove, 1989; Yamanaka and Gaffney, 1988~. Chapter 4 outlines a technique for making a thorough functional analysis of the tasks that need to be done aboard ship and the potential for automation. SUMMARY The rapid pace of innovation in the shipping industry is continuing worldwide. New technology has permitted many U.S.-flag ship operators to reduce crews by nearly half since the l950s. In the future, however, inno- vation will be hampered by an antiquated statutory framework governing . . . manning decisions. The safety effects of U.S. crew reductions are imperfectly understood. Although it is clear that casualty and personnel accident rates have declined during the same period that crews have been reduced, no definitive study of the effects of these smaller crews has been made. The information on which to base such a study is not readily available. The history of manning innovation in Western Europe and Asia offers grounds for confidence. Each phase of the crew reductions in Japan, West Germany, the Netherlands, and elsewhere has been preceded by study and experimentation to ensure that safety has not been degraded. Crew reductions in the United States should build on this experience, with appropriate attention to the unique features of the U.S.-flag fleet. Although the most fundamental question continues to be whether the move toward smaller crews in U.S.-flag fleets has tended to degrade safety, an important directly related issue is whether the current statutory framework adequately protects workers, vessels, and the environment, and whether it unduly restricts the adoption of new technology. Also at issue is the Coast Guard's role in ensuring that foreign-flag vessels, with smaller crews than those permitted by U.S. regulations, do not compromise safety in U.S. waters. The Coast Guard's dilemma is that in the absence of clear violations of manning levels as dictated by flag states, the Coast Guard must accept the decisions of foreign flag states concerning manning of their vessels.
14 CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY REFERENCES American President Lines. 1989. Labor contract. Report to the National Research Council Committee on the Effect of Smaller Crews on Maritime Safety. Marine Board, National Research Council, Washington, D.C. December 21. Anonymous. 1989. The modernization of the seafarer's system in Japan. Paper presented at Maritime Training Forum Europe '89, Amsterdam, June 20. Connaughton, S. 1987. Coast Guard merchant vessel manning. Paper presented at 1987 Ship Operations, Management and Economics International Symposium, U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, September 17-18. Cross, S. J. 1988. Nautical training in the Netherlands: Present and future. Seaways Froese, Jens. 1989. Training for advanced ships. Paper presented at Maritime Training Forum Europe '89, Amsterdam, June 20. Meeting sponsored by Nautical Institute and Marine Research Institute Netherlands. Gafiney, Michael E. 1989. Effective manning at American President Lines. Report from American President Lines to U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, Once of Technology Assessment. Cooperative Agreement No. MA- 11727, Report No. MA-RD-840-89008. June 6. Grove, T. W. 1989. U.S.-flag ship of the future: Concepts, features and issues. Paper presented at 1989 Spring Meeting and STAR Symposium, Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, New Orleans, April. Hamada, Nobody. 1989. A few proposals on the ship technology for the 21st century. Conference record, 15th Meeting of the U.S.-Japan Marine Facilities Panel. U.S./Japan Cooperative Program in Natural Resources. May. Kristiansen, Svein, Egil Rensvik, and Lars Mathisen. 1989. Integrated total control of the bridge. Proceedings of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers Annual Meeting, New York, November 15-18. National Research Council. 1984. Effective manning of the U.S. merchant fleet. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. Schuffel, H., J. P. A. Boer, and L. van Breda. 1989. The ship's wheelhouse of the nineties: The navigation performance and mental workload of the officer of the watch. Journal of the Institute of Navigation 42:1~60-72~. Jan. Yamanaka, Keiko, and Michael Gaffney. 1988. Effective manning in the Orient. Report from American President Lines to U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, Office of Technology Assessment. Cooperative Agreement No. MA- 11727, Report No. MA-RD-770~7052. March 15.